

Renamo dissident leader says attacks continue unless campaign stops

The two attacks on the road in Manica yesterday were by the self-proclaimed Renamo Military Junta (JMR), its leader Mariano Nhongo told a press conference today. And he said the attacks will not stop until the election campaign is suspended.

"If the election campaign continues, shooting will not stop," Nhongo told reporters in Beira by telephone. "If the government suspends the election campaign and postpones the elections, there will not be one more shot," he added. Other demands include integrating Renamo fighters in the army, police, and secret service SISE.

"JMR is not the same the late Renamo president [Afonso Dhlakama], who was patient. Those who do not hear us will get shot, which can hit anyone, journalist, administrator, governor and others," warned Nhongo.

The JRM leader said he had been contacted by an ambassador in Maputo during the peace negotiations. "We had warned this ambassador not to endorse the signing of agreement between [new Renamo leader] Ossufo Momade and the Government, notably those parts governing the disarmament and reintegration of Renamo residual forces."

Explosion at mine kills six in Cuamba

An explosion at an artisanal mine in the Joao neighbourhood of Cuamba killed six people at the same time as Frelimo presidential candidate Filipe Nyusi was holding a rally in the same city. The miners are digging for gamets, the deep red gemstones with a crystalline structure, and other similar crystal gemstones. The six people killed are believed to be garnet dealers. Cuamba is not far from Malema district where there was an armed attack on a bus last week, which some have attributed to a fight between gemstone dealers.

Insurgents block campaign in Cabo Delgado

Campaigning is low key and restricted to district towns in those Cabo Delgado districts subject to dissident attacks: Quissanga, Macomia, Meluco, Nangade, Mocimboa da Praia, and Palma.

Since the campaign began 19 days ago, at least five attacks have been confirmed, which is demoralising people. The first on 31 August was at the launch of the campaign in Quiterajo, Macomia. Other attacks were reported on 2, 3, 10, and 14 September in other districts. In all, 11 people died and hundreds of houses were burned down.

Apart from Macomia, other attacks occurred in the village of Chitunda, Muidumbe district and the administrative post of Mbau, and in the village of Marare, both in Mocimboa da praia.

The most recent was on Monday, September 16, in the village Marere, Mocimboa da Praia. Three insurgents, one armed with an AKM and the other two armed with machetes, were seen circulating and people told the military. Soldiers went to the village and fired mortars and bazookas in the direction of the departing guerrillas. This caused fear and the population fled the village.

Assaults, bullies and burned houses in the centre of the country

Violence, intimidation and physical aggression among supporters of the three main parties, Frelimo, Renamo and MDM, including houses burned down by political rivals, has been reported in the centre of the country.

In Zambezia, Gurue Mayor Jose Aniceto accused the opposition of setting fire to 7 houses in Production Unit No. 6 neighbourhood on Saturday night September 14.

In N'tayansupa, Maravia district, Tete, the house of a 30-year-old teacher was burned Sunday night (September 15). Frelimo accuses Renamo of being behind the arson.

In Changara district, Tete, the home of MDM delegate Anselmo Labsone was torched in the first week of the election campaign. This came after the delegate had received threats from neighbourhood secretary, Roberto Mugabe.

In Manica town MDM and Frelimo supporters engaged in a brawl Monday when an MDM caravan passed in front of Frelimo headquarters, and was attacked by supporters. Police intervention prevented further damage.

And in Mavonde, Manica district, a Renamo parade was ambushed by Frelimo supporters and one Renamo supporter was beaten.

Ossufo Momade in Zambezia hits out at Frelimo for violence and intimidation

Ossufo Momade has been in Zambezia since Thursday September 12, drawing large crowds to his rallies in the province where Renamo won the previous election. Renamo's presidential candidate criticized Frelimo's electoral violence, recalling that "they did this to President Dhlakama," in reference to the various attacks on Renamo's late president.

"We know the behaviour of our evil red brothers, they were the ones who beat that teacher who is hospitalized in Quelimane," Momade told the people of Pebane.

In Quelimane, Momade visited Professor Aristides da Conceicao who was brutally assaulted in the town of Guerrica, Derre district.

In Nicoadala Momade arrived at 14.00 on Sunday 15 September where the rally was scheduled to be held at the CFM sports field. But hours earlier it was occupied by Frelimo members and supporters, forcing Momade to hold a rally at party headquarters.

Elsewhere on the campaign trail

Thrown out of town for talking to Renamo

Anyone who goes close to a Renamo parade will be expelled from the community, local leaders in Honde village, Barue, Manica, have told their people. Because of this, most people are afraid to talk to Renamo members doing door-to-door campaigning.

No Gaza credentials for ND

Gaza's district election commissions (CDEs) are refusing to receive the application documents for ND party polling station delegates. says Felix da Silva, parliamentary candidate for New Democracy (ND). Every party is allowed to nominate one delegate, or poll watcher, in each polling station, plus an alternate, and the names supplied by the parties must be accepted. But ND says Gaza is refusing.

South left for last

The electoral campaign has started slowly in the four provinces of the south of the country, with major political parties and their presidential candidates prioritizing the central and northern regions. Ossufo Momade began his vote hunting in the capital and visited the districts of Marracuene, Boane and Matola, and only then moved north to Zambezia, while the other three candidates concentrated their campaign in the centre and north. Nampula and Zambezia, the two largest constituencies, accounting for more than 1/3 of parliamentary seats.

Filipe Nyusi launched the campaign in Beira and then went to Zambezia, Nampula, Cabo Delgado and Niassa. Daviz Simango launched his campaign in Gurue, Zambezia, before heading to Cabo Delgado and Niassa. Mario Albino from AMUSI has not left Nampula yet.

=====□

ELECTION OVERLOAD? - You are subscribed to two newsletters, the *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin election newsletters* (published by CIP), and *Mozambique News Reports and Clippings* (published by Joseph Hanlon and not linked to CIP). If you want to receive *Mozambique News Reports and Clippings* but not the election newsletters, just reply to this e-mail with "no election" in the subject line.

To **unsubscribe** from both: tinyurl.com/unsunsub-moz

1203168

00049

We hold only your e-mail address and no other information about you, and we never share our subscription list with anyone.

=====

Editor: Joseph Hanlon | Publisher: Edson Cortez | News Editor: Borges Nhamire

Reporters: Aldemiro Bande, Magda Mendonça, Sheila Nhancale, Graciano Claudio, João Machassel
Published by CIP, Centro de Integridade Pública (Public Integrity Centre),
Rua Fernão Melo e Castro, no 124, Maputo. 5.1.2.e@cipmoz.org bit.ly/GenEl2019

=====

ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED but please cite the source: "2019 General Elections - Mozambique Political Process Bulletin".
Previous newsletters are posted on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

=====

There are two archives of historic elections data, at IESE on <http://www.iese.ac.mz/eleicoes-resultados/> and at London School of Economics on <http://bit.ly/MozElData> The LSE archive now has detailed 2013 and 2014 results, by polling station.

=====

This mailing is the personal responsibility of Joseph Hanlon, and does not necessarily represent the views of the Open University.

-- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority in relation to its secondary activity of credit broking.

To: 5.1.2.e @open.ac.uk]
From: 5.1.2e
Sent: Tue 10/2/2019 12:09:24 AM
Importance: Normal
Subject: Mozambique Elections 63 - Daviz blocked in Gaza; MDM violence in Gaza: Facebook - 1 Oct 19
MAIL_RECEIVED: Tue 10/2/2019 12:09:44 AM
[General Elections 62-63 1Oct19 Simango-in-south Facebook Dondo.pdf](#)

2019 General Elections - 62-63

Mozambique Political Process Bulletin

1 October 2019

=====

5.1.2.e @open.ac.uk)

To subscribe: tinyurl.com/sub-moz

To unsubscribe: tinyurl.com/unsab-moz

ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED but please cite the source: "2019 General Elections - Mozambique Political Process Bulletin".

Previous newsletters and other Mozambique material are posted on <http://bit.ly/mozamb>

=====

Attached: this newsletter in pdf

=====

Frelimo blocks Daviz Simango in south

MDM presidential candidate Daviz Simango's campaign has been blocked by Frelimo supporters in at least 7 districts since he moved south across the Save River on 27 September into the four provinces of the south.

In Gaza in **Mandlakazi**, Daviz Simango's caravan was prevented from moving to the village of Mbocodane, where he planned a rally on 29 September. Frelimo supporters blocked the road that gives access to the village by placing a vehicle as a barrier and refusing to withdraw it. The car parked on the road prevented the circulation of other vehicles.

The police accompanying Daviz Simango's caravan did nothing to get the Frelimo car removed and allow MDM members to pass. MDM was forced to intervene and began to remove the car, our correspondents report. Then the police responded to Daviz Simango's appeal and forced Frelimo members to withdraw the car. "The police must play their part. I don't want to resort to violence to solve the problems here in Gaza," Simango told reporters there. He then moved on to Mbocodane and the campaign continued normally.

The next stop was Eduardo Mondlane Municipal Market in **Mandlakazi** Village, where Frelimo occupied the market before the MDM president arrived and Daviz could not campaign.

Similar problems had occurred in Inhambane. In Massinga, Inhambane, MDM received authorization from the City Council to have a rally on 27 September in front of the World Supermarket. But when Simango arrived, Frelimo members were occupying the space. Our correspondents report that Frelimo members only arrived shortly before Simango's scheduled 2 pm arrival. Daviz and MDM members had to campaign elsewhere in the district.

In Homoine, Inhambane, Frelimo blocked the two roads leading to the village of Meho where Daviz Simango and MDM supporters planned to campaign on 28 September.

We reported yesterday that Daviz Simango was prevented from campaigning on 27 September in Vila Franca da Save, Inhambane.

MDM says that the police are giving information about the MDM agenda to Frelimo. "In Inharrime and Zavala where MDM did not inform the police about the campaign agenda, Daviz Simango's campaign was never impeded," said Jacob Chiquice, MDM spokesman in Zavala district.

Daviz yesterday (30 September) went to Chokwe, Gaza and our correspondents report Frelimo members prevented the MDM president from campaigning in the municipal market around 3 pm. According to MDM, police fired 17 shots to disperse members of the two political formations.

Attack in Mocimboa da Praia & Muidumbe

Insurgents attacked the village of Antadora, Mocimboa da Praia district, this afternoon (1 October). Between 3 and 5 pm the guerrillas burned houses and kidnapped some people. There were no deaths, our correspondents report. The village of Antadora is located on the main road giving access to the districts of Mueda, Mocimboa da Praia and Palma.

This is the tenth attack in Cabo Delgado province and the fourth in Mocimboa da Praia since the start of the election campaign.

Due to the frequent attacks, a considerable number of voters will not be able to vote on 15 October. Antadora has a polling station with 270 registered voters.

Yesterday, insurgents attacked the villages of Namatil and Samala, Chitunda administrative post, Mingeleua, Muidumbe district, burning about a dozen homes and seizing rice sacks. "At this time the villages were abandoned. People took refuge in the locality of Mingeleua-headquarters," said our correspondents.

The attacked area is on the outskirts of the Nguri River and residents are exclusively dedicated to planting rice and maize.

Due to this attack, EPC students from Chitunda and other public and private institutions except health and defence did not work today.

Mingeleua has about 11,000 registered voters in 15 polling stations.

This was the third attack that occurred during the campaign in Muidumbe.

\$97 mn for elections from gas sale

The hole in the elections budget will be filled from capital gains tax from the sale of the gas project from Anadarko to Total. President Filipe Nyusi, on the campaign trail in Espungabera, Manica revealed previous secret details of capital gains taxes and how they are being used.

In a complex deal, the US company Anadarko which developed the part of the Cabo Delgado gas fields closest to the coast, was bought by the US company Occidental, which in turn only wanted the US part of Anadarko. So it sold the African gas and oil part of Anadarko to the French company Total. Vicki Hollob, chair of Occidental, told the press at a ceremony in Chimoio that it had been agreed that Occidental would pay \$880 mn in capital gains tax to Mozambique.

Nyusi then told the crowd in Espungabera how the money would be used: \$97 mn for elections costs, \$355 mn for losses to the cyclones and grants to rebuild, \$194 mn to pay off debts to suppliers to the government (caused when the government ran out of money when donors cut off aid after the \$2 bn secret debts were revealed) and \$234 mn into the state budget.

He went on to explain how the \$375 mn of capital gains tax from the sale of part of the further off-shore area by ENI to Exxon Mobil was used: \$205 mn to rehabilitate the main north-south road (EN1) in Inhambane and Sofala, \$70 mn to repay government debts, and \$100 mn for the state budget.



On the road to Zavala

Transported to Nyusi rally and abandoned

In Zavala, Inhambane, Frelimo supporters were mobilized by community leaders from their districts to attend the party president's rally on 30 September. More than a hundred supporters from Panda and Inharrime (both in Inhambane) and Mandlakazi (in Gaza) were transported in trucks to ensure that Filipe Nyusi's rally was full.

As soon as the rally ended, Frelimo supporters from Panda and Mandlakazi were taken home. But there was no transportation for Inharrime's supporters, and no information. The weather was cold and the supporters bedded down on local shop verandas in the hope of finding transport the next day. Finally at 21.00 a local Frelimo businessman provided a truck to take in the supporters home to Inharrime.

People continue to be transported from faraway places in unsafe conditions to fill Filipe Nyusi's rallies, despite Nyusi assuring his audience in Chimoio that this was not done. An overloaded lorry carrying people home from a Nyusi rally in Songo Tete overturned, killing 7 people on 22 September.

Parties campaign on Facebook

In addition to marches, parades, shows, and door-to-door canvassing, parties have invested time and resources in social networks in the hunt for the vote. Facebook is the favourite platform; only one party (Frelimo) is in Twitter with just 191 followers. Our survey showed that half of the contending election parties are permanently present on Facebook. Frelimo is the most accepted party on Facebook, with over 77,000 followers on its page. In the next position is Renamo with about 16,000 followers. Nova Democracia (ND) and MDM follow with more than 11,000 followers.

However, just having followers is not enough. Parties like PODEMOS have over 3,000 followers, but with a level of interaction among followers on their page that surpasses Renamo. See the table in the attached pdf.

The remaining 6 parties, mostly extra-parliamentary, have few followers and also low interaction, that is, rarely their contents get reactions from netizens.

Of the 13 parties campaigning on Facebook, only ND and PODEMOS have their manifestos published on their page. These

two parties are aimed at young people, and there is a lot of interaction on Facebook since young people are the main users of this social network.

Nyusi paralyzes classes in Gaza

Filipe Nyusi today reached Gaza province and at least 18 schools were closed and students and teachers were mobilized to watch Frelimo's presidential candidate.

In the city of Xai-xai, along with teachers and school directors, the Nyusi rally was attended by students below voting age and who did not know the purpose of the event in District 11, our correspondents report. "Our teachers made us come to the rally," said one 5th grader.

Closed schools included Xai-Xai Secondary School (ES), Inhamissa ES, Joaquim Chissano ES, May 25 EPC, Eduardo Mondlane EPC, Tavene primary school (EP), Amilcar Cabral EP and Unit 11 EP.

Nyusi's campaign in Xai-xai transported students and supporters from Chokwe, Macia, Limpopo and Chongoene (all districts of Gaza). All were carried unsafe conditions.

After Xai-xai, Filipe Nyusi went to Mandlakazi, where students, teachers and school board members attended the rally and at least two schools were closed.

"Our teachers told us to come to the rally. But we should only come who are over 18," said a pupil at Josina Machel ES. Mandkakazi ES was also closed.

Filipe Nyusi went to Chibuto after the rally in Mandlakazi. Communal Center EP2 (where the rally was held), Chibuto ES, Chimundo ES, Komochambane EP, Canhavano EP and Wahamuza EP were all closed for the rally, our correspondents report.

Renamo couple still missing in Manica

The Renamo supporting couple kidnapped in the early hours of 19 September in Tambara, Manica, have not been found. On the afternoon before their disappearance, Francisco Joaqueira, 45 and Marosa Joao, 40, refused to receive the district administrator when he was campaigning door-to-door for Frelimo. (See Bulletin 55).

MDM violence in Dondo - 20 injured

An MDM entourage on 10 motorcycles hit a crowd of Renamo supporters attending a rally yesterday morning (30 September), injuring 20 people, our correspondents report. The rally, led by Renamo's political delegate, was in the 1 de Maio neighbourhood of Mutua, Dondo, Sofala

Police escorting Renamo detained two MDM supporters involved while others fled. At the time of the incident, the MDM caravan had just left the 25 de Setembro neighbourhood for the 1 Maio neighbourhood

Also in Dondo, a group of MDM supporters went to Frelimo headquarters and threw stones at party supporters who were gathered there on Saturday morning (28 September). Police were called to restore order, our correspondents report. Two MDM supporters were arrested and released two hours later.

In Dondo, at least six cases of aggression have been reported since the campaign began, and of these, two resulted in the deaths of one Frelimo and one Renamo supporter. In addition, journalists are censored by both police and parties, in order to not report the violence.

Dondo Police Commander Assaulted by MDM Supporters

Dondo District Police Commander Joao Moiane was assaulted by young MDM supporters for allegedly campaigning for Frelimo. The attack took place at the Mafambisse Sugar Pavilion, in the 4th of October neighbourhood, on the morning of the 26 September at a rally by Florindo Nyusi, son of Frelimo presidential candidate Filipe Nyusi.

Our correspondents, who were present at the scene, report that a group of about two dozen young men dressed in MDM T-shirts arrived at the rally and approached the district police commander and began to argue, eventually assaulting and pushing him. The confusion temporarily paralyzed the rally, until the riot police (Rapid Intervention Unit, UIR), rescued the commander and took him away.

Our correspondents say that MDM had requested police protection for their campaign in Dondo but the District Police Command said no, because of insufficient staff. Hours later, MDM supporters learned that the district police commander was campaigning for Frelimo and they went to the pavilion where the rally was taking place, where they found the commander in civilian clothes and Frelimo cap. It was then the fight started and it only ended with the commander's removal from the scene.

Under Mozambican law, police officers are non-partisan and cannot campaign for any party. The commander confirmed that he had been at the rally run by Florindo Nyusi, but told the campaign briefing on Saturday (28 September) in Dondo "I was just there to ensure safety during the rally."

No power for Renamo

In Manica town, residents of the April 7 neighbourhood complain that they were not covered by the expansion of electricity, allegedly for supporting the opposition. The local council of Manica has provided funds for electrification, however the neighbourhood of Raca, where Renamo sympathizers reside, has not yet had access, Renamo's Manica Information Officer Bento Guirau said, following a meeting with residents of Raca yesterday (30 September).

Contacted by the Bulletin, EDM district delegate in Manica Pedro Bero, partially supported the Renamo claim. He blamed a lack of electrical equipment for the delay, but added that the adjoining neighbourhood had had special sponsorship by the Manica City Council.

Renamo Information Officer beaten by Frelimo supporters

Renamo's Chief Information Officer in Moatize, Tete, Inacio Razao, was beaten by two supporters of Frelimo, forcing him to remove his party's campaign shirt, yesterday (30 September) in Nkondezi, Zobue, Tete. "Don't you know we don't want Renamo here?" the Frelimo supporters said during the beating. Renamo reported the case to the Zobue police station and those involved were summoned to the police today.

Accusations

Parties make accusations which are often hard to verify.

Frelimo says Renamo killed two Frelimo. In Milange, Zambezia, two Frelimo supporters, Benjamin Nicupatimba and Rodrigues Chinambua, lost their lives on September 27 and 28, victims of assault by alleged Renamo members. The assault took place on 9 September and the victims were admitted to the local hospital. Although discharged later, they died on their injuries on 27 and 28 September, according to Frelimo district secretary Ismael Noronha on the programme "The Voice of the Citizen" broadcast on Milange community radio, Zambezia.

A Frelimo party headquarters burned down last night (September 30) in Lunga, Muaualo, Mussoril district, Nampula province. Mossuril's Frelimo chief, Evan Business, accuses Renamo supporters of setting fire to the building. "Yesterday they tried to burn a car of a Frelimo member in the Matibane area as they returned from the campaign," said Evan Business. Business also accused Renamo supporters of campaigning door-to-door in quiet of the night (which is not illegal).

Renamo objects to new groups of police officers to Morrumbala, Zambezia, which it considers its zone of influence, and where the party maintains a military base in the locality of Sabe. On 24 September, Protection Police officers were deployed to the district. "These police have been assigned to the district to facilitate fraud so that Frelimo can win the election," said Neves de Brito Dai, Renamo district attorney. "We had never seen a lot of police like that, and they have already started extorting residents," he said. Morrumbala is an opposition bastion and Frelimo has never won an elections there since 1994.

=====□

ELECTION OVERLOAD? - You are subscribed to two newsletters, the *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin election newsletters* (published by CIP), and *Mozambique News Reports and Clippings* (published by Joseph Hanlon and not linked to CIP). If you want to receive *Mozambique News Reports and Clippings* but not the election newsletters, just reply to this e-mail with "**no election**" in the subject line.

To **unsubscribe** from both: tinyurl.com/unsub-moz

We hold only your e-mail address and no other information about you, and we never share our subscription list with anyone.

=====

Editor: Joseph Hanlon | Publisher: Edson Cortez | News Editor: Borges Nhamire

Reporters: Aldemiro Bande, Magda Mendonça, Sheila Nhancale, Graciano Claudio, João Machassel

Published by CIP, Centro de Integridade Pública (Public Integrity Centre),

Rua Fernão Melo e Castro, no 124, Maputo. [5.1.2.e] @cipmoz.org bit.ly/GenEl2019

=====

ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED but please cite the source: "2019 General Elections - Mozambique Political Process Bulletin".

Previous newsletters are posted on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

=====

There are two archives of historic elections data, at IESE on <http://www.iese.ac.mz/eleicoes-resultados/> and at London School of Economics on

<http://bit.ly/MozElData> The LSE archive now has detailed 2013 and 2014 results, by polling station.

=====

This mailing is the personal responsibility of Joseph Hanlon, and does not necessarily represent the views of the Open University.

-- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority in relation to its secondary activity of credit broking.

To: [redacted] 5.1.2.e @open.ac.uk]
From: [redacted]
Sent: Thur 10/3/2019 11:23:14 PM
Importance: Normal
Subject: Mozambique elections 65 - Observation blocked as 6000 observers refused credentials
MAIL_RECEIVED: Thur 10/3/2019 11:23:33 PM
[General Elections 64-65 3Oct19 6000-refused-observer-credentials.pdf](#)

2019 General Elections - 64-65

Mozambique Political Process Bulletin

3 October 2019

Editor: Joseph Hanlon (j.hanlon@open.ac.uk)

To subscribe: tinyurl.com/sub-moz

To unsubscribe: tinyurl.com/unsab-moz

ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED but please cite the source: "2019 General Elections - Mozambique Political Process Bulletin".

Previous newsletters and other Mozambique material are posted on <http://bit.ly/mozamb>

Attached: this newsletter in pdf

Election observation blocked; 6000 observers refused credentials

Provincial Elections Commissions (CPEs) are refusing to approve more than 6000 civil society observers, with particular problems in Nampula and Zambezia. In the largest civil society observation in the history of Mozambican elections, the organised observer groups intend to have more than 11,000 observers in one-third of all polling stations. But it now appears this will be blocked by CPEs.

National and international observation groups also complain of obstruction of their observation. Both the refusals and obstruction are in violation of the electoral law.

Independent observers are key to preventing ballot box stuffing and other forms of fraud, and Nampula and Zambezia are both the largest provinces and the ones where Renamo hopes to win a majority and elect the governor. Zambezia, in particular, had serious fraud in last year's municipal election, so observation is seen as important. Observation will also be important in Gaza, where it is alleged that 300,000 ghost voters were registered.

The electoral law says that civil society organisation can observe and that credentials must be issued within five days of application. CIP, publishers of this bulletin, applied for credentials more than a month ago in Zambezia and Nampula, and they have not been issued. Other observer groups report similar problems.

There are two problems: political bias and lack of staff. Observer groups that tried to submit applications for additional observers yesterday in Zambezia found no one in the STAE office to receive the applications - or to process the thousands not yet issued. One observer coordinator noted that in the office in one province of the person dealing with credentials, there was a triage. Applications from Frelimo-linked organisations were put in one pile and processed quickly; those from independent organisations such as CIP were put in another pile and pushed to one side.

Observers are also having problems in the field. Credentials are really only needed on polling days and for the count, because they allow admission to polling stations and counting centres. The campaign, by definition, is public as parties try to gain support. But there are widespread reports of observers being singled out and told they cannot watch rallies or take pictures without credentials.

In several provinces the Provincial Elections Commission says that observer credentials issued by the National Elections

Commission for the entire country are not recognised within the province. In Gaza, both national and international observers with CNE badges were recently barred from observing because they did not have provincial credentials, which Gaza has stopped issuing.

The problem appears to be with provincial elections commissions (CPEs), which will not accept instructions from the National Elections Commission. In some provinces CPEs and technical secretariats are telling observer coordinators that all credentials have been issued, when 1000s have not been.

With only 11 days left before the election, it will require a major effort by the CNE and CPEs to issue more than 6000 credentials.

CNE head hits out at Frelimo violations

"Bad behaviour" by Frelimo was criticised in a statement today by the President of the National Elections Commission, Sheik Abdul Carimo. Without mentioning Frelimo by name, he cited "obstructions of party entourages in Xai-Xai, Manlakazi, Chokwe, Limpopo and Bilene in Gaza," which were cases of Frelimo blocking the entourage of Daviz Simango, MDM presidential candidate.

He also said, again without naming the ruling party, that the widespread attempts to collect voters cards and card numbers by Frelimo, especially at schools, is illegal and must stop. "We alert all voters that they should never give their voters card to any person or organisation; the document is personal and non-transferable." He added that people had no obligation to tell anyone else their voters number and that collecting numbers was also illegal.

The unusual, if camouflaged, criticism of Frelimo is partly a response to our reporting of the blocking of Daviz Simango's campaign in Gaza and Inhambane and the widespread collection of voters cards and numbers.

In contrast to Daviz, Ossufo had free passage in Inhambane and Gaza

Ossufo Momade began his campaign in the southern part of the country on 30 September and for three days worked unhindered in Inhambane and Gaza. After Frelimo supporters made the MDM Daviz Simango campaign unfeasible in both provinces, Ossufo went unchallenged from the Save River to Manjacaze.

Ossufo Momade started the campaign in the Massinga and Vilanculos districts, where his rallies drew large crowds. Renamo's best results in the municipal elections last year in Inhambane were in these two northern districts of the province. In Massinga, Renamo won 35% of the vote for the municipal assembly and in Vilanculo won 28%.

The next day, 1 October, Ossufo Momade headed for Morrumbene, Maxixe and Zavala districts, further south of the province, without obstruction.

Yesterday, 2 October, Momade moved to the Frelimo bastion of Gaza province, with rallies in Xai-Xai, Mandlakazi, and Chokwe. In all these places Momade mobilized a large following and there were no incidents, unlike David Simango last week.

In Mandlakazi, 300 Frelimo supporters left the party campaign to attend Ossufo Momade's rally in front of the Eduardo Mondlane municipal market in the 25 de Junho neighbourhood.

During his campaign, in every district, Ossufo Momade promises to create more jobs, better roads, education and wages.

There was only one incident, when a Renamo sympathizer assaulted a local City Council official named Admiro Munguambe for allegedly speaking injurious words against Renamo. The victim is a Frelimo supporter and sustained minor head injuries.

1 dead in 'Renamo Junta' attack

One person died and three were injured this morning (October 3) in an attack by gunmen in Gorongosa, Sofala on a Nagi bus travelling from Nampula to Maputo.. The attack took place on the main north-south N1 road near the Pungwe river bridge between Gorongosa and Nhamatanda. The victims were evacuated to Gorongosa Rural Hospital for medical treatment.

The guerrillas ambushed the bus next to a charcoal yard, our correspondents report.

Later, at a press conference in Beira, Sofala Police Spokesperson Daniel Macuacua said the attackers were four men armed with AKM-style assault rifles. Witnesses at the scene reported four dead but police confirmed only one.

This is the second attack in the Pungwe zone and the fourth in the central region since the start of the election campaign. All are blamed on the breakaway 'Renamo Junta'.

Using children to stop a rally

Frelimo handed out balls to many children and then spent the day organizing football matches on the playing field of Mateus Sansao Muthemba School in Tete on Saturday 26 September. The only problem was that Renamo presidential candidate Ossufo Momade had scheduled his rally for that afternoon on the school playing field. Not wanting to disrupt the playing children, he had to move the rally to Kwachena Kunharitanda market.

Frelimo had done the same thing in Doa, Tete on 11 September where children were organised to play soccer on a field where Renamo had scheduled a rally by its candidate for governor of the province.

Innocent fun, or using children to harass the opposition? All parties are using children, particularly in party parades, often in party t-shirts and hats and carrying party flags and posters. For MDM this included the 16 September parade at the 5th Congress market in Macia, Gaza, and in Funhalouro, Inhambane.

Children joined the Frelimo march on 22 September in Catandica, Barue, Manica; in Machaze on 28 September; and in Milange, Zambezia.

In Nampula, dozens of children stood on the street with Renamo flags and posters in Nacala-a-Velha district on 16 September and in Moma on 6 September.

The Network of Communicators and Friends of the Child (RECAC) said in a press release that images of children parading with political party symbols jeopardize the safety and well-being of child: "RECAC calls on all political parties, guardians and society at large to be vigilant against child participation in electoral campaigns."

Mossurize Murder not political, say police

Police in Manica confirmed today (3 October) the murder of Frelimo's circle secretary in Paunde, Mossurize, Manica, but say there are no political motivations behind the murder, our correspondents report. "The crime occurred at a time of election campaign and coincidentally with an active member of a political party, but this is not a determining factor in claiming that it was politically motivated," Police Chief Public Relations in Manica, Mario Arnassa, told reporters. He said three individuals went to the house, shot and killed the man, seized his motorbike, and fled.

Frelimo's Manica representative Abel Albuquerque confirmed there was no evidence to say the murder was politically motivated.

=====□

ELECTION OVERLOAD? - You are subscribed to two newsletters, the *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin election newsletters* (published by CIP), and *Mozambique News Reports and Clippings* (published by Joseph Hanlon and not linked to CIP). If you want to receive *Mozambique News Reports and Clippings* but not the election newsletters, just reply to this e-mail with "**no election**" in the subject line.

To **unsubscribe** from both: tinyurl.com/unsub-moz

We hold only your e-mail address and no other information about you, and we never share our subscription list with anyone.

=====

Editor: Joseph Hanlon | Publisher: Edson Cortez | News Editor: Borges Nhamire

Reporters: Aldemiro Bande, Magda Mendonça, Sheila Nhancale, Graciano Claudio, João Machassel
Published by CIP, Centro de Integridade Pública (Public Integrity Centre),
Rua Fernão Melo e Castro, no 124, Maputo. eleicoes@cipmoz.org bit.ly/GenEl2019

=====

ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED but please cite the source: "2019 General Elections - Mozambique Political Process Bulletin".
Previous newsletters are posted on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

=====

There are two archives of historic elections data, at IESE on <http://www.iese.ac.mz/eleicoes-resultados/> and at London School of Economics on <http://bit.ly/MozElData> The LSE archive now has detailed 2013 and 2014 results, by polling station.

=====

This mailing is the personal responsibility of Joseph Hanlon, and does not necessarily represent the views of the Open University.

-- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority in relation to its secondary activity of credit broking.

To: [5.1.2.e]@open.ac.uk]
From: [5.1.2.e]
Sent: Wed 10/16/2019 12:21:34 PM
Importance: Normal
Subject: Mozambique election 78 - Polling stations burned, violence, fraud - 16Oct19 - 12.00
MAIL_RECEIVED: Wed 10/16/2019 12:21:53 PM

2019 General Elections - 78

Mozambique Political Process Bulletin ☐

16 October 2019 - 12.00

===== ☐

Editor: Joseph Hanlon ([5.1.2.e]@open.ac.uk) ☐

To subscribe: tinyurl.com/sub-moz ☐

To unsubscribe: tinyurl.com/unsab-moz

ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED but please cite the source: "2019 General Elections - Mozambique Political Process Bulletin".

Previous newsletters and other Mozambique material are posted on <http://bit.ly/mozamb>

=====

Polling stations burned in Niassa

Six polling stations with 4605 registered voters were set ablaze by Renamo supporters who were furious over alleged fraud. The classrooms at Milagre Mabote primary school, Maniamba, Lago district, Niassa, where the 6 polling stations operated were made of traditional materials. As the photo shows, the classrooms and all voting materials, including ballot papers, were reduced to ashes.

After voting ended but before the count, the opposition surrounded EPC Milagre Mabote, and police fired into the air to disperse the crowd. With those shots, Renamo supporters threw many stones at police officers and burned all the ballot boxes. Polling station staff, journalists and even the police took refuge in the woods. A police car rescued the polling station staff, reported our correspondent at dawn today.



Death in Nampula; shootings & tear gas in Zambezia, Sofala & Nampula

The election night was marked by violence in the centre and north of the country. There was **one death last night**. A person was killed, shot and beaten by the police, and four people were shot in the lower limbs as police tried to disperse the crowd at Sao Vicente de Paulo Secondary School, Nacala-Porto, Nampula, at about 20h00.

In the city of Quelimane (Zambezia), **police fired shots in the air** to expel voters awaiting results at the Sangariveira EPC. Voters remained at the scene, set up barricades and burned tires to counter the police.

Also in Quelimane, at Marracua EPC, long queues meant voting only ended at 11 pm. After the count, polling station staff (MMVs) **did not post the results** fearing the fury of voters waiting on the scene, and the ballot boxes were taken by a STAE car. So far, no results have been released; 4800 voters are registered at this school.

Polling station staff **refused to post the results** at EPC Samora Machel, Mafambisse, Dondo, Sofala. The Renamo party delegate (party poll watcher) demanded that they be posted, but the polling station head said even though the law required that the results be posted, he could only do so with instructions from the director of STAE. Police fired shots to disperse the growing crowd.

In many places the results sheets are not being posted outside polling stations as required by law. This makes it much harder to conduct the parallel count and for observers to record the count. There are also widespread reports of misconduct and errors in the count, including not sealing bags of ballot papers.

It appears the **Gaza ghosts are not voting**. In Gaza many editais are not posted, but where they are, they show polling stations with 800 registered but only the staff and observers have voted.

Ossufo Momade votes invalidated in Zambezia

A close examination of invalid (nulo) votes at table 042787 - 03 at EPC Eduardo Mondlane, Inhassunge, Zambezia shows they were in favour of Ossufo Momade but were intentionally invalidated. As the photo shows, the ballot has an X for Momade but an extra fingerprint has been added for the Amuse candidate. This was a common fraud by polling station staff in past elections, and the law requires that all ink be taken out of the polling station before the count to prevent this. But our correspondent reports that the polling station head (presidente) had ink in his pocket and added to fingerprint to Momade ballot during the count.



=====□
ELECTION OVERLOAD? - You are subscribed to two newsletters, the *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin election newsletters* (published by CIP), and *Mozambique News Reports and Clippings* (published by Joseph Hanlon and not linked to CIP). If you want to receive *Mozambique News Reports and Clippings* but not the election newsletters, just reply to this e-mail with "**no election**" in the subject line.

To **unsubscribe** from both: tinyurl.com/unsub-moz
 We hold only your e-mail address and no other information about you, and we never share our subscription list with anyone.

=====

Editor: Joseph Hanlon | Publisher: Edson Cortez | News Editor: Borges Nhamire

Reporters: Aldemiro Bande, Magda Mendonça, Sheila Nhancale, Graciano Claudio, João Machassel
 Published by CIP, Centro de Integridade Pública (Public Integrity Centre),
 Rua Fernão Melo e Castro, no 124, Maputo. 5.1.2.e @cipmoz.org bit.ly/GenEl2019

Previous newsletters are posted on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

=====

There are two archives of historic elections data, at IESE on <http://www.iese.ac.mz/eleicoes-resultados/> and at London School of Economics on <http://bit.ly/MozElData> The LSE archive now has detailed 2013 and 2014 results, by polling station.

=====

This mailing is the personal responsibility of Joseph Hanlon, and does not necessarily represent the views of the Open University.

-- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority in relation to its secondary activity of credit broking.

To: [redacted]@open.ac.uk]
From: 5.1.2e
Sent: Wed 10/16/2019 6:43:57 PM
Importance: Normal
Subject: Mozambique Elections 79 - Frelimo on course for tainted victory - 16Oct19-18h00
MAIL_RECEIVED: Wed 10/16/2019 6:44:09 PM

2019 General Elections - 79

Mozambique Political Process Bulletin

16 October 2019 - 18.00

Editor: Joseph Hanlon (j.hanlon@open.ac.uk)

To subscribe: tinyurl.com/sub-moz

To unsubscribe: tinyurl.com/unsab-moz

ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED but please cite the source: "2019 General Elections - Mozambique Political Process Bulletin".

Previous newsletters and other Mozambique material are posted on <http://bit.ly/mozamb>

Frelimo on course for tainted victory

Frelimo and its presidential candidate Filipe Nyusi appear to be on course for victory. Severe restrictions on observation and the failure to post polling station results in places where the opposition is expected to win make it impossible to forecast percentages. But partial and initial reports give Frelimo a large margin. In three key provinces for the opposition - Nampula, Tete and Zambezia - available results are not sufficient to predict. In Sofala, it appears that MDM and Renamo will split the opposition vote and give victory to Frelimo. In the remaining seven provinces the Frelimo victory seems highly likely.

A few polling stations were still counting votes late this afternoon. District elections commissions are still receiving materials from polling stations and most have not started counting. The district results must be announced by Friday.

Initial reports suggest a turnout of about 50%.

Significant ballot box stuffing

Initial reports show a significant number of polling stations where 100% voted and they voted overwhelmingly for Frelimo presidential candidate Filipe Nyusi. As well as the 100%, there is a similar large group where 90% to 100% voted, again overwhelmingly for Nyusi. This must be ballot box stuffing.

As in the past, this has occurred mainly in Gaza, but there is also significant ballot box stuffing in Cabo Delgado, Nampula and Tete. One school in Maputo city also reported 100% turnout.

And in Gaza the ghosts are taking sides. In polling station 092012-02, all 800 registered voters cast their ballots, of whom 799 voted for Nyusi, 1 for Momade and no ballots were blank or spoiled. In another polling station, no ghosts voted and only 17 staff and observers. And in some polling stations, only 200 of 800 registered people voted, which is highly unusual for Gaza. It does appear that the publicity did frighten many of ghosts into not voting. There were 300,000 more voters registered in Gaza than the census said there were voting age adults, and these "ghosts" seem in many cases to have had their own polling stations or a large part of a polling station. Some were able to vote, but many did not.

Polling station head invalidated ballots

In Chinde district, Zambezia, the president of polling station 1 at EPC Filipe Samuel Magaia was arrested after being surprised invalidating Renamo votes by adding a fingerprint to make it look like people had voted for two candidates. Angelo Moniz had shaved his hair and used the die to invalidate Renamo's votes, but was caught by Renamo delegates (poll watchers). Moniz was 1203071 00056

detained by police but released hours later.

On average, invalid votes are about 3% of the total, but initial results show there are polling stations with 10% up to 32% invalid votes, which are probably ballot papers for the opposition which have been intentionally spoiled. This has occurred in many provinces, particularly Niassa, Nampula and Zambezia.

Frelimo "observers" vote several times

Zambezia STAE was unable to accredit more than 1000 independent observers, but many credentials were issued for a Frelimo "observer" group, the National Youth Council (Conselho Nacional da Juventude, CNJ). But our correspondents reports that CNJ abused observer's special voting rights In Zambezia to vote several times at different polling stations. Cases have been reported in Mopeia and Inhassunge districts.

In Mopeia, close to 300 CNJ observers were transported to the polling centres in groups by Frelimo's first secretary, including in a vehicle with AEG 125 MP number plate. The "observers" voted in primary schools 8 March, 16 June and Sede, our correspondents report. "Observers walked in groups of 10 to 20 at each polling centre and went to each table to vote," our correspondent said this morning.

In the Inhassunge district of Zambezia, observers from the CNJ and local churches accredited by the District Election Commission (CDE) used the special vote right to vote for Frelimo several times, the Renamo delegate told our correspondents. Among the observers was a police officer and former police spokesman in Zambezia, Jacinto Felix.

The "observers" voted at three polling stations (042787-06B, 042787-04, 042787-05) at Eduardo Mondlane School in Inhassunge with the permission of the polling station staff and were transported in a Frelimo vehicle with registration AGA-493-MC to Mussama locality about 10 km from Inhassunge to vote again.

Ballots burned in Sofala

A polling station, including ballot boxes, was apparently set on fire last night in Ilha da Inharingue, Machanga, Sofala, STAE Provincial Director Jorge Donquene told reporters today in Beira. But the event remains confused. A police statement issued today in Maputo said that "around 300 Renamo members and supporters vandalized the school and tried unsuccessfully, thanks to the police's prompt intervention, to seize 9 ballot boxes." The statement added that five houses of traditional construction were burned, and precarious construction nine people were arrested.

But our correspondents tell a different story. They say people stormed and set fire to the home of Frelimo's first secretary and of a teacher, claiming they were hiding ballot boxes with pre-marked Frelimo ballot papers.

Observer harassment

Observers were intimidated and evicted from polling stations in Gaza and Nampula, the Civil Society Learning Centre (CESC) reported this afternoon.

In Gaza "the counting of votes in almost all polling stations was marked by the intimidation and expulsion of opposition party observers and delegates from the polling stations by STAE technicians and police. Ten CESC observers were expelled from their polling stations and prevented from observing the vote count, and a further two were threatened with death."

In Nampula, "CESC observers were intimidated and threatened and even prevented from doing their observational work by STAE-related people and observers from AMULTSDS, an organization that emerged surprisingly in these elections and is linked to the Frelimo party. At certain polling stations, such as EPC Maria da Luz Guebuza, police have prohibited observers from taking pictures of the results (editais) posted outside the classroom" used as the polling station.

Frelimo calls for calm

In the face of growing allegations of electoral fraud that may have contributed to Frelimo's probable victory, the party's

secretary general, Roque Silva, called on the press today to urge Mozambicans to look forward to the results with calm. "We wanted to urge all Mozambicans to continue serenely until the relevant bodies make public the official results. And that these should not be seen as a gain for one party but the victory of all Mozambicans," said Roque Silva in a statement to the press that did not allow journalist questions.

=====□

ELECTION OVERLOAD? - You are subscribed to two newsletters, the *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin election newsletters* (published by CIP), and *Mozambique News Reports and Clippings* (published by Joseph Hanlon and not linked to CIP). If you want to receive *Mozambique News Reports and Clippings* but not the election newsletters, just reply to this e-mail with "no election" in the subject line.

To **unsubscribe** from both: tinyurl.com/unsunsub-moz

We hold only your e-mail address and no other information about you, and we never share our subscription list with anyone.

=====

Editor: Joseph Hanlon | Publisher: Edson Cortez | News Editor: Borges Nhamire

Reporters: Aldemiro Bande, Magda Mendonça, Sheila Nhancale, Graciano Claudio, João Machassel

Published by CIP, Centro de Integridade Pública (Public Integrity Centre),

Rua Fernão Melo e Castro, no 124, Maputo. eleicoes@cipmoz.org bit.ly/GenEl2019

=====

ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED but please cite the source: "2019 General Elections - Mozambique Political Process Bulletin".

Previous newsletters are posted on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

=====

There are two archives of historic elections data, at IESE on <http://www.iese.ac.mz/eleicoes-resultados/> and at London School of Economics on <http://bit.ly/MozElData> The LSE archive now has detailed 2013 and 2014 results, by polling station.

=====

This mailing is the personal responsibility of Joseph Hanlon, and does not necessarily represent the views of the Open University.

-- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority in relation to its secondary activity of credit broking.

To: [redacted]@open.ac.uk]
From: [redacted] 5.1.2.e
Sent: Thur 10/17/2019 11:07:48 AM
Importance: Normal
Subject: Mozambique elections 80 - Frelimo landslide victory - 17Oct 11.00
MAIL_RECEIVED: Thur 10/17/2019 11:08:02 AM

2019 General Elections - 80

Mozambique Political Process Bulletin

17 October 2019 - 11h00

Editor: Joseph Hanlon (j.hanlon@open.ac.uk)

To subscribe: tinyurl.com/sub-moz

To unsubscribe: tinyurl.com/unsab-moz

ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED but please cite the source: "2019 General Elections - Mozambique Political Process Bulletin".

Previous newsletters and other Mozambique material are posted on <http://bit.ly/mozamb>

Attached: this newsletter in pdf

Frelimo landslide victory

Frelimo looks set to win with a landslide. Projections now indicate Filipe Nyusi has won at least 70% of the vote. Ossufo Momade (Renamo) is projected to have won only 21% of the vote, Daviz Simango (MDM) 7%, and Mario Albino (Amusi) less than 1%. Turnout was 55%.

The only higher result for Frelimo was Armando Guebuza in 2009 with 75%. This is the highest turnout since 1999.

The level of fraud and misconduct by the ruling party was significantly higher than in past elections. This appears to have been unnecessary for Frelimo to have won the election, but probably contributed to the landslide.

Probably all governors

Frelimo also looks likely to elect all governors. In Momade's home province of Nampula, Frelimo has more than 50%, on a relatively low (less than 50%) turnout. Only in Zambezia is the result unclear; Frelimo has a commanding lead on a turnout of over 60%, but with too few polling stations reported to be sure of the result.

Renamo boycott

Renamo is boycotting all district vote tabulations, and has ordered its people not to participate in any way in those counts. The boycott was confirmed by an authorized Renamo source but there will be no public statement. Our correspondents report the withdrawal of Renamo from some district counts.

MDM will continue to participate in the district counts, but may refuse to sign the district results sheets.

ELECTION OVERLOAD? - You are subscribed to two newsletters, the *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin election newsletters* (published by CIP), and *Mozambique News Reports and Clippings* (published by Joseph Hanlon and not linked to CIP). If you want to receive *Mozambique News Reports and Clippings* but not the election newsletters, just reply to this e-mail with "no election" in the subject line.

To **unsubscribe** from both: tinyurl.com/unsab-moz

We hold only your e-mail address and no other information about you, and we never share our subscription list with anyone.

Editor: Joseph Hanlon | Publisher: Edson Cortez | News Editor: Borges Nhamire

Reporters: Aldemiro Bande, Magda Mendonça, Sheila Nhancala, Graciano Claudio, João Machassel

Published by CIP, Centro de Integridade Pública (Public Integrity Centre),

Rua Fernão Melo e Castro, no 124, Maputo. eleicoes@cipmoz.org bit.ly/GenEl2019

=====

ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED but please cite the source: "2019 General Elections - Mozambique Political Process Bulletin".

Previous newsletters are posted on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

=====

There are two archives of historic elections data, at IESE on <http://www.iese.ac.mz/eleicoes-resultados/> and at London School of Economics on <http://bit.ly/MozElData> The LSE archive now has detailed 2013 and 2014 results, by polling station.

=====

This mailing is the personal responsibility of Joseph Hanlon, and does not necessarily represent the views of the Open University.

-- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority in relation to its secondary activity of credit broking.

To: [redacted] 5.1.2e [redacted]@open.ac.uk]
From: [redacted]
Sent: Sun 1/5/2020 12:53:09 PM
Importance: Normal
Subject: Mozambique Election 94 - In secret, Constitutional Council changes results
MAIL_RECEIVED: Sun 1/5/2020 12:53:27 PM

2019 General Elections - 94
Mozambique Political Process Bulletin
5 January 2020

Editor: Joseph Hanlon (j.hanlon@open.ac.uk)

To subscribe: tinyurl.com/sub-moz

To unsubscribe: tinyurl.com/unsub-moz

ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED but please cite the source: "2019 General Elections - Mozambique Political Process Bulletin".
Previous newsletters and other Mozambique material are posted on <http://bit.ly/mozamb>

In secret, constitutional council
gives 131,623 more votes to Nyusi -
but fails to correct AR totals

In secret in the past few days the Constitutional Council changed its ruling on the 15 October 2019 general elections, because it had incorrectly omitted the votes of Mozambicans in Africa and Europe. The original judgement (acordao) gave the wrong vote totals, excluding the votes in the diaspora, because it simply copied the National Elections Commission (CNE) decision which contained the mistake. The error was noted in this Bulletin (issue 93, 23 December) and by AIM (23 Dec).

However the CC secret change failed to correct the same error for parliament (AR, Assembleia da Republica), and still omits the AR diaspora vote.

No announcement has been made, and more seriously, there is nothing in the ruling that says it has been changed - it is still called "Acordao no, 25/CC/2019, de 22 de Dezembro" with no indication of any change. The change is to the tables on page 31 of the ruling.

The CC judgement simply copied and pasted the CNE ruling, and did not correct the CNE's error in the presidential vote and turnout, which we pointed out in Bulletin 87 (27 Oct <http://bit.ly/EIBull87>). The total registration is given as 13,162,321 which is correct, but the vote for Frelimo Presidential candidate Filipe Nyusi is given as 4,507,549, which is wrong, because it only includes the votes inside Mozambique and not those in Africa and Europe, where Nyusi gained a further 131,623 votes. This takes his total to 4,639,172. Because the CC and CNE include the African and European registration but not their votes, they report a turnout which is too low, 50.74%. The actual turnout is 51.84%.

The CC judgement has a 448 page annex of tables, and the table on page 111 of Acordao 25 includes the presidential votes of the diaspora, which seems to have been ignored when the CNE numbers were copied into the ruling itself.

The CC has corrected the error for the Presidential votes, but failed to correct the same error for AR, on page 32 of the ruling. Registered voters and number of assembly seats include the diaspora and match the table on pages 74 and 101. But the number of votes and turnout does not. Thus in the CC judgement, Frelimo loses 128,226 votes from the diaspora (but not the AR deputies elected by those votes).

Our previous link <http://bit.ly/CCAc25> now goes to the current partially corrected version. The original CC ruling is posted on <http://bit.ly/CCAc25Orig>. The changed tables are on page 31. The simplest way to tell the two versions apart is slightly different formatting. At the bottom of page 3 in the original there are the first 2 lines of item ii), whereas in the corrected version this starts on page 4.

=====□

ELECTION OVERLOAD? - You are subscribed to two newsletters, the *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin election newsletters* (published by CIP), and *Mozambique News Reports and Clippings* (published by Joseph Hanlon and not linked to CIP). If you want to receive *Mozambique News Reports and Clippings* but not the election newsletters, just reply to this e-mail with "no election" in the subject line.

To **unsubscribe** from both: tinyurl.com/unsub-moz

We hold only your e-mail address and no other information about you, and we never share our subscription list with anyone.

=====

Editor: Joseph Hanlon | Publisher: Edson Cortez | News Editor: Borges Nhamire

Reporters: Aldemiro Bande, Magda Mendonça, Sheila Nhancale, Graciano Claudio, Joao Machassel

Published by CIP, Centro de Integridade Pública (Public Integrity Centre),

Rua Fernão Melo e Castro, no 124, Maputo. eleicoes@cipmoz.org bit.ly/GenEI2019

=====

ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED but please cite the source: "2019 General Elections - Mozambique Political Process Bulletin".

Previous newsletters are posted on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

=====

There are two archives of historic elections data, at IESE on <http://www.iese.ac.mz/eleicoes-resultados/> and at London School of Economics on <http://bit.ly/MozEIData> The LSE archive now has detailed 2013 and 2014 results, by polling station.

=====

This mailing is the personal responsibility of Joseph Hanlon, and does not necessarily represent the views of the Open University.

-- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority in relation to its secondary activity of credit broking.

To: [redacted] 5.1.2e [redacted]@open.ac.uk]
From: [redacted]
Sent: Fri 1/31/2020 1:50:41 AM
Importance: Normal
Subject: Mozambique 467 - Cabo Delgado - war and climate change escalation - 31 Jan 2020
MAIL_RECEIVED: Fri 1/31/2020 1:51:19 AM

.....
MOZAMBIQUE 467
News reports & clippings□
31 January 2020

=====□
Editor: Joseph Hanlon (j.hanlon@open.ac.uk)□
To subscribe: tinyurl.com/sub-moz□
To unsubscribe: tinyurl.com/unsub-moz □
Articles may be freely reprinted but please cite the source.

Previous newsletters and other Mozambique material are posted on bit.ly/mozamb
Downloadable books: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books> Election data: <http://bit.ly/MozElData>

=====□
Attached: this newsletter in pdf
=====

Coordinated attacks as war moves south in Cabo Delgado

A series of attacks in Bilibiza, Quissanga district, Wednesday and Thursday mark an escalation of the war. Bilibiza is just 60 Km from Pemba and is the farthest south in Cabo Delgado that insurgents have hit. It was a large attack and the military did not respond. And it hit government schools linked to religious groups.

The Quissanga attacks started last Saturday in Namaluco village which is 20 km south of Macomia town. Namaluco had been attacked in June 2018. The insurgents then moved south through two other villages - Cagembe and Nagruvala (officially Nancaramo). At least two people were decapitated, one person burned to death, and many houses burned. On Wednesday they attacked Ntuare, 10 km from the administrative post of Bilibiza, and moved on to Ntessa.

That evening the insurgents reached Bilibiza, which had by then been abandoned by its residents. Bilibiza is the farthest point south that the insurgents have reached. There was no response from the military at their base in Bilibiza, because the soldiers were outnumbered by the insurgents. They sacked the market and burned houses in Bilibiza, but also attacked and did substantial damage to public facilities - the local offices, health centre, and most importantly the Agricultural Institute and teacher training college. (Carta de Mocambique 27 & 30 Jan, Lusa 30 Jan)

On Thursday morning the insurgents moved north-east and tried to enter Quissanga. Local people had already fled to Pemba and Ibo island. Bilibiza and Quissanga are strategically important. The coast road north from Pemba goes as far north as Quissanga, where the beach is the main port for traffic to Ibo. South of Quissanga is a road going inland (west) to Bilibiza, which is a bypass to the destroyed bridge across the Montepuez river.

Is there a religious tone to this attack?

In recent decades Cabo Delgado has attracted a wide range of religious missionaries. Christian fundamentalists from the US

and South Africa and various Islamic group are all present, often with Mozambican government acceptance and even support. Saudi Arabia trained Mozambicans in conservative Sunni (Wahhabi) doctrine and the Aga Khan, head of the global Ismaili Shia Muslim community, set up large development projects in Cabo Delgado to try to counter the Wahhabi influence. (Both with Mozambican government support.)

The Bilibiza agricultural institute was recently rehabilitated by the Aga Khan Development Network. The teacher training college in Bilibiza is run by ADPP, part of Tvind-Humana, seen as a cult and which has had legal run-ins with governments in various countries. In Mozambique it controls the second hand clothing trade and plays a significant role in teacher training.

One of the recruiting arguments of the insurgents is that traditional Sufi Islam leaders are aligned with Frelimo and working with it to steal the resource wealth from the people, and only a conservative Sunni government would share the wealth, create jobs, and develop Cabo Delgado. Was the attack on Bilibiza the first specific attack on high profile public institutions linked to other religions or cults?

Outsider for military

The week-long march of a large number of insurgents across parts of Cabo Delgado shows how ineffective the military has been in responding to the new civil war. Earlier this month President Nyusi nominated a total outsider as Defence Minister. The 48-year old Jaime Bessa Neto has a master's degree in environment and his career has been largely within Frelimo, as a member of parliament and in various municipal posts in Beira. He has no links to the military, and is not Makondi. He replaces the Makondi military veteran Atanasio M'tumuke.

Nyusi's power base is Makondi and in Cabo Delgado, and those groups are dominant in the army and have not done well. There seem at least three possibilities. 1. Neto is a weak appointment and the army will continue to run itself. 2. Frelimo had always opted for a weak military to prevent military coups. President Guebuza built up the military as part of his power base. Neto's appointment could mean a return to a weak army - and the war in Cabo Delgado could be run by the riot police and Minister of Interior. 3. As an experienced manager, Neto may have been put in to reorganise and clean up.

+ The death of Jose Dias dos Santos Mohamed of an illness was noted with sadness locally. An expert ranger, for a decade he was administrator of the Quirimbas National Park, and had a real impact controlling the timber and ivory trade. He developed a system of patrolling by sailboat so he would not be heard by the smugglers. A friend noted "Dr Dias was one of the few national directors who was not corrupt and was able to make a difference even under the existing corrupt systems."

Climate change adding to Cabo Delgado's woes

Torrential rains, heavier than in normal rainy seasons, have made much of Cabo Delgado impassable to vehicles. Bridges are down, including a major bridge crossing the Montepuez River on the main road from Pemba to Palma (inland from the coastal road which only goes to Quissanga). Today's forecast is for more flooding.

The only open road from Pemba to Palma and the gas developments goes the long way around via Montepuez and Mueda with more than 100 km of mud roads which have become impassable as lorries sink into the mud. River crossing on the road are often "drifts" - low bridges which allow flood waters to flow over the road. These can be treacherous as the photo and this cellphone video show - watch the video til the end. <http://bit.ly/319INdF>



Meanwhile, there is drought in the south and there will probably be water rationing in Maputo. This is exactly what is predicted for climate change - heavier rain in the north and drying out in the south.

=====□
The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) strengthens data protection and requires that consent to receive communication must be 'freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous'. Importantly, there must be a positive opt-in as opposed to an opt-out. As you have voluntarily subscribed to our newsletters, you do not need to take any action and will continue to receive them as usual. We hold only your e-mail address and no other information about you, and we never share our subscription list with anyone.

To **unsubscribe**: tinyurl.com/unsunsub-moz

=====□
ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED but please cite the source: "Mozambique News Reports and Clippings". Previous newsletters are posted on bit.ly/mozamb

=====

Background reading

Special reports

Mozambique heroin transit trade

English - LSE - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin>

Portuguese - Pt - CIP - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroina>

Gas for development?

Gas_for_development_or_just_for_money?_2015 bit.ly/MozGasEng

Gas_para_desenvolvimento_ou_apenas_dinheiro?_2015 bit.ly/MozGasPt

Social protection report - 2017 Mozambique - <http://bit.ly/MozSocPro>

Special report on four poverty surveys: bit.ly/MozPoverty

2018 Constitution - <http://bit.ly/2KF588T>

Minimum wage and exchange rates 1996-2018 -- <http://bit.ly/MinWage18>

\$2bn secret debt - in English

Kroll - Full report on \$2bn debt - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-Moz-full>

Kroll report summary - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-sum>

Key points of Mozambique parliament report - Nov 2016 - <http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt-En>

Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique's \$2.2 bn debt - <http://bit.ly/3WQ-hanlon>

In Portuguese:

Parliamentary Report on the Secret Debt (complete) bit.ly/MozAR-debt

Election study collaboration: We have detailed election data from 1999 through 2014 and are inviting scholars to use this data collaboratively.

<http://bit.ly/MozElData>

Election newsletters are on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

Eight books by Joseph Hanlon can be downloaded, free: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books>

Bangladesh confronts climate change (2016)

Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique (2014)

Há Mais Bicicletas – mas há desenvolvimento? (2008)

Moçambique e as grandes cheias de 2000 (2001)

Paz Sem Benefício: Como o FMI Bloqueia a Reconstrução (1997)

Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding (1996)

Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots (1991)

Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (1984)

Two more will be available shortly to download:

Apartheid's 2nd Front (1986)

Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000

These are still available for sale:

Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento (2014) (free in English)

Zimbabwe takes back its land (2013)

Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South (2010)

Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique? (2008) (free in Portuguese)

Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (1986)

=====

This mailing is the personal responsibility of Joseph Hanlon, and does not necessarily represent the views of the Open University.

-- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority in relation to its secondary activity of credit broking.

To: [5.1.2.e] [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com]
Cc: [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com]; [5.1.2.e] [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com]
From: [5.1.2.e]
Sent: Thur 2/6/2020 10:07:56 AM
Importance: Normal
Subject: RE: 20 01 31 Update Mozambique LNG transactie v2 aanvulling [5.1.2.e]
MAIL_RECEIVED: Thur 2/6/2020 10:07:59 AM
[20 01 31 Update Mozambique LNG transactie v2 extra aanvulling Marije \(AO TC\).docx](#)

.....
~~~~~  
Hoi,

Toevoeging is natuurlijk helemaal goed. Heb ook nog een zinnetje toegevoegd zoals gevraagd waarbij ik ook nog even de ngo aandacht erin fiets ;-).

[5.1.2.e]

**From:** [5.1.2.e] <[5.1.2.e]@atradius.com>  
**Sent:** 06 February 2020 10:03  
**To:** [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com>  
**Cc:** [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com>; [5.1.2.e] <[5.1.2.e]@atradius.com>  
**Subject:** RE: 20 01 31 Update Mozambique LNG transactie v2 aanvulling [5.1.2.e]

Hoi [5.1.2.e] Veel dank voor je snelle terugkoppeling. Ik heb 1 zinnetje toegevoegd mbt het feit dat de zorgpunten die je noemt uiteraard in de beoordeling/voorlegging worden meegenomen. *Is dat oke?*

Verder nog een vraag of je iets kunt zeggen over wat je precies merkt nu Total aan boord is (tov Anadarko). Is dit een verbetering? *Kun je hier kort een zinnetje over toevoegen?*

Zie track changes in bijlage.

Dank!

Met vriendelijke groet,

[5.1.2.e]

[5.1.2.e]

Atradius Dutch State Business N.V.  
David Ricardostraat 1, 1066 JS, Amsterdam | P.O. Box 8982, 1006 JD, Amsterdam | Netherlands  
Phone: +31 (0)20 [5.1.2.e] Fax: +31 (0)20 [5.1.2.e] |  
E-mail: [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com | Website: <http://www.atradiusdutchstatebusiness.nl>



Atradius Dutch State Business N.V. is de uitvoerder van de faciliteiten voor exportkredietverzekering en investeringsgaranties voor rekening en op naam van de Staat der Nederlanden.

Atradius Dutch State Business N.V. is the Export Credit Agency of the Netherlands.

**From:** [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com>  
**Sent:** donderdag 6 februari 2020 09:54  
**To:** [5.1.2.e] <[5.1.2.e]@atradius.com>  
**Cc:** [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com>; [5.1.2.e] <[5.1.2.e]@atradius.com>  
**Subject:** 20 01 31 Update Mozambique LNG transactie v2 aanvulling [5.1.2.e]

Beste [5.1.2.e],

Zoals beloofd hierbij mijn mvo aanvulling voor de memo. Ik heb er voor het gemak maar een puntje bij nieuwe ontwikkelingen van gemaakt. Ik weet niet precies meer wat er eerder over mvo gecommuniceerd is dus ik heb maar een algemene samenvatting gegeven.

Als je nog vragen hebt dan weet je me te vinden.

Groet

5.1.2e

To: [redacted]@open.ac.uk]  
From: [redacted] 5.1.2e  
Sent: Wed 2/12/2020 2:02:52 PM  
Importance: Normal  
Subject: Mozambique Elections 96 - EU condemns elections, saying results 'highly unlikely' - 12Feb2020  
MAIL\_RECEIVED: Wed 2/12/2020 2:03:12 PM  
[General Elections 97-12Feb2020 EU-final Malawi-court.pdf](#)

# 2019 General Elections - 97

## Mozambique Political Process Bulletin

12 February 2020

Editor: [redacted] 5.1.2e @open.ac.uk)

To subscribe: [tinyurl.com/sub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/sub-moz)

To unsubscribe: [tinyurl.com/unsab-moz](http://tinyurl.com/unsab-moz)

**ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED** but please cite the source: "2019 General Elections - Mozambique Political Process Bulletin".

Previous newsletters and other Mozambique material are posted on <http://bit.ly/mozamb>

Attached: this newsletter in pdf

## EU condemns elections saying results 'highly unlikely'

"EU observers detected numerous irregularities and malpractice both ahead of election day and during polling, counting and the tabulation of results. Irregularities included the unconcealed inflation of the voter register in Gaza and an under-registration of voters in other provinces, and the restriction of independent monitoring by opposition party agents and established independent national observer groups," declared the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) in its final report released today (12 Feb).

"EU observers also noted ballot-box stuffing, organised multiple voting, intentional invalidation of votes for the opposition, altering of polling station results with the fraudulent addition of extra votes, unlikely turnout figures, major results deviations between polling stations in the same polling centre, and many cases of poll workers, civil servants, electors, and observers found with ballot papers outside of polling stations."

"Irregularities were observed in all provinces, and were made possible through the inaction or complicity of local election authorities, the police, state officials, and overzealous ruling party sympathisers. Observed irregularities supported a trend in favour of improved electoral outcomes for Frelimo," the report says.

EU observers make clear they do not believe the results. "There was an astonishing reversal of results in opposition stronghold provinces of Sofala, Nampula and Zambezia and in opposition districts within the provinces of Manica, Tete and Niassa (such as Barue, Tsangano and Ngauma, respectively). ... Such sudden, targeted, and significant shifts in voting preferences, strictly limited to opposition districts and contradicting the 2018 municipal election results, are highly unlikely given the polarised political environment and deeply entrenched voting preferences."

Phrases like "astonishing reversal" and "highly unlikely" are a diplomatic way of saying the published results cannot be true.

The full EU EOM report in Portuguese is on [http://bit.ly/UE-Fin\\_Pt](http://bit.ly/UE-Fin_Pt) and in English on <http://bit.ly/EU-Fin-En>.  
This Bulletin's final report on the elections is on <http://bit.ly/MozElFinal>

In the attached pdf version of this bulletin are EU EOM graphs comparing the district results for Frelimo in all six general elections, showing how districts like Chibabava, Sofala and Molumbo, Zambezia were below 35% for Frelimo in the five

previous elections but above 75% in 2019. Notable is the way Frelimo votes in opposition districts have doubled or more to ensure Frelimo has between 60% and 80% in every district - flatter distribution with less variation.

In addition, the EU estimates that STAE (Secretariado Tecnico da Administracao Estatal) registered 453,170 voters who did not exist in Gaza and "the inflated voter register amounted to an unwarranted boost of 280,137 votes for Frelimo. EU observers in Chokwe reported a strange pattern on election day, in which the first two or three polling stations within a polling centre had long queues, but the remaining polling stations were empty."

## CNE illegalities hit

EU observers were particularly critical of the National Elections Commission (CNE), which violated the law.

"The CNE missed important legal deadlines without offering any reasonable justification at the same time that it required other stakeholders to strictly follow legal provisions and deadlines." Government money for campaigns was distributed 24 days after the legal deadline and after the start of the campaign. The CNE has not published its assessment of campaign spending as required by law.

Candidates lists were only made public a week before the election.

The CNE violated the law when it put Frelimo first on all three ballot papers, giving it "the advantage of the ballot order effect where a higher ballot position translates into increased electoral success."

The EU also criticized CNE's "lack of transparency". The CNE refused to publish results disaggregated by polling station, even though there is a STAE centralization in which polling station results are digitised in a system where data is entered by two different people and only saved if the two match.

"The CNE website was rarely updated and there were no new posts on its institutional Facebook page from one month prior to election day. ... The CNE made minimal use of the media centre." Observers called on the CNE to "implement a more effective public communications strategy, including the prompt and complete publication of all decisions ... and the continuous dissemination of information to all stakeholders."

At the CNE's 26 October assembly for the national tabulation of results, "there was no actual tabulation or verification of the results received from provincial levels, but rather a slideshow presentation of already aggregated election results. As such, the assembly was less of a tabulation more of a presentation by the CNE of a *fait accompli*."

## 'Unlevel playing field'

"An unlevel playing field was evident throughout the campaign," observers noted. "Limitations to freedoms of assembly and movement of opposition parties were often reported. ... The campaign of Renamo's presidential candidate was particularly affected."

"The EU EOM media monitoring unit noted an imbalance in [state media] news bulletins and programmes covering the campaign. ... Frelimo received the largest share of coverage, often in an uncritical tone." TVM devoted half of its coverage to Frelimo, often opening with Frelimo and its presidential candidate. Privately owned stations STV, Miramar, and TV Sucesso were also imbalanced in favour of Frelimo.

"The EU EOM observed the use of state resources at one third of Frelimo campaign events. Compulsory financial contributions to the ruling party and/or compulsory participation of civil servants and teachers during work hours in Frelimo's campaign activities were reported in Nampula, Zambezia, Sofala, Tete, Cabo Delgado, Manica, Inhambane and Gaza."

Established national observer groups could not obtain credentials for thousands of observers. But tens of thousands of observers from unnamed observer groups obtained credentials. "The electoral authority subsequently shared that a large component of these observers were from Frelimo youth groups."

The assassination of Gaza civil society observation head Anastacio Matavel by members of the national police a week before voting "resulted in further limitation of national observation efforts [and] had the effect of exacerbating an already existing



climate of fear and self-censorship prevalent in Mozambican society."

## Voting and counting

"EU observers were made aware of hundreds of cases countrywide of polling station presidents expelling opposition party agents and party-appointed poll workers, often with the assistance of police." In Tete more than 500 Renamo and MDM party agents and poll watchers were expelled by polling station presidents and police. The conduct of police showed a "clear bias in favour of the ruling party".

"There was several reports throughout the country of persons caught with pre-marked or blank ballot papers outside polling stations on election day."

"The mission was aware of specific cases involving up to 30 ballots per person in Maputo, Gaza, Sofala, Manica, Tete, Zambezia, Nampula, and Cabo Delgado."

One-third of observed polling stations did not follow the correct closing procedure. Counting was not transparent in one-third of polling stations. Results sheets were sometimes filled in long after the count finished.

EU observers noted "a significant number of inconsistencies" including the number of votes exceeding the number of ballots or number of voters.

The district count was "disorganised" with correct procedures followed only half the time.

The EU observers also point to extensive problems with the legal structures for carrying out the elections, and note that most past EU observer recommendations were not carried out.

## Malawi court annuls elections

Malawi is very different than Mozambique. After widespread irregularities in the 21 May 2019 election there were three months of demonstrations and even riots with citizens protesting. And on 3 February the Constitutional Court annulled the elections, with harsh criticism of the Malawi Election Commission. In Mozambique there was no public protest against equally massive irregularities in the 15 October 2019 elections. And Mozambique's Constitutional Council approved the election with no criticism of the National Elections Commission and rejected all protests without even looking at evidence of irregularities.

"In every election there will be irregularities but in the present matter, it has been our finding that the irregularities were so widespread, systematic and grave that the results of the elections have been compromised and cannot be trusted as a reflection of the votes", said Healy Potani, the head of the Malawi panel of five judges. (*Financial Times*, 3 Feb 2020)

The election had become known as the "Tipp-Ex election" because of the way correction fluid had been used to change results sheets.

The Constitutional Court also ruled that Malawi's parliament should consider replacing the current electoral commission. (BBC's Alan Harding called it "an important blow against a widespread culture of impunity."

<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-51369191>)

Thirdly, the judges said the current system where the new president is simply the candidate with most votes is unconstitutional. In future, they said, the winner needed to gain more than 50% of the vote, which could mean a second-round run-off (as is already the case in Mozambique).

In the May 2019 election incumbent President Peter Mutharika was said by the Malawi Elections Commission to have won with 38,6% of the vote, and challenger Lazarus Chakwera took 35,4%

=====

ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED but please cite the source: "2019 General Elections - Mozambique Political Process Bulletin".  
Previous newsletters are posted on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>  
To **unsubscribe** from both: [tinyurl.com/unsunsub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/unsunsub-moz)  
We hold only your e-mail address and no other information about you, and we never share our subscription list with anyone.

=====

There are two archives of historic elections data, at IESE on <http://www.iese.ac.mz/eleicoes-resultados/> and at London School of Economics on <http://bit.ly/MozElData> The LSE archive now has detailed 2013 and 2014 results, by polling station.

=====

This mailing is the personal responsibility of Joseph Hanlon, and does not necessarily represent the views of the Open University.

-- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority in relation to its secondary activity of credit broking.

To: [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com]; [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com]; [5.1.2.e]  
[5.1.2.e] [5.1.2.e] [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com]; [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com]  
From: [5.1.2.e]  
Sent: Wed 2/12/2020 5:36:21 PM  
Importance: Normal  
Subject: FW: Mozambique Elections 96 - EU condemns elections, saying results 'highly unlikely' - 12Feb2020  
MAIL\_RECEIVED: Wed 2/12/2020 5:36:00 PM  
[General Elections 97-12Feb2020 EU-final Malawi-court.pdf](#)

.....  
Fyi: EU zou uitslag recente verkiezingen Moz veroordelen...

From: [5.1.2.e]@open.ac.uk>  
Sent: woensdag 12 februari 2020 14:03  
To: Dev-Mozambique-List <[5.1.2.e]@open.ac.uk>  
Subject: Mozambique Elections 96 - EU condemns elections, saying results 'highly unlikely' - 12Feb2020

## 2019 General Elections - 97

### Mozambique Political Process Bulletin

### 12 February 2020

Editor: Joseph Hanlon ([5.1.2.e]@open.ac.uk)

To subscribe: [tinyurl.com/sub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/sub-moz)

To unsubscribe: [tinyurl.com/unsab-moz](http://tinyurl.com/unsab-moz)

**ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED** but please cite the source: "2019 General Elections - Mozambique Political Process Bulletin".  
Previous newsletters and other Mozambique material are posted on <http://bit.ly/mozamb>

Attached: this newsletter in pdf

## EU condemns elections saying results 'highly unlikely'

"EU observers detected numerous irregularities and malpractice both ahead of election day and during polling, counting and the tabulation of results. Irregularities included the unconcealed inflation of the voter register in Gaza and an under-registration of voters in other provinces, and the restriction of independent monitoring by opposition party agents and established independent national observer groups," declared the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) in its final report released today (12 Feb).

"EU observers also noted ballot-box stuffing, organised multiple voting, intentional invalidation of votes for the opposition, altering of polling station results with the fraudulent addition of extra votes, unlikely turnout figures, major results deviations between polling stations in the same polling centre, and many cases of poll workers, civil servants, electors, and observers found with ballot papers outside of polling stations."

"Irregularities were observed in all provinces, and were made possible through the inaction or complicity of local election authorities, the police, state officials, and overzealous ruling party sympathisers. Observed irregularities supported a trend in favour of improved electoral outcomes for Frelimo," the report says.

EU observers make clear they do not believe the results. "There was an astonishing reversal of results in opposition stronghold provinces of Sofala, Nampula and Zambézia and in opposition districts within the provinces of Manica, Tete and Niassa (such as Barué, Tsangano and Ngaúma, respectively). ... Such sudden, targeted, and significant shifts in voting preferences, strictly limited to opposition districts and contradicting the 2018 municipal election results, are highly unlikely given the polarised political environment and deeply entrenched voting preferences."

Phrases like "astonishing reversal" and "highly unlikely" are a diplomatic way of saying the published results cannot be true.

The full EU EOM report in Portuguese is on [http://bit.ly/UE-Fin\\_Pt](http://bit.ly/UE-Fin_Pt) and in English on <http://bit.ly/EU-Fin-En>. This Bulletin's final report on the elections is on <http://bit.ly/MozElFinal>

In the attached pdf version of this bulletin are EU EOM graphs comparing the district results for Frelimo in all six general elections, showing how districts like Chibabava, Sofala and Molumbo, Zambezia were below 35% for Frelimo in the five previous elections but above 75% in 2019. Notable is the way Frelimo votes in opposition districts have doubled or more to ensure Frelimo has between 60% and 80% in every district - flatter distribution with less variation.

In addition, the EU estimates that STAE (Secretariado Tecnico da Administracao Estatal) registered 453,170 voters who did not exist in Gaza and "the inflated voter register amounted to an unwarranted boost of 280,137 votes for Frelimo. EU observers in Chokwe reported a strange pattern on election day, in which the first two or three polling stations within a polling centre had long queues, but the remaining polling stations were empty."

## CNE illegalities hit

EU observers were particularly critical of the National Elections Commission (CNE), which violated the law.

"The CNE missed important legal deadlines without offering any reasonable justification at the same time that it required other stakeholders to strictly follow legal provisions and deadlines." Government money for campaigns was distributed 24 days after the legal deadline and after the start of the campaign. The CNE has not published its assessment of campaign spending as required by law.

Candidates lists were only made public a week before the election.

The CNE violated the law when it put Frelimo first on all three ballot papers, giving it "the advantage of the ballot order effect where a higher ballot position translates into increased electoral success."

The EU also criticized CNE's "lack of transparency". The CNE refused to publish results disaggregated by polling station, even though there is a STAE centralization in which polling station results are digitised in a system where data is entered by two different people and only saved if the two match.

"The CNE website was rarely updated and there were no new posts on its institutional Facebook page from one month prior to election day. ... The CNE made minimal use of the media centre." Observers called on the CNE to "implement a more effective public communications strategy, including the prompt and complete publication of all decisions ... and the continuous dissemination of information to all stakeholders."

At the CNE's 26 October assembly for the national tabulation of results, "there was no actual tabulation or verification of the results received from provincial levels, but rather a slideshow presentation of already aggregated election results. As such, the assembly was less of a tabulation more of a presentation by the CNE of a *fait accompli*."

## 'Unlevel playing field'

"An unlevel playing field was evident throughout the campaign," observers noted. "Limitations to freedoms of assembly and movement of opposition parties were often reported. ... The campaign of Renamo's presidential candidate was particularly affected."

"The EU EOM media monitoring unit noted an imbalance in [state media] news bulletins and programmes covering the campaign. ... Frelimo received the largest share of coverage, often in an uncritical tone." TVM devoted half of its coverage to Frelimo, often opening with Frelimo and its presidential candidate. Privately owned stations STV, Miramar, and TV Sucesso were also imbalanced in favour of Frelimo.

"The EU EOM observed the use of state resources at one third of Frelimo campaign events. Compulsory financial contributions to the ruling party and/or compulsory participation of civil servants and teachers during work hours in Frelimo's campaign activities were reported in Nampula, Zambezia, Sofala, Tete, Cabo Delgado, Manica, Inhambane and Gaza."



Established national observer groups could not obtain credentials for thousands of observers. But tens of thousands of observers from unnamed observer groups obtained credentials. "The electoral authority subsequently shared that a large component of these observers were from Frelimo youth groups."

The assassination of Gaza civil society observation head Anastacio Matavel by members of the national police a week before voting "resulted in further limitation of national observation efforts [and] had the effect of exacerbating an already existing climate of fear and self-censorship prevalent in Mozambican society."

## Voting and counting

"EU observers were made aware of hundreds of cases countrywide of polling station presidents expelling opposition party agents and party-appointed poll workers, often with the assistance of police." In Tete more than 500 Renamo and MDM party agents and poll watchers were expelled by polling station presidents and police. The conduct of police showed a "clear bias in favour of the ruling party".

"There was several reports throughout the country of persons caught with pre-marked or blank ballot papers outside polling stations on election day."

"The mission was aware of specific cases involving up to 30 ballots per person in Maputo, Gaza, Sofala, Manica, Tete, Zambezia, Nampula, and Cabo Delgado."

One-third of observed polling stations did not follow the correct closing procedure. Counting was not transparent in one-third of polling stations. Results sheets were sometimes filled in long after the count finished.

EU observers noted "a significant number of inconsistencies" including the number of votes exceeding the number of ballots or number of voters.

The district count was "disorganised" with correct procedures followed only half the time.

The EU observers also point to extensive problems with the legal structures for carrying out the elections, and note that most past EU observer recommendations were not carried out.

## Malawi court annuls elections

Malawi is very different than Mozambique. After widespread irregularities in the 21 May 2019 election there were three months of demonstrations and even riots with citizens protesting. And on 3 February the Constitutional Court annulled the elections, with harsh criticism of the Malawi Election Commission. In Mozambique there was no public protest against equally massive irregularities in the 15 October 2019 elections. And Mozambique's Constitutional Council approved the election with no criticism of the National Elections Commission and rejected all protests without even looking at evidence of irregularities.

"In every election there will be irregularities but in the present matter, it has been our finding that the irregularities were so widespread, systematic and grave that the results of the elections have been compromised and cannot be trusted as a reflection of the votes", said Healy Potani, the head of the Malawi panel of five judges. (*Financial Times*, 3 Feb 2020)

The election had become known as the "Tipp-Ex election" because of the way correction fluid had been used to change results sheets.

The Constitutional Court also ruled that Malawi's parliament should consider replacing the current electoral commission. (BBC's Alan Harding called it "an important blow against a widespread culture of impunity."

<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-51369191>)

Thirdly, the judges said the current system where the new president is simply the candidate with most votes is unconstitutional. In future, they said, the winner needed to gain more than 50% of the vote, which could mean a second-round run-off (as is

already the case in Mozambique).

In the May 2019 election incumbent President Peter Mutharika was said by the Malawi Elections Commission to have won with 38,6% of the vote, and challenger Lazarus Chakwera took 35,4%

=====

Editor: Joseph Hanlon | Publisher: Edson Cortez | News Editor: Borges Nhamire  
Reporters: Aldemiro Bande, Magda Mendonça, Sheila Nhancale, Nelia Nhacume, Telma Mahiquene  
Published by CIP, Centro de Integridade Pública (Public Integrity Centre),  
Rua Fernão Melo e Castro, no 124, Maputo. [5.1.2.e@cipmoz.org](mailto:5.1.2.e@cipmoz.org) [bit.ly/GenEl2019](http://bit.ly/GenEl2019)

=====

ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED but please cite the source: "2019 General Elections - Mozambique Political Process Bulletin".  
Previous newsletters are posted on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>  
To **unsubscribe** from both: [tinyurl.com/unsunsub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/unsunsub-moz)  
We hold only your e-mail address and no other information about you, and we never share our subscription list with anyone.

=====

There are two archives of historic elections data, at IESE on <http://www.iese.ac.mz/eleicoes-resultados/> and at London School of Economics on <http://bit.ly/MozElData> The LSE archive now has detailed 2013 and 2014 results, by polling station.

=====

This mailing is the personal responsibility of Joseph Hanlon, and does not necessarily represent the views of the Open University.

-- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority in relation to its secondary activity of credit broking.

To: [5.1.2.e]@open.ac.uk]  
From: [5.1.2.e]  
Sent: Tue 2/18/2020 11:36:52 PM  
Importance: Normal  
Subject: Mozambique 468 - Cabo Delgado - Marcelino dos Santos and Mario Machungo die  
MAIL\_RECEIVED: Tue 2/18/2020 11:37:12 PM  
[Mozambique 468-18Feb2020 Cabo-Delgado war mine-invasion Praise-singers.pdf](#)

.....

# MOZAMBIQUE 468

## News reports & clippings

### 18 February 2020

=====

Editor: Joseph Hanlon ([5.1.2.e]@open.ac.uk)  
To subscribe: [tinyurl.com/sub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/sub-moz)  
To unsubscribe: [tinyurl.com/unsunsub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/unsunsub-moz)

**Articles may be freely reprinted but please cite the source.**

Previous newsletters and other Mozambique material are posted on [bit.ly/mozamb](http://bit.ly/mozamb)  
Downloadable books: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books> Election data: <http://bit.ly/MozElData>

=====

**Attached: this newsletter in pdf**

=====

*Also in this issue:*

**Deaths of Marcelino dos Santos and Mario Machungo**

=====

## *Cabo Delgado:*

## Mine invasion, war, aid, media attacks, climate crisis

The civil war in Cabo Delgado is expanding, with government portraying the war as foreign backed and needing foreign military assistance and restrictions on media. But an invasion of a ruby mine by many artisanal miners points to the importance of lack of jobs. Meanwhile torrential rains exacerbated by the climate emergency have affected the same areas hit by cyclone Kenneth, cutting off all roads to the north of the province and the gas developments.

## 800-1500 miners invade Gemfields

An estimated 800 to 1500 artisanal miners have invaded the Montepuez ruby mine in the past month. Soil softened by heavy rains has collapsed onto miners, killing 11. Zitamar cited other sources saying 30 dead and DW said 42, but Gemfields contacted Zitamar to say it was confident the death toll is only 11. (Zitamar 17,18 Feb, Deutsche Welle - DW -7 Feb, <https://p.dw.com/p/3XQwb>)

Montepuez Ruby Mining (MRM) is 75% owned by Gemfields and 25% by Mwiriti, which is controlled by Raimundo Pachinuapa, a liberation war commander now on the Frelimo Political Commission. MRM is chaired by Samora Machel Jr. Pachinuapa's son Raime is MRM's director of corporate affairs. The mine area is 340 square kilometres. Hundreds of artisanal miners and farmers were displaced when MRM won the licence. (Mozambican land law gives priority to miners over farmers.)

But MRM has never been able to fully control the huge area. Initially violence was used and a year ago Gemfields settled a London High Court action and agreed to pay \$8.3 mn to settle murder, torture and house burning claims. It also agreed to set up compensation funds to resettle those displaced and pay future claims. (See this newsletter 436 <http://bit.ly/Ruby-Moz436>) But Mozambican authorities late last year barred UK lawyers from Leigh Day who went to Mozambique to help set up the compensation funds. Gemfields this week was readmitted to the London Stock Exchange's AIM list, following a two year absence due to a take-over and management issues; the stock is already listed in Johannesburg and Bermuda.

Artisanal miner Julio Ismael, from Muaja in neighbouring Ancuabe district, told DW "We work there looking for something to eat. For example, here, wherever you are working in terms of mining is forbidden, they expel us. So, with this situation of hunger and poverty that we live in, we are entering there to get something to eat. "

Land given to ruby, graphite and other miners and to gas companies cover such large areas that there are reports from both the ruby and gas zones that it has become impossible to find new farmland for the displaced villagers. This is adding to tensions caused by the eviction of traditional artisanal miners, who are an important part of the Cabo Delgado rural economy. Reduced opportunities have combined with growing inequality and the obvious mineral wealth to create support for the insurgents.

The insurgents have been recruiting in neighbouring provinces with offers of jobs. On 9 February 36 young people were presented to the public in Muhaivire neighbourhood of Nampula city. Police had detained them in Erati on their way to Cabo Delgado. They had been told they would be given jobs as artisanal miners. The secretary of state for Nampula, Mety Gondola, urged parents not to let their sons be recruited because the promises are false - there are no jobs. It is a repeated refrain. In Alto Molocue on 27 November last year President Filipe Nyusi himself told young people not to be deceived by false promises of jobs. (AIM 28 Nov 2019, 10 Feb 2020)

## Attacks in north, west, south

Three new attacks show the spread of the Cabo Delgado civil war. Nangololo in Meluco district was attacked on Saturday morning (15 Feb) with one person killed and houses burned. Nangololo is on the N380 road, which is the main road from Pemba to Palma. It is also halfway between Macomia and Bilibiza, which was attacked and suffered major damage on 29 January. It was announced Monday that the damage to the Agricultural Institute there was so serious that classes will have to be moved to lower level schools in the south of the province. Bilibiza was the southernmost attack so far.

Last week (12 Feb) two neighbouring villages in Nangade district, Chicuaia Nova and Litingina, were attacked. Two people were killed and houses and shops burned. There was a response from a nearby military base and the attacks were limited. Nangade is in the north of Cabo Delgado on the border with Tanzania and inland from Palma. Litingina had been attacked previously in November.

Also on 12 February there was an attack, apparently by the insurgents, in Mecula district of Niassa province (bordering Mueda, Cabo Delgado). This is the further west of any attacks so far. Police say they killed 8 attackers and injured 15. (*Carta da Mocambique* 17 Feb)

The 12 February attacks were a day after President Nyusi was in Pemba for a cabinet meeting to discuss the war.

Provincial authorities say that 156,000 people are affected by the war, and that 76 schools and 4 health posts have been destroyed or damaged. The Catholic bishop of Pemba, Luiz Fernando Lisboa, estimates that at least 500 people have died in the war.

Thousands have fled to the coast or to the provincial capital Pemba. Provincial authorities says 14,000 peasant households have abandoned their farms, and 2,000 fishermen have had to flee. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) spokesperson Andrej Mahecic, says number of displaced people is at least 100,000. (AIM 10 Feb)

At a meeting with the diplomatic corps in Maputo Friday (14 Feb) President Nyusi complained that countries have offered help to combat the insurgency, "but when we ask them how they want to help, they say nothing - there is nothing concrete." (Lusa 14 Feb, Zitamar 17 Feb) The only military help has come from Russia, but its Wagner Group mercenaries failed and were forced to withdraw.



# Nyusi's praise singers call for 'extra-legal actions' against the press

"Extra-legal actions" should be taken by police, army and security services against journalists who report "despondent 'news' that demoralizes the Defence and Security Forces (FDS)" in Cabo Delgado. *Carta de Mocambique*, its editor Marcelo Mosse, and those who provide information to them "are not patriots", wrote Juliao Joao Cumbane in an 11 February post. Their activities "must not be allowed or tolerated."

Cumbane is not an ordinary Facebook polemicist, but a backer of the President who has been rewarded for his work. And his call to intensify press restrictions in Cabo Delgado has brought widespread criticism. The Media Institute of South Africa, the Mozambican journalists union, and the Portuguese Language Journalists (FJLP) have all attacked what they see a call for violence against journalists.

Social media has become an important battleground and leaders have a modern form of "praise singers". President Armando Guebuza had a group called the "G-40" of about 40 commentators that state media were expected to use and who posted regularly on Facebook and other social media to praise Guebuza and fiercely attack his critics. Filipe Nyusi has followed that model, with his own praise-singing bloggers. Their importance during the elections was recognised when one of the most important of the G-40 who had moved to praise Nyusi, UEM physics lecturer Juliao Cumbane, was rewarded in November with the post as chair of the National Company of Science and Technology Parks (ENPCT). (*Savana* 29 Nov 2019) Two other Nyusi praise singers have also received government posts, Gustavo Mavie as a board member of the Matola grain terminal and Amorim Bila as deputy director of the Financial Information Office.

The government does not want the war reported by journalists or studied by academics. Several journalists have already been arrested and illegally detained for extended periods for reporting the war and there are restrictions on foreign journalists going to Cabo Delgado to report. *Carta de Mocambique* has the best correspondents and been the most effective in reporting the war.

## No roads north

Exactly the area of central Cabo Delgado hit by the unprecedented Cyclone Kenneth in April 2019 has been hit by heavy rains a month ago and then again last week, causing high flood levels in the Montepuez and Messalo rivers. The January floods destroyed sections of bridges over both rivers on the N380 which goes from Pemba north to Palma. An attempt was made to build a temporary causeway (known as a "drift") across the Montepuez river, but that has been washed out by the more recent floods. Waters are falling but still above flood level and there is no chance of opening the N380 for at least two months. This section of road is also under regular attack by insurgents.

The only other, much longer, route north is via Montepuez and Mueda, but the dirt road is now mud and impassable for lorries. So there will be no overland cargo transport from Pemba to the gas developments for some time. Small passenger planes now fly Pemba-Palma, but cargo must go by barge.

## This is the climate crisis

Ten months after Buzi, Sofala, was cut off by flood waters from cyclone Idai, it is cut off again, and floodwaters on the Buzi and Pungue rivers are still rising. Two other areas hit by Itai were hit again last week, with floodwaters cutting off Dombe and Mossurize, Manica. At least two bridges have been washed away in Manica and Sofala.

Meanwhile, reservoirs in the south are not filling, and there is a shortage of rain.

Both cyclones last year were unusual. There had never been a cyclone in central Cabo Delgado. And the way Cyclone Idai built up its power and rain content was unusual. Both were due to the rising temperature of the ocean, which fuels cyclones.

And all climate crisis forecasts for Mozambique have been for less rainfall in the south, while in the centre and north total rainfall will not change but it will come in more intense bursts. So what Mozambique is seeing is the predicted impact of the climate crisis - and it will get worse.

**Marcelino dos Santos**, one of the founders of Frelimo, died in Maputo on 11 February at the age of 90. He was born on 20 May 1929 in Lumbo, Mozambique Island, Nampula. He was a student in Lisbon from 1948 to 1951, and escaped the Portuguese political police, PIDE, to France where he worked with other exiled African nationalists. Dos Santos became head of the foreign relations department of Udenamo (National Democratic Union of Mozambique), which in 1962 merged with Manu (Mozambique African National Union) and Unami (National African Union for the Independence of Mozambique) to form Frelimo, under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane. When Mondlane was assassinated by the Portuguese in 1969, Samora Machel was elected President of Frelimo and dos Santos Deputy President.

After independence, in 1975, dos Santos became Minister of Planning and Development in Machel's first government, and held various posts until he became speaker of Parliament 1986-1994. AIM comments that despite Frelimo's embrace of a market economy, dos Santos never wavered in his commitment to socialism. He remained a member of the Frelimo Central Committee until he died. Dos Santos was also a poet, writing under the pseudonyms of Kulangano and Lilinho Micaia.

Former prime minister **Mario Machungo** died of an illness in Portugal on 17 February. Machungo was born on 1 December 1940 in Maxixe, Inhambane, and studied in Portugal where he joined Frelimo. He was a member of the Political Bureau 1977-1991. In the transitional government set up after the independence agreement he was Minister for Economic Coordination. From independence, he was Minister of Industry, then Agriculture, then Planning. He was Prime Minister 1986-94 and agreed the introduction of World Bank structural adjustment. Before and after his political career he was a banker, and became the founder and chair 1995-2015 of the International Bank of Mozambique (BIM), which became the largest commercial bank in the country.

=====

The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) strengthens data protection and requires that consent to receive communication must be 'freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous'. Importantly, there must be a positive opt-in as opposed to an opt-out. As you have voluntarily subscribed to our newsletters, you do not need to take any action and will continue to receive them as usual. We hold only your e-mail address and no other information about you, and we never share our subscription list with anyone.

To **unsubscribe**: [tinyurl.com/unsub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/unsub-moz)

=====

ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED but please cite the source: "Mozambique News Reports and Clippings". Previous newsletters are posted on [bit.ly/mozamb](http://bit.ly/mozamb)

## =====

## Background reading

### Special reports

#### Mozambique heroin transit trade

English - LSE - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin>

Portuguese - Pt - CIP - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroina>

#### Gas for development?

Gas for development or just for money? 2015 [bit.ly/MozGasEng](http://bit.ly/MozGasEng)

Gas para desenvolvimento ou apenas dinheiro? 2015 [bit.ly/MozGasPt](http://bit.ly/MozGasPt)

Social protection report - 2017 Mozambique - <http://bit.ly/MozSocPro>

Special report on four poverty surveys: [bit.ly/MozPoverty](http://bit.ly/MozPoverty)

2018 Constitution - <http://bit.ly/2KF588T>

Minimum wage and exchange rates 1996-2018 -- <http://bit.ly/MinWage18>

#### \$2bn secret debt - in English

Kroll - Full report on \$2bn debt - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-Moz-full>

Kroll report summary - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-sum>

Key points of Mozambique parliament report - Nov 2016 - <http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt-En>

Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique's \$2.2 bn debt - <http://bit.ly/3WQ-hanlon>

#### In Portuguese:

Parliamentary Report on the Secret Debt (complete) [bit.ly/MozAR-debt](http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt)

**Election study collaboration:** We have detailed election data from 1999 through 2014 and are inviting scholars to use this data collaboratively.

<http://bit.ly/MozElData>

Election newsletters are on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

**Eight books by Joseph Hanlon can be downloaded, free:** <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books>

Bangladesh confronts climate change (2016)

Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique (2014)

Há Mais Bicicletas – mas há desenvolvimento? (2008)

1203159

Moçambique e as grandes cheias de 2000 (2001)  
Paz Sem Benefício: Como o FMI Bloqueia a Reconstrução (1997)  
Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding (1996)  
Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots (1991)  
Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (1984)

**Two more will be available shortly to download:**

Apartheid's 2nd Front (1986)  
Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000

**These are still available for sale:**

Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento (2014) (free in English)  
Zimbabwe takes back its land (2013)  
Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South (2010)  
Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique? (2008) (free in Portuguese)  
Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (1986)

=====

This mailing is the personal responsibility of Joseph Hanlon, and does not necessarily represent the views of the Open University.

=====□

-- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority in relation to its secondary activity of credit broking.

**To:** [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com]; [5.1.2.e] [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com]  
**Cc:** [5.1.2.e] [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com]  
**From:** [5.1.2.e]  
**Sent:** Thur 2/27/2020 5:50:49 PM  
**Importance:** Normal  
**Subject:** Moz LNG CO2 study  
**MAIL\_RECEIVED:** Thur 2/27/2020 5:50:00 PM

.....  
Hoi [5.1.2.e] en [5.1.2.e], Op verzoek van met name [5.1.2a] en [5.1.2a] komt er een specifieke studie tav de CO2 impact van het project (incl monitoring hierop geloof ik). We ontvangen binnenkort de scope of work. Consultant wordt waarschijnlijk Wood Mackenzie (<https://www.woodmac.com/>). Paar vragen/opmerkingen aan/voor jullie:

1. Wordt de CO2 impact van dit project en andere projecten niet al meegenomen in de MVO beoordeling (en ERM DD)?
2. Kunnen jullie ajb namens Atradius meekijken en commentaar leveren op de scope of work die we binnenkort ontvangen?
3. Overigens is zo'n rapport mogelijk interessant in het kader van de service bonus 2020, waarbij volgens mij nu een potentiële workstream wordt om onze "bruine" deals te categoriseren (bijv tav CO2 impact...)

Als er iets niet duidelijk is hoor ik het graag. Dank!

Met vriendelijke groet,

[5.1.2.e]

[5.1.2.e]

Project Finance

Atradius Dutch State Business N.V.  
David Ricardostraat 1, 1066 JS, Amsterdam | P.O. Box 8982, 1006 JD, Amsterdam | Netherlands  
Phone: +31 (0)20 [5.1.2.e] | Fax: +31 (0)20 [5.1.2.e] |  
E-mail: [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com | Website: <http://www.atradiusdutchstatebusiness.nl>



Atradius Dutch State Business N.V. is de uitvoerder van de faciliteiten voor exportkredietverzekering en investeringsgaranties voor rekening en op naam van de Staat der Nederlanden.

Atradius Dutch State Business N.V. is the Export Credit Agency of the Netherlands.



**To:** [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com]  
**From:** [5.1.2.e]  
**Sent:** Thur 2/27/2020 5:51:11 PM  
**Importance:** Normal  
**Subject:** FW: Moz LNG CO2 study  
**MAIL\_RECEIVED:** Thur 2/27/2020 5:51:00 PM

.....

**From:** [5.1.2.e]  
**Sent:** donderdag 27 februari 2020 17:51  
**To:** [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com>; [5.1.2.e] <[5.1.2.e]@atradius.com>  
**Cc:** [5.1.2.e] <[5.1.2.e]@atradius.com>  
**Subject:** Moz LNG CO2 study

Hoi [5.1.2.e] en [5.1.2.e], Op verzoek van met name UKEF en USEXIM komt er een specifieke studie tav de CO2 impact van het project (incl monitoring hierop geloof ik). We ontvangen binnenkort de scope of work. Consultant wordt waarschijnlijk Wood Mackenzie (<https://www.woodmac.com/>). Paar vragen/opmerkingen aan/voor jullie:

1. Wordt de CO2 impact van dit project en andere projecten niet al meegenomen in de MVO beoordeling (en ERM DD)?
2. Kunnen jullie ajb namens Atradius meekijken en commentaar leveren op de scope of work die we binnenkort ontvangen?
3. Overigens is zo'n rapport mogelijk interessant in het kader van de service bonus 2020, waarbij volgens mij nu een potentiële workstream wordt om onze "bruine" deals te categoriseren (bijv tav CO2 impact...)

Als er iets niet duidelijk is hoor ik het graag. Dank!

Met vriendelijke groet,

[5.1.2.e]

[5.1.2.e]

| Project Finance

Atradius Dutch State Business N.V.  
David Ricardostraat 1, 1066 JS, Amsterdam | P.O. Box 8982, 1006 JD, Amsterdam | Netherlands  
Phone: +31 (0)20 [5.1.2.e] Fax: +31 (0)20 [5.1.2.e] |  
E-mail: [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com | Website: <http://www.atradiusdutchstatebusiness.nl>



Atradius Dutch State Business N.V. is de uitvoerder van de faciliteiten voor exportkredietverzekering en investeringsgaranties voor rekening en op naam van de Staat der Nederlanden.

Atradius Dutch State Business N.V. is the Export Credit Agency of the Netherlands.

To: 5.1.2.e @open.ac.uk]  
From:  
Sent: Thur 2/27/2020 6:17:34 PM  
Importance: Normal  
Subject: Mozambique 469 - Special report - evolution of the Cabo Delgado war  
MAIL\_RECEIVED: Thur 2/27/2020 6:17:55 PM  
[Mozambique 469-27Feb2020 Cabo-Delgado-origins-notes.pdf](#)

.....

# MOZAMBIQUE 469

## News reports & clippings

### 27 February 2020

=====

Editor: Joseph Hanlon ( [j.hanlon@open.ac.uk](mailto:j.hanlon@open.ac.uk) )

To subscribe: [tinyurl.com/sub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/sub-moz)

To unsubscribe: [tinyurl.com/unsab-moz](http://tinyurl.com/unsab-moz)

**Articles may be freely reprinted but please cite the source.**

Previous newsletters and other Mozambique material are posted on [bit.ly/mozamb](http://bit.ly/mozamb)

Downloadable books: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books> Election data: <http://bit.ly/MozElData>

=====

Attached in pdf

**Special report on the evolution of the Cabo Delgado war**

=====

*Notes on the evolution of the Cabo Delgado war:*  
**Although the global should not be forgotten,  
the local is most important**

An organised invasion of a Cabo Delgado ruby mine last weekend (22-23 February) by up to 2000 artisanal miners points to the broad base of the growing tensions and violence in Cabo Delgado. The ruby mine north of Montepuez has come to symbolise the conflict between local people and natural resource companies and Mozambican elites linked to those companies. Mozambique Ruby Mining (MRM) is 75% owned by Gemfields and 25% by Mwiriti, which is controlled by Raimundo Pachinuapa, a liberation war commander now on the Frelimo Political Commission. MRM is chaired by Samora Machel Jr. Pachinuapa's son Raime is MRM's director of corporate affairs.

In 2016 police evicted thousands of artisanal miners and farmers from the 340 square kilometer area that had been given to Montepuez Ruby Mining (MRM). The entire value chain was broken and thousands lost their income - traders, suppliers and farmers as well as the actual miners. In January 2019 Gemfields agreed a US\$8.3 million out-of-court settlement to resolve 273 claims of death, beatings and other human rights violations. The evictions, repression and economic hardship fuelled radicalization across Cabo Delgado.

Last week a rumour was circulated, probably by gemstone traders, that the President had announced that on Saturday the Maningue Nice mine on MRM land would be reopened to local miners. MRM claims that by Friday there were 2000 artisanal miners in neighbouring villages, and that in the invasion on Saturday mine security guards were attacked and injured. MRM has called on the government to protect the MRM concession from the informal miners it expelled.

There had been an invasion of Maningue Nice in the first week of February, but MRM successfully evicted the informal miners. Last weekend's invasion was larger and more organized.

Meanwhile 13 people were killed last week in attacks by Islamist insurgents in three districts, including five people beheaded in Imbada village, Meluco district, in a growing armed conflict. (*Carta de Moçambique*, 26 Feb)

A set of notes on the evolution of this war are in the pdf attached to this bulletin.

Our key point is to show the very complex linkages behind the Islamist insurgency, and to argue that the factors behind the insurgency and the MRM mine invasion are similar. Setting out the origins and evolution of the war, we show:

- + The antecedents of this war go back decades. and that there are a very large number of external and internal actors and contexts.
- + Externally, Cabo Delgado has been a playground for a wide range of religious missionaries, global natural resource companies, and traders in legal and illegal commodities. World Bank and IMF policies have set the development strategy.
- + Internally, poverty and inequality are growing. Greed and corruption have exacerbated the inequalities and caused a growing discontent, especially from marginalised young people.
- + External and internal actors work together. The local elite (internal) works with the natural resource companies and illegal traders (external). But at a lower level some people respond to the crisis of poverty and inequality by looking to religious leaders and sects for an explanation and solution, while religious leaders (both internal and external) try to interpret their doctrines and teachings as a solution to these crises, in order to recruit followers. Religion is presented as an answer to a development crisis.
- + The distrust of local elites is greater that many realise and there is a history of violence, from cholera riots two decades ago to last weekend's mass invasion of ruby mines. Following this history, it is less surprising that marginalised young people will join a violent group pledged to redress inequality

This leads to the conclusion that the growing civil war does not have a military solution. Civil war is fed by grievances, which must be resolved to end support for insurgents. But external factors must also be controlled to end the war, and it needs to be remembered that external factors are not just foreign Islamic militants, but also natural resource companies and illegal traders.

The local is most important, but the global should not be forgotten.

=====

The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) strengthens data protection and requires that consent to receive communication must be 'freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous'. Importantly, there must be a positive opt-in as opposed to an opt-out. As you have voluntarily subscribed to our newsletters, you do not need to take any action and will continue to receive them as usual. We hold only your e-mail address and no other information about you, and we never share our subscription list with anyone.

To **unsubscribe**: [tinyurl.com/unsub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/unsub-moz)

=====

ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED but please cite the source: "Mozambique News Reports and Clippings". Previous newsletters are posted on [bit.ly/mozamb](http://bit.ly/mozamb)

=====

## Background reading

### Special reports

#### Mozambique heroin transit trade

English - LSE - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin>

Portuguese - Pt - CIP - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroina>

#### Gas for development?

Gas for development or just for money? 2015 [bit.ly/MozGasEng](http://bit.ly/MozGasEng)

Gás para desenvolvimento ou apenas dinheiro? 2015 [bit.ly/MozGasPt](http://bit.ly/MozGasPt)

Social protection report - 2017 Mozambique - <http://bit.ly/MozSocPro>

Special report on four poverty surveys: [bit.ly/MozPoverty](http://bit.ly/MozPoverty)

2018 Constitution - <http://bit.ly/2KF588T>

Minimum wage and exchange rates 1996-2018 -- <http://bit.ly/MinWage18>

#### \$2bn secret debt - in English

Kroll - Full report on \$2bn debt - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-Moz-full>

Kroll report summary - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-sum>

Key points of Mozambique parliament report - Nov 2016 - <http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt-En>

Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique's \$2.2 bn debt - <http://bit.ly/3WQ-hanlon>

#### In Portuguese:

Parliamentary Report on the Secret Debt (complete) [bit.ly/MozAR-debt](http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt)

**Election study collaboration:** We have detailed election data from 1999 through 2014 and are inviting scholars to use this data collaboratively.

<http://bit.ly/MozElData>

Election newsletters are on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

**Eight books by Joseph Hanlon can be downloaded, free:** <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books>

Bangladesh confronts climate change (2016)  
Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique (2014)  
Há Mais Bicicletas – mas há desenvolvimento? (2008)  
Moçambique e as grandes cheias de 2000 (2001)  
Paz Sem Benefício: Como o FMI Bloqueia a Reconstrução (1997)  
Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding (1996)  
Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots (1991)  
Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (1984)

**Two more will be available shortly to download:**

Apartheid's 2nd Front (1986)  
Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000

**These are still available for sale:**

Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento (2014) (free in English)  
Zimbabwe takes back its land (2013)  
Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South (2010)  
Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique? (2008) (free in Portuguese)  
Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (1986)

=====

This mailing is the personal responsibility of Joseph Hanlon, and does not necessarily represent the views of the Open University.

=====□

-- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority in relation to its secondary activity of credit broking.



To: 5.1.2.e @open.ac.uk]  
From:  
Sent: Tue 3/17/2020 2:24:30 AM  
Importance: Normal  
Subject: Mozambique 472 - Cabo Delgado, Covid-19, Kidnaps return - 17 March 2020  
MAIL\_RECEIVED: Tue 3/17/2020 2:24:56 AM  
[Mozambique 472 17Mar2020 CaboDelgado Covid-19 kidnapdoc.pdf](#)

# MOZAMBIQUE 472

## News reports & clippings

### 17 March 2020

=====

Editor: Joseph Hanlon ( [j.hanlon@open.ac.uk](mailto:j.hanlon@open.ac.uk) )

To subscribe: [tinyurl.com/sub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/sub-moz)

To unsubscribe: [tinyurl.com/unsub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/unsub-moz)

**Articles may be freely reprinted but please cite the source.**

Previous newsletters and other Mozambique material are posted on [bit.ly/mozamb](http://bit.ly/mozamb)

Downloadable books: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books> Election data: <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>

=====

**Attached: this newsletter in pdf**

**Corrections** have been made to issue 471, 10 March 2020. In the Embraer article, a sentence is corrected to read "The \$800,000 was to paid to a Sao Tome account of Zimba, who then ordered payments." And in the heroin article the correct link for the Portuguese heroin paper is <http://bit.ly/HeroinaPT> The revised issue 471 is on <http://bit.ly/Mozam471>

=====

***Also in this issue: Covid-19; Kidnaps***

=====

## War intensifying near Mocimboa da Praia and Bilibiza

It appears that insurgents are trying to maintain control over the corridor and road through Bilibiza, Cabo Delgado, which was attacked and heavily damaged 29-30 January.. On 9 March there was an attack on the road from Bilibiza toward Quissanga on the coast. And Moz24h (10 Mar) says the insurgents have closed the road going inland from Bilibiza, blocking the road with trees and have put headless bodies on the road. Moz24h says local people report heavy fighting, with ambushes of government armoured cars. (The map in the pdf version of this bulletin shows the roads in the area.) Bilibiza is 50 km north west of Pemba as the crow flies or 120 km by road, and is the farthest south the war has spread

The other focus of the war is very close to Mocimboa da Praia. On 8 March at 05.00, gunmen ambushed a heavy truck belonging to Bangladeshi traders who have been working in Mocimboa da Praia district for the past four years. At about 14.00, a pick-up sent to fetch the owners of the truck and assess the damage was fired on. In the two ambushes four people were injured. (AIM 10 Mar)

The villages of Ulo and Anga, close to Mocimboa da Praia town, were attacked and burned on 12 March. On 5 March Naikidunga was attacked and on 6 March Nabage. Local people report a number of villages in the area have been recently attacked and local people report many dead, some kidnapped, and houses burned. (Moz24h 13, 6 Mar)

Elsewhere, on 4 March insurgents killed four people and burnt down 30 houses in an attack against the village of Nkonda, Nangade district. (AIM 10 Mar) Insurgents attacked soldiers in Chomba, 30 km northwest of Mueda town, but the date is not known.

The World Food Programme has produced a good set of district maps for Cabo Delgado, on  
1203157

00073

## 910 dead in Cabo Delgado civil war

The death toll in the Cabo Delgado war has reached 910, according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). And the toll is rising. from 188 in 2018 to 583 in 2019 and 106 up to 5 March this year. ACLD keeps a very detailed data base, on <https://www.acleddata.com>. I have taken just the Cabo Delgado data, and posted it in an Excel spreadsheet on <http://bit.ly/ACLED-CD-Mar19>

Several other groups are reporting lower levels of fatalities, ranging from 300 to 700.

**Comment:** Can this be called a "war"? In the book *Civil War, Civil Peace* (Helen Yanacopulos and Joseph Hanlon, 2006) we defined "Civil war is collective killing for some collective purpose, mainly within one country, and where the fighting is primarily between people of that country." Some research groups add a body count, often 100 people per year or a total of 1000 dead. Deaths are likely to exceed 1000 in Cabo Delgado within a few months. Thus we feel confident in calling the fighting in Cabo Delgado a "civil war".

## Information curbs

In an attempt to stop them passing information to the media and the public at large about what attacks are happening in Cabo Delgado, the military and police are carrying out raids on citizens, in particular NGO workers. In one case, last week, members of one NGO were stopped in their vehicle by members of the security forces and forced to hand over their mobile phones, and codes to unlock them. They were questioned for four hours, while their phones were checked to see what messages or videos they were sending on WhatsApp, Twitter, and Facebook, and to whom. Such investigations are also happening within the security forces, whose members are also suspected of being a source of leaks. A security force member told *Carta de Mocambique* (12 Mar) that the objective was to stop the press and public knowing what is happening in the war.

## Other Cabo Delgado war news

**Russian military aid:** Another Russian Antonov plane landed in Nacala on 23 February, Africa Intelligence reports - bringing a cargo of military hardware probably including another military helicopter to join one that was flown in from Russia last September. The Antonov An-124 flew from Ulan-Ude's Baikal International Airport in Siberia, close to the Ulan-Ude Aviation Plant that assembles Mi-17 helicopters. The flight was operated by Russian state military aircraft operator 224 Flight Unit, which also delivered an Mi-17 helicopter to be used for surveillance operations last September. (*Africa Intelligence* 9 Mar)

**New agency:** The government Thursday announced an economic development agency for the country's three northern provinces, hoping it will combat the Cabo Delgado insurgency. The Northern Integrated Development Agency (Agencia de Desenvolvimento Integrado do Norte, ADIN) "will drive the integrated, balanced and harmonious development of the provinces of Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nampula," government spokesman Filimao Suaze told the press following an extraordinary session of Council of Ministers on Thursday (12 Mar). The agency will provide employment opportunities for young people, who may otherwise be recruited by the insurgents, and inspire faith that their country has more to offer than the insurgency, Suaze said. But *@Verdade* (15 Mar) is not impressed, seeing as just another agency that will drain money into the pockets of Frelimo. It points to the Development Agency of the Zambeze Valley (Agencia de Desenvolvimento do Vale do Zambeze) which the Administrative Tribunal found that in 2017 spent \$1.4 mn without appropriate paperwork and \$350,000 on spending with no contracts at all.

**War contracts:** An alleged contract between the gas companies and the military has been published by *Canal de Mocambique* (11 Mar). The 28 February 2019 contract is between the gas companies Anadarko and ENI and the ministries of defence and interior, in which the gas companies pay for military and police protection. What is unusual is that the money goes not to the ministries, but to a special account with four signatories: then defence minister Atanasio Mtumuke, then vice minister Patricio Jose, permanent secretary Fernando Campire, and Casimiro Mueio. They are supposed to make the extra payments, which range from 315 Meticaís (\$5) per day for senior officers down to 150 Meticaís (\$2.50) for basic police guards. But Canal says that the soldiers and police are not receiving their money, and the people guarding the gas installations say the money has gone to the big men. Canal argues that the replacement of Mtumuke and former Interior Minister Basilio 1203157

Monteiro was because the failure to pay the money to the people doing the guarding was causing discontent.

## **No maintenance and overweight truck caused bridge collapse**

Over many years the Montepuez River eroded the soil around the pillars of the bridge on the N380 road over the river. Built more than 50 years ago, the bridge has not been maintained or rehabilitated - or even inspected. And when an overweight truck crossed the bridge on 27 December, it collapsed. The government set up an inquiry commission headed by Tiago Filipe, who said lack of maintenance left the bridge in a precarious state. The N380 is the only paved road from Pemba north to Mocimboa da Praia and the gas fields at Palma. (See map in the pdf version of this newsletter.) (STV 8 Mar, O Pais 9 Mar)

The Montepuez River bridge is south of Macomia. Another bridge on the N380 over the Messalo River, north of Macomia, has also collapsed, probably due to lack of maintenance. Temporary bypasses have been built. The road from Pemba to Bilibiza and on to Macomia is closed because the bridge over the Montepuez river on the road is also down.

There are only two routes open from Pemba north to Mocimboa da Praia, and both are precarious and limited to 10 tonne vehicles. They are the N380 with its several bypasses, or the road via Montepuez and Mueda which is largely dirt.

Two other bridges on the main N1 road, over the Lurio and Save rivers, are currently bypassed as the highway authority tries to catch up with decades of lack of maintenance.

## **Attacks resume near Gorongosa**

Renamo dissidents have resumed attacks on the main north-south N1 road, with three attacks in five days in the section between Inchope (the junction with the N6 Beira-Chimoio road) and Gorongosa. Yesterday morning (Monday 16 March) a lorry was fired on, seriously injuring one person. There is a military convoy going through this section, and the convoy was fired at on Friday (13 Mar), injuring four people. On Thursday a bus was machine gunned, injuring three people. Since attacks started in August, 20 people have been killed. (Lusa 16 Mar)

---

## **Covid-19: restrictions but no cases yet**

All events attended by over 300 people are suspended, President Filipe Nyusi said on Saturday night, adding that events that do go ahead should not be held in closed spaces with inadequate ventilation. The Mozambican Football Federation (FMF) chair, Feizal Sidat, told reporters that provincial football championships will continue, but the number of people allowed to enter the stadiums will be limited to 300. Games scheduled for closed environments, such as five-a-side football, are cancelled, he said. The pandemic is also affecting religious ceremonies. The Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Maputo cancelled Sunday's "Via Sacra" (Stations of the Cross) which would have attracted more than 300 people.

Frelimo has stopped the 20-22 March meeting of the Central Committee, which has 189 members, but once support staff (including caterers and cleaners), journalists and guests are included the number would exceed 300. But parliament has decided its session starting 25 March will take place, even though it has 250 members and with staff total attendance will be more than 300.

The Health Ministry announced on Thursday compulsory quarantine for any traveller arriving in Mozambique from China, Italy, South Korea, Iran, Germany or France. These are all countries that recorded over 1,000 cases of Covid-19, with more than 100 daily infections, and others will be added to the list. The United States and Spain have since been added. (AIM 13, 15, 16 Mar) Government has suspended all state travel outside the country.

The IMF and World Bank had already postponed missions due to arrive this month.

So far, Mozambique has reported no cases, but 37 gas workers are under quarantine in Cabo Delgado, and Chinese workers are under quarantine elsewhere. All arrived recently from countries with high levels of Covid-19. But neighbouring South Africa has confirmed 61 cases and declared a national "state of disaster", closing schools and prohibiting gatherings of more than 100 people. In a statement Sunday President Cyril Ramaphosa announced a travel ban on foreign nationals from high-risk countries



including Italy, Iran, South Korea, Spain, Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom and China as from 18 March 2020. South Africa has closed three of its four land border crossings with Mozambique; only Lebombo/Ressano Garcia remains open.

A detailed assessment of Covid-19 in Mozambique has been released by risk consultants Intelyse, and is on: <http://bit.ly/3b3C1Jl>

The economy has already been hit, particularly tourism and imports from China. Falling oil prices (and thus LNG prices) mean bankers are less willing to fund billion dollar LNG loans, which may delay the start of the Cabo Delgado LNG projects, said Carlos Zacarias, president of the National Petroleum Institute. The Bank of Mozambique cut the amount that banks must deposit with the central bank to release money for lending. Reserves are cut from 13% to 11.5% for local currency and from 36% to 34.5% per cent for foreign currency.

## **Little money for cyclone recovery**

At the donors conference in Beira in May 2019, \$1.4 bn was pledged for reconstruction from cyclones Idai and Kenneth - both record breaking cyclones made worse by global heating. But of that money, only \$193 mn will be available this year, said Minister of Public Works Joao Machatine after the 10 March Council of Ministers meeting. Based on the pledges, contracts have been signed for \$706 mn of works, but the money is not there, he said.

One of the projects being deferred again is the rebuilding of ten kilometres of coastal protection which separates the city of Beira from the Indian Ocean. Of the \$193 mn available, \$138 mn will be for infrastructure and \$55 mn for economic recovery, including support for private companies damaged by the cyclones, and for institutional support. (AIM 11 Mar)

## **Informal traders win again**

Faced with poverty, an estimated 4000 people sell goods on the streets and pavements of Maputo, particularly in the downtown "baixa", where they sometimes block the pavement completely. Each new mayoral administration tries to force the traders into formal markets. This happened again on Friday (13 Mar). After a long campaign saying the informal trading would be banned after 12 March, police attacked the traders on Friday. The traders responded with force, throwing up barricades, burning tyres, and attacking some baixa shops and buses. Police dogs were used, and tear gas and pepper gas were fired indiscriminately. By Monday, the informal traders had returned to business as usual. (AIM 13, 16 Mar) Matthew Hill of Bloomberg posted videos of the protests and response: <https://twitter.com/mattstephenhill/status/1238394066087395328>

## **Credit Suisse is liable for the \$2 bn secret debt.**

US prosecutors believe they have evidence of the Swiss lender's culpability for the \$2bn secret debt after three former bankers pleaded guilty last year, according to Reuters (16 March). "Prosecutors believe Credit Suisse can be held criminally liable for its employees' crimes if they were committed in the scope of their role and at least partly benefited the bank, said one of the sources who is a US law enforcement official. They believe a plea deal and testimonies from two former bankers at a subsequent trial give them evidence of the bank's culpability," Reuters said.

Meanwhile, the first payment of \$22.5 mn on the new Ematum bonds was due on yesterday, 16 March.

The *Mail and Guardian* (21 Feb) accused prominent South African estate agent Pam Golding of handling some of the money, which was used to buy property as a form of money laundering. US court transcripts show Privinvest, the company behind the secret \$2 bn loans, sent Rand 50 mn (\$3 mn) to buy properties in Cape Town for Armando Guebuza's children Armando and Valentina.

## **Kidnapping and gangs return**

Kidnapping and gangs linked to the police have returned to Maputo.

The 12 year old child of proprietor of electrical shop Armazens Africa was kidnapped on 11 March near the shop on Avenida Josina Machel. A security camera showed the kidnapping:  
1203157



<https://www.facebook.com/issuf.mahomed/videos/10220304040564098/?t=0> From 30 seconds into the video watch the man in the white t-shirt grab the child and bundle him into a white car which has just arrived. This is the fourth kidnapping this year involving businessmen or families. (Club of Mozambique 11 Mar)

Maputo businessman Moniz Carsane, known as Manish Cantilal, was kidnapped by unknown men on 18 February, and has not been released. A security camera video shows hooded men abducting Cantilal in the garage of his house in central Maputo. Cantilal and Dino Foi are the owners of the new El Patron restaurant on Avenida Julius Nyerere in the capital. Ironically, in 2014 Manish was arrested on suspicion of involvement in the wave of kidnappings of businessmen in Maputo City and Matola, but was later cleared. The phenomenon of kidnappings now appears to be back. CanalMoz notes today that the police continue to allow the kidnappers to operate with impunity, while *Savana* says the criminals have high level protection in the Ministry of Interior. (CanalMoz, Zitamar 19 Feb; *Savana* 13 March)

On 29 February Guita Samji was found dead in South Africa, after having been kidnaped four months before. She ran a small tobacconists which also changed money on Av Julius Nyerere in Maputo. On 2 February the cousin of business man Juneid Lalgay was released after a large sum of money was paid. (*Savana* 13 March)

Gunmen killed a policeman as he drove away from the headquarters of the National Criminal Investigation Service (SERNIC) in Maputo. The car stopped at the junction with Av 24 de Julho. Another car drew up alongside, and peppered the victim's Toyota with bullets. Just to make sure, some of the gunmen got out of the vehicles, opened the door of the victim's car, and shot him several times in the head. The assassins then escaped. (AIM 12 Mar) Two other people were killed in a car on the same day; one is apparently a policeman and the other had been expelled from the police for renting out guns. (*Savana* 13 March)

=====

The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) strengthens data protection and requires that consent to receive communication must be 'freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous'. Importantly, there must be a positive opt-in as opposed to an opt-out. As you have voluntarily subscribed to our newsletters, you do not need to take any action and will continue to receive them as usual. We hold only your e-mail address and no other information about you, and we never share our subscription list with anyone.

To **unsubscribe**: [tinyurl.com/umsub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/umsub-moz)

=====

ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED but please cite the source: "Mozambique News Reports and Clippings". Previous newsletters are posted on [bit.ly/mozamb](http://bit.ly/mozamb)

## =====

## Background reading

### Special reports

#### Mozambique heroin transit trade

English - LSE - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin>

Portuguese - Pt - CIP - <http://bit.ly/HeroinaPT>

#### Gas for development?

Gas\_for\_development\_or\_just\_for\_money?\_2015 [bit.ly/MozGasEng](http://bit.ly/MozGasEng)

Gás\_para\_desenvolvimento\_ou\_apenas\_dinheiro?\_2015 [bit.ly/MozGasPt](http://bit.ly/MozGasPt)

Social protection report - 2017 Mozambique - <http://bit.ly/MozSocPro>

Special report on four poverty surveys: [bit.ly/MozPoverty](http://bit.ly/MozPoverty)

2018 Constitution - <http://bit.ly/2KF588T>

Minimum wage and exchange rates 1996-2018 -- <http://bit.ly/MinWage18>

#### \$2bn secret debt - in English

Kroll - Full report on \$2bn debt - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-Moz-full>

Kroll report summary - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-sum>

Key points of Mozambique parliament report - Nov 2016 - <http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt-En>

Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique's \$2.2 bn debt - <http://bit.ly/3WQ-hanlon>

#### In Portuguese:

Parliamentary Report on the Secret Debt (complete) [bit.ly/MozAR-debt](http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt)

**Election study collaboration:** We have detailed election data from 1999 through 2014 and are inviting scholars to use this data collaboratively.

<http://bit.ly/MozElData>

Election newsletters are on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

**Eight books by Joseph Hanlon can be downloaded, free:** <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books>

Bangladesh confronts climate change (2016)

Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique (2014)

1203157

00073

Há Mais Bicicletas – mas há desenvolvimento? (2008)  
Moçambique e as grandes cheias de 2000 (2001)  
Paz Sem Benefício: Como o FMI Bloqueia a Reconstrução (1997)  
Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding (1996)  
Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots (1991)  
Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (1984)

**Two more will be available shortly to download:**

Apartheid's 2nd Front (1986)  
Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000

**These are still available for sale:**

Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento (2014) (free in English)  
Zimbabwe takes back its land (2013)  
Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South (2010)  
Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique? (2008) (free in Portuguese)  
Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (1986)

=====

This mailing is the personal responsibility of Joseph Hanlon, and does not necessarily represent the views of the Open University.

=====□

-- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority in relation to its secondary activity of credit broking.

To: 5.1.2.e @open.ac.uk]  
From:  
Sent: Wed 3/25/2020 8:36:19 PM  
Importance: Normal  
Subject: Mozambique 475 - Quissanga occupied as war escalates; Covid-19 - 25 March 2020  
MAIL\_RECEIVED: Wed 3/25/2020 8:37:04 PM  
[Mozambique 475-25Mar2020 Quissanga Covid-19-elite.pdf](#)

# MOZAMBIQUE 475

## News reports & clippings

### 25 March 2020

=====

Editor: Joseph Hanlon ([j.hanlon@open.ac.uk](mailto:j.hanlon@open.ac.uk))

To subscribe: [tinyurl.com/sub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/sub-moz)

To unsubscribe: [tinyurl.com/unsub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/unsub-moz)

**Articles may be freely reprinted but please cite the source.**

Previous newsletters and other Mozambique material are posted on [bit.ly/mozamb](http://bit.ly/mozamb)

Downloadable books: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books> Election data: <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>

=====

Attached: this newsletter in pdf

=====

*Also in this issue:*

**First covid-19 cases threaten top people**

=====

## Quissanga attacked as civil war escalates

Insurgents this morning occupied Quissanga, which is just 60 km by air and 120 km by road north of Pemba. (Lusa 25 Mar) It had been clear since the attack on Bilibiza on 29 January that insurgents were aiming at Quissanga, and there have been repeated attacks in the N380-Bilibiza-Quissanga corridor. (This newsletter 467, 31 Jan 2020, and 472, 17 March 2020; A map of the area is available on <https://bit.ly/BilibizaMap>) Quissanga is an important local port providing links to Ibo and other Islands, as well as for shipping cargo north.



The picture shows insurgents in front of the Quissango police station and must be from this attack as it has not been attacked before. No other details are available. AIM today (25 Mar) reports that "other photos show bodies. In one there is a body wearing a uniform of the Mozambican armed forces (FADM), and in another the victim is wearing what seem to be police boots. The other photos are almost certainly of civilians. One is of a man whose body has been badly burnt and mutilated. Another is of a man wearing a pair of sandals, with no sign of any military equipment or uniform. The most gruesome of these photos shows a pile of seven bodies."

Apparently there were few people in the town; in response to growing threats, many had already fled, including by boat to Ibo and Pemba.

The attack comes just two days after insurgents occupied Mocimboa da Praia, on the coast 120 km further north. The insurgents raised their flag on the military barracks and police station, and burned various buildings including three banks and the houses of the mayor and district administrator.

They remained for the day on Monday, fraternizing with local people, and left in the late afternoon without being effectively challenged by security forces. Ministers of defence and interior, Jaime Neto and Amade Miquidade, yesterday travelled to Mocimboa da Praia to see what had gone wrong.

**Bridge down again.** The temporary bridge which provides the only paved road link between Pemba and the gas fields of the north has collapsed again, perhaps due to an overweight lorry, as the picture shows.



The temporary bridge is limited to vehicles of 10 tonnes. The bridge is over the Montepuez River on the N380 south of Macomia, and was a temporary replacement for a bridge that washed out in floods in December. (Bridge on the left of the map on <https://bit.ly/BilibizaMap>) A report of the washout suggests that the bridge had not been inspected or maintained for many years - perhaps since independence - and over years the river slowly washed the soil away from around the bridge piers and no one noticed. The alternative coastal route, from Pemba to Quissanga, remains closed because the bridge on that route over the Montepuez river also washed out and has not been repaired. (Bridge on the right of the map.) **Comment:** It is the small and frustrating things that make some people argue that Mozambique is becoming a failed state - core infrastructure is not even



inspected and dozens of bridges have been damaged or destroyed by overweight lorries. The roads authority imposed weight limits on this temporary bridge, but they were not enforced. *jh*

## First covid-19 cases threaten top people

Lucia Comiche, the wife of the mayor of Maputo Eneas Comiche, last evening telephoned STV to say she had covid-19 and was "case 2". This makes it clear that Eneas is "case 1". So far there are five positive tests, according to health officials today.

Eneas was in London on 10 March for a meeting of Water Aid; a photo shows him sitting next to Prince Albert of Monaco. Also at the meeting was Prince Charles of Britain. Charles, Albert and Comiche have all tested positive for Covid-19.

On their return the Comiches did not go into isolation, and the Maputo mayor went into a round of meetings with ministers, the Frelimo Political Commission, governors and members of parliament - which means the entire top leadership has been exposed. (*Carta de Mocambique* 25 Mar)

=====

**ELECTION OVERLOAD?** - You are subscribed to two newsletters, the *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin election newsletters* (published by CIP), and *Mozambique News Reports and Clippings* (published by Joseph Hanlon and not linked to CIP). If you want to receive this newsletter but not the election newsletters, just reply to this e-mail with "no election" in the subject line.

=====

The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) strengthens data protection and requires that consent to receive communication must be 'freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous'. Importantly, there must be a positive opt-in as opposed to an opt-out. As you have voluntarily subscribed to our newsletters, you do not need to take any action and will continue to receive them as usual. We hold only your e-mail address and no other information about you, and we never share our subscription list with anyone.

To **unsubscribe**: [tinyurl.com/umsub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/umsub-moz)

=====

ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED but please cite the source: "Mozambique News Reports and Clippings". Previous newsletters are posted on [bit.ly/mozamb](http://bit.ly/mozamb)

=====

### Background reading

#### Special reports

##### Mozambique heroin transit trade

English - LSE - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin>

Portuguese - Pt - CIP - <http://bit.ly/HeroinaPT>

##### Gas for development?

Gas\_for\_development\_or\_just\_for\_money?\_2015 [bit.ly/MozGasEng](http://bit.ly/MozGasEng)

Gás\_para\_desenvolvimento\_ou\_apenas\_dinheiro?\_2015 [bit.ly/MozGasPt](http://bit.ly/MozGasPt)

Social protection report - 2017 Mozambique - <http://bit.ly/MozSocPro>

Special report on four poverty surveys: [bit.ly/MozPoverty](http://bit.ly/MozPoverty)

2018 Constitution - <http://bit.ly/2KF588T>

Minimum wage and exchange rates 1996-2018 -- <http://bit.ly/MinWage18>

##### \$2bn secret debt - in English

Kroll - Full report on \$2bn debt - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-Moz-full>

Kroll report summary - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-sum>

Key points of Mozambique parliament report - Nov 2016 - <http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt-En>

Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique's \$2.2 bn debt - <http://bit.ly/3WQ-hanlon>

##### In Portuguese:

Parliamentary Report on the Secret Debt (complete) [bit.ly/MozAR-debt](http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt)

**Election study collaboration:** We have detailed election data from 1999 through 2014 and are inviting scholars to use this data collaboratively. <http://bit.ly/MozElData>

Election newsletters are on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

**Eight books by Joseph Hanlon can be downloaded, free:** <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books>

Bangladesh confronts climate change (2016)

Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique (2014)

Há Mais Bicletas – mas há desenvolvimento? (2008)

Moçambique e as grandes cheias de 2000 (2001)

Paz Sem Benefício: Como o FMI Bloqueia a Reconstrução (1997)

Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding (1996)

Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots (1991)

Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (1984)

1203156

00075

**Two more will be available shortly to download:**

Apartheid's 2nd Front (1986)

Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000

**These are still available for sale:**

Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento (2014) (free in English)

Zimbabwe takes back its land (2013)

Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South (2010)

Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique? (2008) (free in Portuguese)

Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (1986)

=====

This mailing is the personal responsibility of Joseph Hanlon, and does not necessarily represent the views of the Open University.

=====□

-- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority in relation to its secondary activity of credit broking.

To: [redacted] 5.1.2.e @open.ac.uk]  
From: [redacted]  
Sent: Mon 3/30/2020 9:51:01 PM  
Importance: Normal  
Subject: Mozambique 477 - State of emergency; Covid-19 could be as bad as AIDS - 30 March 2020  
MAIL\_RECEIVED: Mon 3/30/2020 9:51:30 PM  
[Mozambique 477-30March2020 State-of-emergency appointments.pdf](#)

# MOZAMBIQUE 477

## News reports & clippings

### 30 March 2020

=====

Editor: Joseph Hanlon ( [j.hanlon@open.ac.uk](mailto:j.hanlon@open.ac.uk) )

To subscribe: [tinyurl.com/sub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/sub-moz)

To unsubscribe: [tinyurl.com/unsub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/unsub-moz) □

**Articles may be freely reprinted but please cite the source.**

Previous newsletters and other Mozambique material are posted on [bit.ly/mozamb](http://bit.ly/mozamb)

Downloadable books: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books> Election data: <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>

=====

#### Attached: this newsletter in pdf

The updated Imperial College report "The Global Impact of COVID-19 and Strategies for Mitigation and Suppression" is now available on [bit.ly/Imperial-Covid-12v2](http://bit.ly/Imperial-Covid-12v2). The spread sheet with the data by country, including Mozambique, is on [bit.ly/Imperial-Covid-12data](http://bit.ly/Imperial-Covid-12data).

=====

#### *Also in this issue:*

**No to resumed budget support**

**Covid-19 could be as serious as AIDS**

=====

## President declares state of emergency for Covid-19

In a televised statement, President Filipe Nyusi this evening declared a state of emergency because of the Covid-19 crisis. It will take effect Wednesday 1 April and run for 30 days. The state of emergency would allow restrictions on movement to reduce contacts and transmission of the disease. Nyusi said it would not be a full lockdown, but gave no other details. Actions will be defined tomorrow at the Council of Ministers meeting.

On Friday afternoon the Council of State had advised the President to call a state of emergency. The Council of State is an advisory body which the President must consult before issuing a state of emergency. The Council was named by parties in parliament Thursday and sworn in by Nyusi Friday morning. In the afternoon it held its first meeting. Covid-19 was the only point on the agenda, and the Council suggested that, in the light of the danger of a rapid spread of the disease, Nyusi should declare a state of emergency. (AIM 28 Mar)

The Constitution says that a state of emergency can only be declared "in cases of actual or imminent aggression, a serious threat to or disturbance of the constitutional order, or a public disaster". Covid-19 is a "public disaster". Once he has declared the state of emergency, the President must submit it to parliament (the Assembly of the Republic, AR) for ratification within 24 hours. The AR has 48 hours to decide whether or not to ratify the state of emergency.

Under a state of emergency, measures may be taken to curtail individual rights and freedoms. A state of emergency lasts for 30 days and can be renewed twice. Under the Constitution, there is no way that a state of emergency can last for more than 90 days. Mozambique has never before declared a state of emergency

There has been quite an intense debate in the independent press over a possible lockdown. The main argument is that with most people being very poor, living from day-to-day in self-built houses without proper access to water and with no food reserves, it is impossible for households to be isolated. The counter argument is that the alternative is worse - of households having to cope with sick and dying people because health services are overwhelmed. See <http://www.verdade.co.mz/nacional/70111>, <https://cartamz.com/>, and <https://cipmoz.org/2020/03/30/isolamento-para-mitigar-covid-19-no-meio-da-pobreza-propostas-de-alternativas-para-mocambique/>

## **Covid-19 could be as serious as AIDS**

The Imperial College model published last week estimated that Covid-19 could kill up to 65,000 Mozambicans this year, if nothing is done to block transmission. (See this newsletter 476, 27 March). UNAIDS estimates that in 2018, AIDS killed 54,000 people in Mozambique and 150,000 people were newly infected. UNAIDS estimates that 2.2 mn Mozambicans are infected with AIDS and 1.2 mn are on antiretroviral therapy.

## **No money direct to government**

There will be no resumption of budget support and no new money direct to government, the European Union representative Antonio Sanchez-Benedito told *O Pais Económico* (27 Mar). At a meeting with donors Monday (23 March), government asked for \$703 mn to fight Covid-19, and asked part of it as budget support - money given directly to the government budget.

All donors stopped budget support and money directly to government in May 2016 when the \$2 bn secret debt was revealed. Sanchez-Benedito made clear that there was no chance of a resumption until the government agreed with the IMF a programme that included transparency and good financial management. And that is some way off. An IMF team was due in mid-March to start discussions, but the trip was cancelled due to Covid-19.

All Sanchez-Benedito offered was to reallocate some money already in the EU budget for Mozambique.

Asked about promised money for cyclones Idai and Kenneth, he said the EU had promised €100 mn and the European Investment Bank (EIB) has promised another €100 mn. Of the EU money, €75 mn has been spent, in part for food and through a UN common fund. The other €25 mn and the EIB €100 mn is still being sorted out because it is for infrastructure projects jointly with other donors. He did not say so explicitly, but made very clear the EU was not letting government get its hands on the money, which would all be controlled by the donors and UN.

The Public Integrity Centre (CIP) points out that of the \$703 mn, \$553 mn is to build 79 district hospitals promised by President Filipe Nyusi in his election campaign last year.

<https://cipmoz.org/2020/03/25/governo-deve-publicar-plano-de-contingencia-para-fazer-face-ao-covid-19/> And in a separate statement CIP pointed out the government has received \$880 mn for the sale of Anadarko to Total, and this could be used to that expenditure.

## **Frelimo veteran Panguene to head northern development agency**

Retired diplomat Armando Panguene has been named chair of the newly established Agency for the Integrated Development of the North (ADIN), intended in particular to create jobs in Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nampula as a response to the growing insurgency.

The 77 year old Panguene is a veteran of the liberation war, who served in a wide range of posts including chief of staff of the armed forces; at various times ambassador to Portugal, Britain, South Africa and the United States; deputy foreign and defence ministers; and governor of Cabo Delgado and Nampula provinces.

The agency reports directly to the Council of Ministers and there will be inevitable conflicts with the new elected governors, the nominated secretaries of state in each province, and Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development Celso Correia with his National Fund for Sustainable Development (FNDS) - all of whom have responsibility for local economic development.



Pulling Panguene out of retirement may be an attempt to solve two problems. First, ADIN will need donor money at a time donors are refusing to give cash to the government. Panguene is old guard Frelimo from an era when integrity mattered, and is an experienced diplomat, so might be able to win donor support. But many in Frelimo will want a share of those resources, and Panguene as a liberation war fighter, diplomat, and former governor of Cabo Delgado will know all of the key players and may be able to come to arrangements that allow some of the money to be spent on creating jobs for Cabo Delgado youth.

But his appointment has not been universally welcomed. In 1974, when he was just 32 years old, Panguene was appointed governor of Nampula province in the transitional government. Surely there exist similarly capable young people to take on leadership roles like this, asks Joao Tinga of the recently created CDD (Centro para a Democracia e Desenvolvimento, Centre for Democracy and Development). ADIN is about creating jobs and creating social and economic conditions for young people, to discourage them from joining radical groups. That requires an "agency to be led by young people with creative and innovative ideas, young people full of energy to get the institution running," Tinga continues. "It is worth remembering the words of Filipe Nyusi in his inauguration speech: 'Mozambique is a country of young people. There will be no development in Mozambique without the involvement of young people'." With millions of young people prepared to take on the challenges of the country, the government must show by example that they have a role, Tinga argues. <https://cddmoz.org/armando-panguene-de-77-anos-e-presidente-da-adin-governo-sacrifica-reforma-de-um-combatente-num-pais-cheio-de-jovens/>

## Advisory commissions named

Members of three advisory commissions were named by political parties in parliament on Thursday 27 March. (AIM 27 Mar)

**The Council of State** advises the President, who must consult the Council prior to any declaration of war, or of a state of emergency or state of siege. The Council must also be consulted if the President wishes to dissolve parliament, to hold a referendum, or to sack any provincial governor or district administrator.

The ruling Frelimo Party, with its huge majority in parliament (184 out of 250 seats), appointed five members to the Council of State, while the main opposition party, Renamo, appointed two. The third parliamentary party, the Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM) only holds six seats, which is not enough to allow it to appoint any members.

Frelimo named Alcinda Abreu (a member of the Frelimo Political Commission); Methodist pastor Jamisse Taimo (former chair of the National Elections Commission); Islamic cleric Aminuddin Mohammed; Felizarda Paulino; and Maria Luisa Massamba. Renamo appointed Juliano Picardo (a former parliamentary deputy, who stood for President of Renamo at the party's Congress in January 2019, but only received five votes), and businessman Abdul Magide Ibraimo.

President Nyusi chooses four members, and selected former Defence Minister Alberto Chipande (the man reputed to have fired the first shots in Mozambique's war of independence); former education minister and now a leading civil society activist, Graca Machel; a former Frelimo commander in the liberation struggle, Eduardo da Silva Nihia; and the Mayor of Beira and leader of the MDM, Daviz Simango.

The other members of the Council of State are President Filipe Nyusi, previous presidents (Joaquim Chissano and Armando Guebuza), the speaker of parliament (Esperanca Bias), former speakers (Eduardo Mulembue and Veronica Macamo), the Prime Minister (Carlos Agostinho do Rosario), the chair of the Constitutional Council (Lucia Ribeiro), the ombudsman (Isaque Chande), and the runner-up in the latest presidential election (Renamo leader Ossufo Momade).

**The National Defence and Security Council** (CNDS) was also named, with four members appointed by Frelimo and one by Renamo. The Frelimo appointees were former Security Minister Jacinto Veloso, former Defence Minister Aguiar Mazua, former Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Antonio Hama Thai, and founder member of the women's detachment during the independence war Marina Pachinuapa. Renamo appointed a colonel from its militia, Domingos Manuel Joaquim. Nyusi had already appointed former interior minister Basilio Monteiro as general secretary of the CNDS.

Under the Constitution, the Council must give its opinion prior to any declaration of war, or state of emergency or state of siege, and the suspension of constitutional guarantees these may involve. The CNDS must give its opinion on Mozambican participation in peace missions abroad, advise on the criteria for using zones of total or partial protection intended for the defence and security of Mozambican territory, and "analyse and accompany initiatives of other state bodies that seek to

guarantee consolidation of national independence, the strengthening of democratic political power and the maintenance of law and order”.

**The National Human Rights Commission** was also named. Frelimo selected the former Minister of Gender, Children and Social Welfare, Cidalia Chauque, and lawyer Alfredo Caetano Dias. Renamo appointed Augusto Mateus, who was a political adviser to the later Renamo leader, Afonso Dhlakama.

## Carlos Serra dies

Sociologist and researcher Carlos Serra died Tuesday 24 March of lung cancer. Professor catedratico at UEM, from independence he promoted and participated in research that was relevant to Mozambique. He wrote and coordinated the first post-independence Mozambique history book. I have frequently cited his ground-breaking research on the cholera riots which presaged much that is happening now in Cabo Delgado: <http://bit.ly/SerraCol>

## We don't want the flag of Frelimo

Frequently criticised by government for not stating their goals, the insurgents occupying Quissanga issued a short video. Apparently filmed on the wall of the administrator's house on Wednesday 25 March, the video shows a fighter holding an Islamic State (IS) flag (see photo). The narrator says "we are fighting to be under this flag; we do not want the Frelimo flag." He continues: "We want the law of the Koran". And he stresses, "we are not fighting for the riches of the world. We want salvation." The short video is on [bit.ly/Quissanga-video](http://bit.ly/Quissanga-video)



Intelyse, a Dubai-based security risk consultant, is monitoring Cabo Delgado closely and has done two detailed reports, on the background ([bit.ly/Int-Moz-1](http://bit.ly/Int-Moz-1)) and on the escalating insurgency ([bit.ly/Int-Moz-2](http://bit.ly/Int-Moz-2))

=====

**ELECTION OVERLOAD?** - You are subscribed to two newsletters, the *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin election newsletters* (published by CIP), and *Mozambique News Reports and Clippings* (published by Joseph Hanlon and not linked to CIP). If you want to receive this newsletter but not the election newsletters, just reply to this e-mail with "no election" in the subject line.

=====

The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) strengthens data protection and requires that consent to receive communication must be 'freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous'. Importantly, there must be a positive opt-in as opposed to an opt-out. As you have voluntarily subscribed to our newsletters, you do not need to take any action and will continue to receive them as usual. We hold only your e-mail address and no other information about you, and we never share our subscription list with anyone.

To **unsubscribe**: [tinyurl.com/unsub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/unsub-moz)

1203155=====

00077

=====

## Background reading

### Special reports

#### Mozambique heroin transit trade

English - LSE - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin>

Portuguese - Pt - CIP - <http://bit.ly/HeroínaPT>

#### Gas for development?

Gas for development or just for money? 2015 [bit.ly/MozGasEng](http://bit.ly/MozGasEng)

Gas para desenvolvimento ou apenas dinheiro? 2015 [bit.ly/MozGasPt](http://bit.ly/MozGasPt)

Social protection report - 2017 Mozambique - <http://bit.ly/MozSocPro>

Special report on four poverty surveys: [bit.ly/MozPoverty](http://bit.ly/MozPoverty)

2018 Constitution - <http://bit.ly/2KF588T>

Minimum wage and exchange rates 1996-2018 -- <http://bit.ly/MinWage18>

#### \$2bn secret debt - in English

Kroll - Full report on \$2bn debt - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-Moz-full>

Kroll report summary - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-sum>

Key points of Mozambique parliament report - Nov 2016 - <http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt-En>

Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique's \$2.2 bn debt - <http://bit.ly/3WQ-hanlon>

#### In Portuguese:

Parliamentary Report on the Secret Debt (complete) [bit.ly/MozAR-debt](http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt)

**Election study collaboration:** We have detailed election data from 1999 through 2014 and are inviting scholars to use this data collaboratively.

<http://bit.ly/MozElData>

Election newsletters are on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

**Eight books by Joseph Hanlon can be downloaded, free:** <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books>

Bangladesh confronts climate change (2016)

Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique (2014)

Há Mais Bicicletas – mas há desenvolvimento? (2008)

Mozambique e as grandes cheias de 2000 (2001)

Paz Sem Benefício: Como o FMI Bloqueia a Reconstrução (1997)

Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding (1996)

Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots (1991)

Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (1984)

#### Two more will be available shortly to download:

Apartheid's 2nd Front (1986)

Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000

#### These are still available for sale:

Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento (2014) (free in English)

Zimbabwe takes back its land (2013)

Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South (2010)

Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique? (2008) (free in Portuguese)

Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (1986)

=====

This mailing is the personal responsibility of Joseph Hanlon, and does not necessarily represent the views of the Open University.

=====□

-- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority in relation to its secondary activity of credit broking.

**To:** [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com]  
**From:** [5.1.2.e]  
**Sent:** Wed 4/1/2020 4:07:53 PM  
**Importance:** Normal  
**Subject:** RE: Mozambique LNG / BHOS verzoek  
**MAIL\_RECEIVED:** Wed 4/1/2020 4:07:00 PM  
[20 04 01 Highlights Mozambique LNG BHOS \(AO track changes\).docx](#)

Hoi [5.1.2.e] Heel goed dat [5.1.2.e] nu al contact zoekt. Hopelijk haalt dit de BHOS angel uit dit verhaal... Bijgaand paar kleine typo verbeteringen in track changes.

Best Regards, Met vriendelijke groet,

[5.1.2.e]

[5.1.2.e]

| Project Finance

Atradius Dutch State Business N.V.  
David Ricardostraat 1, 1066 JS, Amsterdam | P.O. Box 8982, 1006 JD, Amsterdam | Netherlands  
Phone: +31 (0)20 [5.1.2.e] Fax: +31 (0)20 [5.1.2.e] |  
E-mail: [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com | Website: <http://www.atradiusdutchstatebusiness.nl>



Atradius Dutch State Business N.V. is de uitvoerder van de faciliteiten voor exportkredietverzekering en investeringsgaranties voor rekening en op naam van de Staat der Nederlanden.

Atradius Dutch State Business N.V. is the Export Credit Agency of the Netherlands.

**From:** [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com>  
**Sent:** woensdag 1 april 2020 15:41  
**To:** [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com>; [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com>  
**Cc:** [5.1.2.e] <[5.1.2.e]@atradius.com>; [5.1.2.e] <[5.1.2.e]@atradius.com>  
**Subject:** Mozambique LNG / BHOS verzoek

Ha [5.1.2.e]

Ik ben vanmiddag gebeld door [5.1.2.e] van BHOS over Moz LNG. Hij wil binnen BHOS het besluitvormingsproces goed managen omdat hij intern veel weerstand verwacht op de MVO punten. Hij wil nu alvast de interne discussie starten en heeft input van ons nodig. Vooral de rol en opvattingen van de NGOs hebben de aandacht binnen BHOS, zo vertelde hij.

Hij heeft mij concreet gevraagd om het volgende:

1. de financieel/economische project highlights
2. info over de veiligheidssituatie;
3. Welke MVO issues spelen

1203107

00079



4. info over onze discussies met NGOs. [5.1.2e] wil graag weten met welke NGOs we praten, over welke onderwerpen en wat er met hun input gebeurt.

Ik heb een concept memo opgesteld (zie bijlage):

Daarin heb ik zelf de beantwoording van vraag 1. voor mijn rekening genomen

Voor vraag 2. Heb ik geput uit de bijdrages aan de voorlegging van [5.1.2e] en jou;

Voor vraag 3. Heb ik geput uit een eerdere bijdrage van jou in onze projectupdate aan de staat van februari jl. maar misschien kun je daar nog wat aan toevoegen.

Voor vraag 4. Wilde ik jou vragen om de beantwoording voor je rekening te nemen.

[5.1.2e] wilde graag in de loop van morgen een reactie. Zie jij kans om morgen je input bij mij aan te leveren? Dan verstuur ik het (en zal ik ook EKI inkopieren).

Veel dank alvast.

Groeten

[5.1.2e]

[5.1.2e]

Atradius Dutch State Business N.V.

David Ricardostraat 1, 1066 JS, Amsterdam | P.O. Box 8982, 1006 JD, Amsterdam | Netherlands

Phone: +31 (0)20 [5.1.2e] Fax: +31 (0)20 [5.1.2e]

E-mail: [5.1.2e] @atradius.com | Website: [www.atradiusdutchstatebusiness.nl](http://www.atradiusdutchstatebusiness.nl)

We are working from home to protect the health and safety of our colleagues and ensure our continuous support to our business partners and customers throughout these challenging times.

Thank you  
for your  
understanding

## **Mozambique LNG AREA I project**

Hieronder de hoofdpunten van het Mozambique LNG project waarvoor Atradius voornemens is om eind april een acceptatievoorstel in te dienen. We presenteren kort enkele financieel economische highlights en de belangrijkste enkele IMVO issues.

### **Project highlights**

Het project betreft de ontwikkeling van enkele gasvelden (Area I) in Mozambikaanse wateren en de bouw van een LNG fabriek in het noorden van het land. Het Mozambique LNG project is de grootste Project Financiering ooit op het Afrikaanse continent.

- 5.1.1c
- Bij de bouw van het project, die vijf jaar in beslag neemt zijn vele internationale contractors betrokken. De projectbegroting bedraagt ongeveer USD 25 miljard, waarvan max. 16 miljard wordt gefund via projectleningen en 9 miljard uit equity van de sponsors.
- De looptijd van de leningen, incl. bouwperiode, bedraagt ca. 18 jaar. De terugbetaling van de leningen moet geschieden uit de verkoop van het LNG.
- De verkoop van het LNG is zeker gesteld via lange termijn afnamecontracten met kredietwaardige afnemers. Wel is het project daarbij blootgesteld aan olie- en gasprijrisico. De afname contracten zorgen echter voor een robuuste business case.
- De NL betrokkenheid komt van Van Oord en mogelijk ook nog van de Nederlandse vestiging van Besix, een van origine Belgische aannemer. Van Oord heeft een contract voor het offshore werk (aanleggen pijpleiding op zee). Besix legt een overslagsteiger aan.
- Op basis van die NL betrokkenheid zal Atradius/Staat naar verwachting een leningsbedrag van ca. USD 750 miljoen kunnen supporten. Er zijn nog acht andere ECAs betrokken (US EXIM, UKEF, SACE, NEXI, JBIC, Thai EXIM, ECIC en ook AFDB) die tezamen het leeuwendeel van de genoemde USD 16 miljard zullen supporten.
- Het project zorgt voor een sterke impuls voor de lokale werkgelegenheid. Dit betreft zowel geschoolde als ongeschoolde arbeid. Het gaat uiteindelijk om tienduizenden banen.
- Ook de directe bijdrage van het project aan de schatkist van Mozambique is groot. Over de gehele looptijd van de concessie bekeken, is dit ruim vijf maal het GDP van het land.
- De grote bijdrage aan de lokale economie was voor de Wereldbank aanleiding om een waiver te geven aan Mozambique onder het Non Concessional Borrowing beleid van de Wereldbank, waaraan Mozambique onderworpen is. Dit was nodig omdat Mozambique de equity verplichtingen van de lokale Mozambikaanse sponsor ENH garandeert.
- Financial close voor de projectfinanciering is voorzien in mei 2020;

### **IMVO**

Diverse MVO aspecten komen aan de orde in dit project zoals de herhuisvesting en "livelihood restoration" voor lokale bewoners. Daarnaast speelt ook de veiligheidssituatie een belangrijke rol; niet alleen voor het project maar zeker ook voor de bevolking in de regio. Het project wordt nauwlettend gevolgd door lokale en internationale NGOs. We gaan hieronder in op de contacten die ADSB met de NGOs onderhoudt.

#### *Veiligheidssituatie*

Regelmatig vinden er in de provincie waar het project wordt gebouwd, incidenten plaats. De veiligheidssituatie is vooral zwak in het noordoosten van het land (provincie Cabo Delgado). Gedurende 2019 en 2020 is het aantal terroristische aanvallen sterk gestegen. Hoewel de overheid de aanwezigheid van veiligheidsdiensten flink heeft opgeschroefd is het vooralsnog onvoldoende om de aanvallen in te dammen. Verschillende landen (Rusland en de VS) roepen de internationale gemeenschap dan ook op het gebied gezamenlijk te beveiligen. Volgens berichten zijn er al Amerikaanse en Russische huurlingen actief om de belangen van deze landen veilig te stellen.

Het noorden is als vanouds al de regio met de meeste armoede en een zwakke veiligheidssituatie. Dat de veiligheidssituatie in de afgelopen jaren zo is verslechterd heeft een aantal oorzaken.

Ten eerste heeft de toename van geweld een Islamitische achtergrond. De aanwezigheid van Islamitische groeperingen zorgt voor toenemende gewelddadigheden. In toenemende mate worden aanhangers uit het buitenland aangetrokken, voornamelijk uit Kenia, Tanzania en Somalië. Door de poreuze grenzen kunnen deze strijders zich gemakkelijk vestigen in het noorden. Vooralsnog zijn de aanvallen niet specifiek gericht op de gasprojecten (al is het project nu bij twee incidenten betrokken geweest. Daarbij werden contractors van het project aangevallen en zijn twee medewerkers overleden en meerdere gewond geraakt).

Als tweede oorzaak voor de zwakke veiligheidssituatie wordt de illegale handel in drugs en ivoor genoemd. Poreuze grenzen werken ook deze illegale handel in de hand.

Een derde oorzaak is de aanwezigheid van verschillende stammen in de regio. Botsingen tussen deze verschillende groeperingen leiden tot geweld.

Tenslotte is er voor jongeren weinig toekomstperspectief in deze regio, waardoor het voor hun aantrekkelijk wordt om zich aan te sluiten bij een Islamitische groepering.

Het is echter moeilijk een goed overzicht van de actuele situatie in de regio te krijgen. De Nederlandse ambassade in Mozambique geeft aan dat door de onvoorspelbaarheid van de situatie de regio nauwelijks toegankelijk is. Bovendien is er weinig openheid voor journalisten, waardoor nieuws maar mondjesmaat naar buiten komt.

Om het project en de medewerkers te beschermen zijn er inmiddels diverse maatregelen vastgelegd in het 'Community Security Management Plan'. Een deel van de maatregelen is reeds uitgevoerd de rest staat nog in de planning. In de eerste plaats wordt de directe projectlocatie (nearshore en onshore) beveiligd. Er staan hekken en is militaire beveiliging. Er komt ook nog een muur om de directe projectlocatie en een "low security hek" waardoor ook de direct omliggende dorpen worden beschermd voor aanvallen.

Ook is er aandacht voor het bredere projectgebied waar de busdiensten voor de werkers rijden. Hier vindt informatievoorziening voor de gemeenschappen plaats. Dit omdat er bij de gemeenschappen het idee leeft dat ze onvoldoende beschermd worden. Dit wordt deels veroorzaakt door gebrek aan communicatie vanuit de overheid. Dit neemt het project voor een deel voor zijn rekening. Ook is er een intensievere politieaanwezigheid gepland. Tenslotte worden de transportroutes naar het project beveiligd. Er zijn controlepunten en surveillance aanwezig.

|        |        |
|--------|--------|
| 5.1.2a | 5.1.2a |
|--------|--------|

Het transport van mensen gebeurt nu met helicopters ipv via de luchthaven van Mocimboa de Praia. Een kwetsbare vorm van transport. Het project bouwt momenteel een landingsbaan bij het project. Zodra die af is kan er direct daarop gevlogen worden.

#### *MVO issues*

Op het gebied van mvo is dit project een grote uitdaging. Alle IFC performance standards, op inheemse bevolkingsgroepen na, worden getriggerd. Het project vindt plaats in een gebied met hoge biodiversiteitswaarden, zowel on- als offshore. Er moeten tegen de 400 huishoudens verhuizen en zo'n 750 (deels overlappende) huishoudens komen in aanmerking voor vervangende landbouwgronden. Daarnaast is Cabo Delgado een zeer onderontwikkeld gebied, met bijvoorbeeld slechte voorzieningen en een hoog percentage analfabetisme, dat nu in een sneltreinvaart ontwikkeld wordt wat grote gevolgen heeft voor de lokale bevolking. Momenteel zijn de veiligheidssituatie, maar ook de slechte weersomstandigheden (na cycloon Kenneth in april 2019 is inmiddels een heel zwaar regenseizoen gaande met grote gevolgen voor de infrastructuur in het gebied), een belemmerende factor voor de gemeenschappen en het project.

Ook op mvo gebied zien we de gevolgen van de overname van Anadarko door Total terug. Waar Anadarko een onbekende partij was voor ngo's kent Total veel exposure. Daar tegenover staat dat Total veel meer ervaring heeft in vergelijkbare projecten in Afrika. Wij zijn heel blij dat Total heeft besloten de lokale groep mensen die aan de herhuisvesting werkt in takt heeft gelaten. Sinds het voorjaar 2017 hebben wij 3 site visits uitgevoerd en drie all party meetings op het gebied van mvo gehad voor dit project.

5.1.2e

Kun je misschien kort iets zeggen over de voortgang van het resettlement en het livelihood restoration proces en over jouw indruk van de kwaliteit van het door Total cs. gevoerde MVO beleid in dit project?

*Contacten met NGOs*

Kun je hier wat meer vertellen over onze contacten met de diverse NGOs? Met welke NGOs praten we? Wat doen we met hun input en wat is de meest recente stand van zaken met betrekking tot de NGO contacten?



To: Dev-Mozambique-List[5.1.2.e]@open.ac.uk]  
From: J.Hanlon  
Sent: Sat 4/4/2020 2:33:55 PM  
Importance: Normal  
Subject: Mozambique 478 - State of Emergency - 4 April 2020  
MAIL\_RECEIVED: Sat 4/4/2020 2:34:20 PM  
[Mozambique 478-4Apr2020 Covid-19-emergency.pdf](#)

# MOZAMBIQUE 478

## News reports & clippings

### 4 April 2020

=====

Editor: Joseph Hanlon ( [j.hanlon@open.ac.uk](mailto:j.hanlon@open.ac.uk) )

To subscribe: [tinyurl.com/sub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/sub-moz)

To unsubscribe: [tinyurl.com/unsub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/unsub-moz)

**Articles may be freely reprinted but please cite the source**

Previous newsletters and other Mozambique material are posted on [bit.ly/mozamb](http://bit.ly/mozamb)

Downloadable books: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books> Election data: <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>

=====

**Attached: this newsletter in pdf**

=====

### *State of Emergency special issue*

**Latest: beaches & Pemba port closed; press restrictions**

=====

## Parliament blocks most sensible action as confused emergency starts

The state of emergency opened Wednesday in total confusion after parliament (Assembleia da Republica, AR) unexpectedly and very late Tuesday night substantially changed the emergency decree proposed by President Filipe Nyusi, in order to curb his powers. The effect was to prevent a full lockdown, block the most sensible measures, and create total confusion. But it appears as if the Council of Ministers (CM) may ignore the AR.

Announcement of the first rules was set and cancelled twice on Wednesday as the Council of Ministers meeting ran until 23.00. A press conference was set for Thursday morning and postponed, and the first regulations were only read out late Thursday afternoon on national TV and radio by Justice Minister Helena Mateus Kida. But no text was available until Thursday night - leading to incorrect reports on the web. Then a decree was published late on Friday with press curbs and additional restrictions, including closure of beaches and the port of Pemba.

And the confusion is not over, as Kida said that each ministry, including Health, Education, Commerce and Finance, will be issuing their own regulations.

The state of emergency was approved by parliament at 23.45 on Tuesday night and came into effect 15 minutes later, at 00.00 on Wednesday 1 April. On Wednesday morning in Maputo, national and municipal police forced the closure of most shops. And there were reports in other areas of police closing shops and markets. This was due to confusion about the AR-approved decree, which included "closure of commercial establishments". But even lawyers were unsure.

A state of emergency decree must be approved by the AR and Nyusi's intended decree published on Tuesday morning left it for the Council of Ministers (CM) to set rules to "limit internal circulation of people", close shops, etc. The AR said limiting movement of people was unconstitutional, and did not want the CM to have total power to impose rules on other issues. Many lawyers and the police read the rewritten decree as imposing closure of shops and other actions nationally and immediately. Only on Wednesday afternoon did CM spokesperson Deputy Justice Minister Filimao Suaze admit there was "confusion" and

1203154

say that shops were not closed. The CM assumed that the AR decree, although rewritten in a more confusing way to demonstrate that the AR had power, was simply a new version of Nyusi's original draft. Thus the CM would have to issue regulations relating to the powers in the law, and the only substantive change was the ban on a lockdown.

### **Documents:**

The parliamentary approved State of Emergency (Lei no 1/2020): [bit.ly/MozCov-1-Emer](https://bit.ly/MozCov-1-Emer)

CM decree 12/2020 with regulations: [bit.ly/MozCov-2-Reg](https://bit.ly/MozCov-2-Reg)

Justice Minister Kida's statement: [bit.ly/MozCov-b1](https://bit.ly/MozCov-b1)

Audio of Kida's press conference: [bit.ly/MozCov-b2](https://bit.ly/MozCov-b2)

Original presidential proposal: [bit.ly/MozCov-b3](https://bit.ly/MozCov-b3)

@Verdade's excellent 1 April report of the parliament session and changes made is on <https://bit.ly/3aAc841> in English and in Portuguese <http://www.verdade.co.mz/tema-de-fundo/35/70125>

### **Levels of restrictions**

The Ministry of Health has set four levels of restrictions, and government says that the state of emergency is for level 3, which includes restrictions on group sizes, prohibition of events, and restrictions on the number of people who have to be present for work. Level 4 would include a prohibition on leaving the house, no travel, and closing all public and private activity. No country has reached level 4 because deliveries and some public activity is required, but South Africa has already imposed severe limitations on leaving the house. The Ministry of Health now has a daily Covid-19 bulletin on <https://covid19.ins.gov.mz/>, which includes the levels of restrictions.

### **Parliament tries to prevent lockdown**

Nyusi had wanted the CM to have the right to restrict movement in part or all of the country. But the AR refused, and the new law allows "restriction of internal circulation of people in any part of the national territory only if it is verified that cases of contamination are rising exponentially."

Mozambique only tested 18 people on Wednesday and 15 on Thursday, and does not have the capacity to test enough people to know how many cases of Covid-19 there are, and thus it will be impossible to show exponential growth. Indeed, there appears to be no organised system of reporting people with Covid-19 symptoms - fever and cough - or even of possible Covid-19 deaths.

"Exponential growth" describes an infection such as Covid-19 where the number of infected people repeatedly doubles. In both South Africa and the United States the number of cases is doubling every 4 days. No one has any idea how many cases Mozambique has now, but if we assume Mozambique has 100 cases now and the same infection rate as its neighbour, then exponential growth would be to 200 cases in 4 days, 400 cases in 8 days, 800 cases in 12 days, 1600 cases in 16 days, and so on. That quickly exceeds Mozambique's testing capacity.

It is likely that, so far, Covid-19 has not spread to the entire country. Cases tested so far are in Maputo-Matola. Returning miners from South Africa will probably have taken Covid-19 to Gaza. And Total has reported the first confirmed case of a Mozambican worker on the gas project a Afungi in Cabo Delgado. These represent the obvious hot-spots for Covid-19, and a sensible strategy would be to do early lockdowns just in these places. Parliament's change appears to prevent that, ensuring the spread of Covid-19 across the country.

The Imperial College (London) models suggest that with no intervention there would be 64,000 extra deaths in Mozambique due to Covid-19. Cutting interpersonal contact in half would only reduce this to 45,000 extra deaths. Reducing interpersonal contact by 75% could cut deaths to below 10,000. It is hard to estimate but a cut of contacts by 75% really does mean most contacts are only within the household, which probably requires a lockdown - plus a significant increase in testing.

Government stressed it was not ready for a "lockdown" yet. But it wanted the flexibility to impose measures between levels 3 and 4, either in specific areas or stricter travel limitations which were not a ban on leaving the house. At first, it appears that the way the restriction as written by the AR will prevent this. But Justice Minister Kida told the press conference Thursday that "eventually", if a district is identified to have an outbreak of Covid-19, the government would restrict people going into and out of the district. This implies Nyusi and the CM intend to ignore the AR changes.

AR sources stressed that the restriction on a lockdown was because giving such strong powers to the President would set a dangerous precedent. They made clear that this use of "exponential" assumes a major increase in testing, or that when there is an apparent serious increase in cases the CM could return to the AR and ask for this restriction to be changed. A more subtle option would be to note that epidemics like Covid-19, where each person with the disease infects several others, is automatically exponential. This is especially an issue with Covid-19 because those with the disease infect others for two days before they have symptoms. The main point of reducing contacts is to reduce the transmission of the disease by those who do not yet know they are infected. Thus, technically, the CM could say Covid-19 growth in other countries is exponential, so it must be so in Mozambique.

## Using cell phones to track people

Everyone who arrived in Mozambique in the past two weeks, and anyone who has come into direct contact with a person who is confirmed to have Covid-19, must go into 14 days quarantine at home. This covers tens of thousands of people, retrospectively. Police and health authorities "must create the necessary conditions to, in real time, locate by geo-location", these people, according to the regulations of Decree 12/2020.

Justice Minister Kida explained that people who enter the country give a mobile telephone number as part of their entry form, and this will be used to locate people, so that local officials can check they are following the quarantine.

## Press restrictions

A new media curb is included in yesterday's Decree 12/2020: "During the validity of the State of Emergency, the media that transmit information about COVID-19 contrary to the official ones are sanctioned." That appears to say media cannot say the government is not telling the truth. Will it be permitted to disagree with the government policies, for example on lockdown?

## Travel and work restrictions

"We have not reached the lockdown phase, but we only want people to travel if strictly necessary. So we are limiting but not banning travel," Kida explained.

Buses, mini-buses (chapas) and even "my loves" (open back passenger lorries) will be limited to carrying a maximum of one-third of their official carrying capacity. Bicycle taxis and three-wheel motor taxis (txopela, tuk-tuk) are banned because passengers are too close to the driver. Any violator will have their vehicle confiscated. The idea is to simply cut transport capacity to one-third. But it has two problems. Huge queues will build up at bus stops, with people less than 1.5 m apart. And it is not clear if private bus and chapa operators will find it profitable to operate with one-third loads.

Public and private institutions continue to operate, but with only one-third of the workforce present in the office or installation, and they must be at least 1.5 metres apart. Kida stressed that "this cannot be confused with dismissal". There should be a rotation with one group coming to work for two weeks, then another group, and then the other. Those not in the office will work from home. Senior figures in the public service, however, continue to work full time.

## Other rules and restrictions

Other points in the government decree 12/2020 yesterday include:

- + All visas are cancelled.
- + Emission of government documents is suspended. But the documents, authorizations and licences which will run out during the emergency are extended to 30 June 2020, or simply "remain valid".
- + Pemba port is closed (although the small ports of Quelimane and Pebane remain open).
- + Health personnel outside the National Health Service (other than those considered vulnerable) can be forced to work for the Health Service, and the Ministry of Health is instructed to set out how this is to be done.
- + The following are closed: schools, discos, games rooms, bars and stalls selling alcohol (but no restrictions on restaurants and food stalls), gyms, playing fields, beaches (except for fishers), museums, libraries, theatres, and monuments.
- + Groups of more than 20 people are prohibited, including religious services. Funerals are limited to 20 people (except 10 people if a person died of Covid-19) and all participants must wear masks and stand 1.5 m apart.



- + Formal markets can only open 06h00-17h00; stallholders must wear masks and be at least 1.5 m apart.
- + Visits to hospitals and prisons are restricted
- + Delays in making payments to banks due to the State of Emergency cannot be penalised.
- + People cannot be evicted for non-payment of rent, but must eventually pay.
- + Government buying and contracting is simplified.
- + Import of food, medicines and other essential products is simplified and import duties are to be paid retrospectively.

## Portugal for comparison

Portugal has a population of 10 million, one-third of Mozambique. By 6 March it had confirmed 13 cases but it estimated that it was confirming only 15% of cases; schools and sports facilities were closed in some places. On 10 March with 41 confirmed cases, the Portuguese government declared restrictions on discos, bars, restaurants and shops and stopped sporting events. The first death was on 16 March, when there were 331 confirmed cases. On 18 March Portugal declared a State of Emergency, which included closure of non-food shops.

The measures are working. The exponential growth of new cases halted around 26 March - there are still cases but the number of new cases is not increasing and they have remained at about 800 per day for seven days. The death rate has also stopped rising at about 20 per day.

Daily new cases and deaths are not falling yet, but they have levelled off - it would appear that the exponential phase is over and early intervention worked.

There are good tables by country on <https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/>

## Comment: Issues remain

The vast majority of urban Mozambicans live from day to day and work in the informal sector, and the regulations so far do not take into account the informal sector and informal traders. Thousands who cannot squeeze into chapas will walk kilometres to reach work or sell informally. If these people cannot work, how will they eat?

Food is another issue. Journalists report that prices are rising dramatically - potatoes and onion prices have jumped from \$4.50 to \$10 per sack. (Moz24h) Much of Maputo's food comes from South Africa and a lot of that is brought in by informal traders who can no longer cross the border.

By definition, these measures are already hugely disruptive - intended to disrupt normal life and reduce contact between people. Government will have to act quickly to ensure food and money to the poor majority.

## UN: biggest challenge since WW2 - but what happens after?

The current coronavirus outbreak is the biggest challenge for the world since World War Two, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres warned Tuesday. He said it could bring a recession "that probably has no parallel in the recent past". He added: "COVID-19 is the greatest test that we have faced together since the formation of the United Nations."

"When we get past this crisis, which we will, we will face a choice", said the UN chief, "we can go back to the world as it was before or deal decisively with those issues that make us all unnecessarily vulnerable to crises".

=====

**ELECTION OVERLOAD?** - You are subscribed to two newsletters, the *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin election newsletters* (published by CIP), and *Mozambique News Reports and Clippings* (published by Joseph Hanlon and not linked to CIP). If you want to receive this newsletter but not the election newsletters, just reply to this e-mail with "no election" in the subject line.

=====

The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) strengthens data protection and requires that consent to receive communication must be 'freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous'. Importantly, there must be a positive opt-in as opposed to an opt-out. As you have voluntarily subscribed to our newsletters, you do not need to take any action and will continue to receive them as usual. We hold only your e-mail address and no other information about you, and we never share our subscription list with anyone.

To **unsubscribe**: [tinyurl.com/unsub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/unsub-moz)



=====

## Background reading

### Special reports

#### Mozambique heroin transit trade

English - LSE - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin>

Portuguese - Pt - CIP - <http://bit.ly/HeroínaPT>

#### Gas for development?

Gas for development or just for money? 2015 [bit.ly/MozGasEng](http://bit.ly/MozGasEng)

Gas para desenvolvimento ou apenas dinheiro? 2015 [bit.ly/MozGasPt](http://bit.ly/MozGasPt)

Social protection report - 2017 Mozambique - <http://bit.ly/MozSocPro>

Special report on four poverty surveys: [bit.ly/MozPoverty](http://bit.ly/MozPoverty)

2018 Constitution - <http://bit.ly/2KF588T>

Minimum wage and exchange rates 1996-2018 -- <http://bit.ly/MinWage18>

#### \$2bn secret debt - in English

Kroll - Full report on \$2bn debt - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-Moz-full>

Kroll report summary - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-sum>

Key points of Mozambique parliament report - Nov 2016 - <http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt-En>

Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique's \$2.2 bn debt - <http://bit.ly/3WQ-hanlon>

#### In Portuguese:

Parliamentary Report on the Secret Debt (complete) [bit.ly/MozAR-debt](http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt)

**Election study collaboration:** We have detailed election data from 1999 through 2014 and are inviting scholars to use this data collaboratively.

<http://bit.ly/MozElData>

Election newsletters are on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

**Eight books by Joseph Hanlon can be downloaded, free:** <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books>

Bangladesh confronts climate change (2016)

Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique (2014)

Há Mais Bicicletas – mas há desenvolvimento? (2008)

Moçambique e as grandes cheias de 2000 (2001)

Paz Sem Benefício: Como o FMI Bloqueia a Reconstrução (1997)

Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding (1996)

Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots (1991)

Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (1984)

#### Two more will be available shortly to download:

Apartheid's 2nd Front (1986)

Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000

#### These are still available for sale:

Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento (2014) (free in English)

Zimbabwe takes back its land (2013)

Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South (2010)

Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique? (2008) (free in Portuguese)

Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (1986)

=====

This mailing is the personal responsibility of Joseph Hanlon, and does not necessarily represent the views of the Open University.

=====□

-- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority in relation to its secondary activity of credit broking.

**To:** [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com]; [5.1.2.e] [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com]; [5.1.2.e]  
**Jan** [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com]  
**Cc:** [5.1.2.e] [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com]; [5.1.2.e] [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com]  
**From:** [5.1.2e]  
**Sent:** Tue 4/7/2020 10:46:30 AM  
**Importance:** Normal  
**Subject:** A-categorie (Total, Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, milsoc) definitief  
**MAIL\_RECEIVED:** Tue 4/7/2020 10:46:50 AM  
[A-categorie \(Total, Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, milsoc\) definitief.doc](#)

Beste heren,

Hierbij de afgeronde milieu- en sociale beoordeling voor het Mozambique project.

Het was een flinke klus. Ik ben er vooralsnog vanuit gegaan dat we te maken hebben met Van Oord en Besix als NI exporteurs.

Her en der heb ik iets geel gearceerd om voor jullie te checken in aansluiting op jullie verhaal.

Veel leesplezier en succes met de afronding van jullie deel.

En als jullie nog vragen hebben dan hoor ik die graag. Jullie weten me te vinden.

Groet

[5.1.2e]

**To:** [5.1.2.e] [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com]; [5.1.2.e] [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com]  
**From:** [5.1.2e]  
**Sent:** Thur 4/9/2020 10:59:25 AM  
**Importance:** Normal  
**Subject:** FW: Mozambique: terugkoppeling van gesprek met de post  
**MAIL\_RECEIVED:** Thur 4/9/2020 10:59:27 AM

Ter informatie.

**From:** [5.1.2.e]@minbuza.nl>  
**Sent:** 09 April 2020 10:53  
**To:** [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com>  
**Cc:** [5.1.2.e]@atradius.com>; [5.1.2e] BFB/EKI) <[5.1.2.e]@minfin.nl>;  
[5.1.2.e] <[5.1.2.e]@minbuza.nl>  
**Subject:** Mozambique: terugkoppeling van gesprek met de post

Ha [5.1.2e]

Dinsdag hebben wij met de post gesproken over de IMVO- en veiligheidssituatie m.b.t. de PF-zaak in Mozambique. Wat ons betreft met name goed als jullie kunnen aangeven waar de post een rol kan spelen in de discussies met de autoriteiten over compensatie en 'livelihood restoration', of op andere aspecten zoals veiligheid. Wij spelen graag een verbindende rol hierin met de post.

IMVO:

- De projectlocatie ligt relatief ver van de hoofdstad en de centrale overheid heeft relatief minder grip op die gebieden;
- Herhuisvesting: bij de twee overkoepelende projecten worden internationale standaarden gehanteerd bij het organiseren van de herhuisvesting, zoals gebruikelijk bij internationale transacties.;
- De post heeft ook een aantal keer gesproken met Both Ends.

Veiligheidssituatie:

- Het veiligheidsrisico neemt eerder toe dan af de komende tijd in de regio. Tegelijkertijd wordt het gebied wel meer gecontroleerd door de autoriteiten. De post kan echter niet met sterke zekerheid aangeven wat de oorzaken zijn van het geweld.
- De projecten kunnen een bijdrage leveren aan grondoorzaken van de problematiek.

Indien gewenst licht in e.e.a. graag telefonisch toe.

Hartelijke groet,

1203141

00084

---

Help save paper! Do you really need to print this email?

Dit bericht kan informatie bevatten die niet voor u is bestemd. Indien u niet de geadresseerde bent of dit bericht abusievelijk aan u is toegezonden, wordt u verzocht dat aan de afzender te melden en het bericht te verwijderen. De Staat aanvaardt geen aansprakelijkheid voor schade, van welke aard ook, die verband houdt met risico's verbonden aan het elektronisch verzenden van berichten.

This message may contain information that is not intended for you. If you are not the addressee or if this message was sent to you by mistake, you are requested to inform the sender and delete the message. The State accepts no liability for damage of any kind resulting from the risks inherent in the electronic transmission of messages.



To: [redacted] 5.1.2.e [redacted]@open.ac.uk]  
From: [redacted]  
Sent: Thur 4/9/2020 2:23:00 PM  
Importance: Normal  
Subject: Mozambique 279 - Insurgent push in Cabo Delgado - 9 April 2020  
MAIL\_RECEIVED: Thur 4/9/2020 2:23:38 PM  
[Mozambique 479-9Apr2020 Muidumbe.pdf](#)

# MOZAMBIQUE 479

## News reports & clippings

### 9 April 2020

=====

Editor: Joseph Hanlon ( [j.hanlon@open.ac.uk](mailto:j.hanlon@open.ac.uk) )

To subscribe: [tinyurl.com/sub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/sub-moz)

To unsubscribe: [tinyurl.com/unsub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/unsub-moz)

**Articles may be freely reprinted but please cite the source.**

Previous newsletters and other Mozambique material are posted on [bit.ly/mozamb](http://bit.ly/mozamb)

Downloadable books: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books> Election data: <http://bit.ly/MozElData>

Attached: this newsletter in pdf with detailed maps, also on <https://bit.ly/Mozam-479>

## Insurgent push in Cabo Delgado

Insurgents made a major attack in Muidumbe district, Cabo Delgado this week. They also reoccupied Bilibiza on Monday (6 April), and at a meeting told local people that Islamic practices would now be followed. On the same day they occupied Miangalewa on the N380 road in Muidumbe, and stayed the whole day. The N380 is the only paved road from Pemba to Palma and Mocimboa da Praia and has been reopened to light trucks.

On Tuesday insurgents moved from Miangalewa up the N381 road toward Mueda, occupying Xatia, Namacande (district town of Muidumbe), Ntchinga, and Muatade villages.

The occupation of Ntchinga was particularly provocative because this has been a Frelimo base in the liberation war; it is still a military base, and it is claimed the soldiers fled. The insurgents have been criticised by President Filipe Nyusi of being "faceless" and not stating their goals. And they used their occupation of Ntchinga to record a second video to respond. At a public meeting, and speaking in the local language, kimwani, they said: "We are occupying this village to show that the government of the day is unfair. It humiliates the poor to the advantage of bosses. Those who are detained are those of the lower class, so this is not fair. Like it or not, we are defending Islam. We want an Islamist government, not a government of unbelievers. We are children of here and these faces are not new. And in the forest, we are many." (Carta de Mocambique 8 Apr)

In the district town, Namacande, insurgents first attacked the security force base and the police post and captured weapons, then attacked public institutions and shops, notably the district government office, Millennium Bim bank, and the local petrol station.

In Miangalewa they burned the Catholic church, shops, the workshop of the security firm Arkje, and kidnapped some people; one report says 6 people were killed. They attacked the military camp guarding the Japanese firm Konoike repairing the N380 bridge over the Messalo river. The soldiers fled and all vehicles and machinery at the construction camp were destroyed. In Muatade the secondary school, health post, houses and other infrastructure were burned. (@emorier, LUSA 7 Apr, CDD 8 Apr)



Low flying South African registered helicopters with machine guns and white crew, apparently the Russian Wagner mercenaries, were photographed Tuesday and Wednesday flying up the coast and there are reports of fighting in Muidumbe.

=====

**ELECTION OVERLOAD?** - You are subscribed to two newsletters, the *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin election newsletters* (published by CIP), and *Mozambique News Reports and Clippings* (published by Joseph Hanlon and not linked to CIP). If you want to receive this newsletter but not the election newsletters, just reply to this e-mail with "no election" in the subject line.

=====

The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) strengthens data protection and requires that consent to receive communication must be 'freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous'. Importantly, there must be a positive opt-in as opposed to an opt-out. As you have voluntarily subscribed to our newsletters, you do not need to take any action and will continue to receive them as usual. We hold only your e-mail address and no other information about you, and we never share our subscription list with anyone.

To **unsubscribe**: [tinyurl.com/unsub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/unsub-moz)

=====

ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED but please cite the source: "Mozambique News Reports and Clippings". Previous newsletters are posted on [bit.ly/mozamb](http://bit.ly/mozamb)

=====

## Background reading

### Special reports

#### Mozambique heroin transit trade

English - L SE - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin>

Portuguese - Pt - CIP - <http://bit.ly/HeroínaPT>

#### Gas for development?

Gas\_for\_development\_or\_just\_for\_money?\_2015 [bit.ly/MozGasEng](http://bit.ly/MozGasEng)

Gás\_para\_desenvolvimento\_ou\_apenas\_dinheiro?\_2015 [bit.ly/MozGasPt](http://bit.ly/MozGasPt)

Social protection report - 2017 Mozambique - <http://bit.ly/MozSocPro>

Special report on four poverty surveys: [bit.ly/MozPoverty](http://bit.ly/MozPoverty)

2018 Constitution - <http://bit.ly/2KF588T>

Minimum wage and exchange rates 1996-2018 -- <http://bit.ly/MinWage18>

#### \$2bn secret debt - in English

Kroll - Full report on \$2bn debt - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-Moz-full>

Kroll report summary - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-sum>

Key points of Mozambique parliament report - Nov 2016 - <http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt-En>

Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique's \$2.2 bn debt - <http://bit.ly/3WQ-hanlon>

#### In Portuguese:

Parliamentary Report on the Secret Debt (complete) [bit.ly/MozAR-debt](http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt)

**Election study collaboration:** We have detailed election data from 1999 through 2014 and are inviting scholars to use this data collaboratively. <http://bit.ly/MozElData>

Election newsletters are on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

1203161

00085

**Eight books by Joseph Hanlon can be downloaded, free:** <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books>

Bangladesh confronts climate change (2016)

Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique (2014)

Há Mais Bicicletas – mas há desenvolvimento? (2008)

Moçambique e as grandes cheias de 2000 (2001)

Paz Sem Benefício: Como o FMI Bloqueia a Reconstrução (1997)

Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding (1996)

Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots (1991)

Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (1984)

**Two more will be available shortly to download:**

Apartheid's 2nd Front (1986)

Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000

**These are still available for sale:**

Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento (2014) (free in English)

Zimbabwe takes back its land (2013)

Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South (2010)

Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique? (2008) (free in Portuguese)

Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (1986)

=====  
This mailing is the personal responsibility of Joseph Hanlon, and does not necessarily represent the views of the Open University.

=====□

-- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority in relation to its secondary activity of credit broking.

To: [5.1.2.e]@open.ac.uk]  
From: [5.1.2.e]  
Sent: Fri 4/11/2020 1:04:54 AM  
Importance: Normal  
Subject: Mozambique 480 - Quirimba attached; helicopter shot down - 10 Apr 2020  
MAIL\_RECEIVED: Fri 4/11/2020 1:05:09 AM  
[Mozambique 480-10Apr2020 Quirimba Helicopter-down.pdf](#)

# MOZAMBIQUE 480

## News reports & clippings

### 10 April 2020

=====

Editor: Joseph Hanlon ([5.1.2.e]@open.ac.uk)

To subscribe: [tinyurl.com/sub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/sub-moz)

To unsubscribe: [tinyurl.com/unsub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/unsub-moz)

**Articles may be freely reprinted but please cite the source.**

Previous newsletters and other Mozambique material are posted on [bit.ly/mozamb](http://bit.ly/mozamb)

Downloadable books: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books> Election data: <http://bit.ly/MozElData>

=====

**Attached: this newsletter in pdf**

=====

## Attack on Quirimba Island; helicopter shot down

Insurgents in small boats landed last night (Thursday 9 April) on Quirimba Island just off the coast of Quissanga; South African private military forces responded and one of their helicopters was shot down this morning (Friday 10 Apr) although the crew was rescued. (Moz24h, Zitamar 10 Feb) For maps of the Cabo Delgado war zone, see <https://bit.ly/Mozam-479>. The map below shows the more detailed area. In the past month, insurgents have moved south from Macomia through Bilibiza (which they reoccupied on Tuesday) and then Quissanga, and have now made the 7 km water crossing to Quirimba Island. Many people fled Quissanga before the attacks there, and were refugees on Quirimba. Pinnacle News (<https://www.facebook.com/pinnaclenews79>) says the insurgents destroyed some government installations but left after the South African attack.



## South African helicopter gunships in Cabo Delgado

Light helicopter gunships strafed a base of the insurgents in Mueda area on Wednesday and then attacked their bases in Mbau 1203153

00087



in Mocimboa da Praia and in Muidumbe on Thursday, according to Peter Fabricius in *Daily Maverick* (9 April, [bit.ly/Fabricius-9Apr](http://bit.ly/Fabricius-9Apr)) The attacks did not include ground forces although these might follow later.

A Gazelle gunship and a Cessna Caravan fixed-wing personnel carrier arrived in Pemba last weekend. On Wednesday they were joined by three helicopters - another Gazelle gunship, a Bell UH I "Huey" and a Bell 406 Long Ranger - and one fixed-wing Diamond DA42. The attacks were carried out by the South African private security company Dyck Advisory Group, according to *Daily Maverick*. Moz24h reports that they are based at the Pemba Naval Base and were involved in the attack on Quirimba invaders Friday morning. Pinnacle News says that it was one of the Gazelles which was shot down, and that at least one insurgent boat was sunk. "Gunship" means a man sitting at the door of the helicopter with a heavy machine gun.

Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) replaces the Russian Wagner Group which withdrew, defeated, last month. According to *Daily Maverick* DAG is "owned by former Zimbabwean military colonel Lionel Dyck who is believed to be close to Zimbabwean President Emerson Mnangagwa." Lionel Dyck was involved in Zanu-PF politics and various projects from 2002 to have Mnangagwa replace Robert Mugabe. Max Dyke is part of the group, and according to its website (<https://www.dyckadvisorygroup.com/>) was a guide on the Zambezi River and was involved in demining in Mozambique in 1997. Their website says DAG has "undertaken security-based operations" in Mozambique and has "counter poaching operations ... currently running in Mozambique". Zitamar (10 Apr) says Dyke helped Mozambique take Renamo's Gorongosa base in 1985.

## Militarization of Cabo Delgado

Local media reported that in many districts of Cabo Delgado impacted by the insurgency, civilian officials have recently been replaced by military officers as the security situation has deteriorated, according to Intelyse (9 Apr). In Pemba, nervous police and military have imposed an unofficial 19h00 curfew. Tension is increasing because of the failure of the military to challenge the insurgency, and rumours have raced through Pemba in recent days that it will be attacked by the insurgents.

**Tactical comment:** Although insurgents have attacked district towns, they probably do not have the capacity to attack a city. They do seem to be often using Renamo tactics; during the 1980s war Renamo had Beira surrounded but attacks were mainly on electricity lines and water supply pipes outside the city, in rural areas harder to guard. Initially, a similar action would seem more likely than a frontal attack on the city. *jh*

## Battle and massacre?

*Savana* today (10 April) reports an insurgent defeat and massacre not reported or verified elsewhere. The Macondis from Mueda were a key part of the guerrillas fighting for independence 50 years ago and still represent a militant force. *Savana* says that faced with the failure of the army and police to stop the insurgent attacks in Muidumbe district earlier this week and their move toward Mueda, war veterans (and presumably their children) confronted the insurgents in a blind valley near Mitenda, and killed 30 insurgents. Pinnacle News (<https://www.facebook.com/pinnaclenews79>) suggests that South African helicopters may have been part of the attack on the insurgents. *Savana* says that in retaliation, in their occupation of Xitaxi village on Wednesday, insurgents decapitated and machine-gunning local people, killing 50-70. Xitaxi is on the main N380 road. None of this is independently confirmed, and Zitamar (10 Apr) says only 14 were killed in Xitaxi.

## Military detains Palma journalist

Journalist and announcer of Palma Community Radio, Ibraimo Abu Mbaruco, disappeared Tuesday 7 April on his way home from work, just after sending an SMS to a colleague saying he was surrounded by soldiers. Nothing has been heard from him since, and he cannot be located. The local chapter of the MISA (Media Institute of Southern Africa) could not locate him, and issued a statement this afternoon expressing concern.

**Comment:** The crackdown on formal news coverage in Cabo Delgado at the same time that there is widespread social media reporting - with inaccuracies and fake news - makes it very difficult to confirm what is happening in the civil war. I call this newsletter *News Reports and Clippings* because that is what it is - a compilation of news reports - with my own judgements and commentaries. For that reason I try to always give sources and make some judgements as to what is verifiable. But this becomes increasingly difficult in Cabo Delgado. Were 14 or 70 killed in Xitaxi? So I apologize for the inevitable errors. I try.

*ih*

=====

**ELECTION OVERLOAD?** - You are subscribed to two newsletters, the *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin election newsletters* (published by CIP), and *Mozambique News Reports and Clippings* (published by Joseph Hanlon and not linked to CIP). If you want to receive this newsletter but not the election newsletters, just reply to this e-mail with "no election" in the subject line.

=====

The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) strengthens data protection and requires that consent to receive communication must be 'freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous'. Importantly, there must be a positive opt-in as opposed to an opt-out. As you have voluntarily subscribed to our newsletters, you do not need to take any action and will continue to receive them as usual. We hold only your e-mail address and no other information about you, and we never share our subscription list with anyone.

To **unsubscribe**: [tinyurl.com/unsub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/unsub-moz)

=====

ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED but please cite the source: "Mozambique News Reports and Clippings". Previous newsletters are posted on [bit.ly/mozamb](http://bit.ly/mozamb)

=====

## Background reading

### Special reports

#### Mozambique heroin transit trade

English - LSE - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin>

Portuguese - Pt - CIP - <http://bit.ly/HeroínaPT>

#### Gas for development?

Gas for development or just for money? 2015 [bit.ly/MozGasEng](http://bit.ly/MozGasEng)

Gás para desenvolvimento ou apenas dinheiro? 2015 [bit.ly/MozGasPt](http://bit.ly/MozGasPt)

Social protection report - 2017 Mozambique - <http://bit.ly/MozSocPro>

Special report on four poverty surveys: [bit.ly/MozPoverty](http://bit.ly/MozPoverty)

2018 Constitution - <http://bit.ly/2KF588T>

Minimum wage and exchange rates 1996-2018 -- <http://bit.ly/MinWage18>

#### \$2bn secret debt - in English

Kroll - Full report on \$2bn debt - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-Moz-full>

Kroll report summary - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-sum>

Key points of Mozambique parliament report - Nov 2016 - <http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt-En>

Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique's \$2.2 bn debt - <http://bit.ly/3WQ-hanlon>

#### In Portuguese:

Parliamentary Report on the Secret Debt (complete) [bit.ly/MozAR-debt](http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt)

**Election study collaboration:** We have detailed election data from 1999 through 2014 and are inviting scholars to use this data collaboratively. <http://bit.ly/MozElData>

Election newsletters are on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

**Eight books by Joseph Hanlon can be downloaded, free:** <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books>

Bangladesh confronts climate change (2016)

Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique (2014)

Há Mais Bicicletas – mas há desenvolvimento? (2008)

Moçambique e as grandes cheias de 2000 (2001)

Paz Sem Benefício: Como o FMI Bloqueia a Reconstrução (1997)

Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding (1996)

Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots (1991)

Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (1984)

#### Two more will be available shortly to download:

Apartheid's 2nd Front (1986)

Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000

#### These are still available for sale:

Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento (2014) (free in English)

Zimbabwe takes back its land (2013)

Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South (2010)

Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique? (2008) (free in Portuguese)

Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (1986)

=====

This mailing is the personal responsibility of Joseph Hanlon, and does not necessarily represent the views of the Open University.

-- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority in relation to its secondary activity of credit broking.

To: 5.1.2.e @open.ac.uk]  
From:   
Sent: Thur 4/16/2020 2:01:08 AM  
Importance: Normal  
Subject: Mozambique 481 - Gas bubble bursts, Cabo Delgado debate; cocaine baron caught - 16 Apr 2020  
MAIL\_RECEIVED: Thur 4/16/2020 2:01:46 AM  
[Mozambique 481-16Apr2020 Gas-no-FID; cocaine baron; Cabo Delgado quotes.pdf](#)

# MOZAMBIQUE 481

## News reports & clippings

### 16 April 2020

=====

Editor: Joseph Hanlon ( [j.hanlon@open.ac.uk](mailto:j.hanlon@open.ac.uk) )

To subscribe: [tinyurl.com/sub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/sub-moz)

To unsubscribe: [tinyurl.com/unsub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/unsub-moz) □

**Articles may be freely reprinted but please cite the source.**

Previous newsletters and other Mozambique material are posted on [bit.ly/mozamb](http://bit.ly/mozamb)

Downloadable books: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books> Election data: <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>

=====

**Attached: this newsletter in pdf**

=====

*Also in this issue:*

**Cocaine baron, no cash, Cabo Delgado**

=====

## Gas bubble bursts

Half of Mozambique's gas production will be delayed for five years, shooting a big hole in dreams that liquefied natural gas (LNG) would bail the country from its economic crisis. Exxon Mobile has again delayed its investment decision. The delay is likely to be five years, with no production until 2030 instead of 2025, according to Platts, the main oil industry newsletter (9 Apr, <https://bit.ly/3a7zQmY>)

ExxonMobile had planned to spend \$27-30 bn. The final investment decision (FID) was to be announced last year but was deferred, with only an entirely artificial "intermediate investment decision" announcement to back Filipe Nyusi's presidential campaign. Now the FID has been kicked into the far future.

ExxonMobile has planned 15.2 mn tonnes per year (t/y) of LNG starting in 2025, half of the total production. Most of the money would have been spent on two gas liquification "trains" on the Afungi peninsula, on a shared facility with Total. Development of the other half of planned production continues - the joint ENI-Exxon floating 3.4 mn t/y plant now under construction and expected to start production in 2022, and the Total-operated 12.9 mn t/y onshore plant on Afungi now under construction and due to start production in 2024.

Globally, natural gas has been caught in a whirlwind of problems. As Saudi Arabia and Russia flood the market to try to put US shale gas and oil out of business, the price of Brent crude has fallen from \$69 per barrel in January to \$31 today. Gas prices are linked to oil, and global LNG prices have fallen from a peak of \$11 per MMBtu in September 2018 to \$4 in 2019 to just \$2 now.

The global depression caused by Covid-19 will keep gas and oil prices low, causing major cuts in investment everywhere. Commentators such as Platts note that the on-going war in Cabo Delgado and attacks close to Afungi make investment there less attractive. And the *Financial Times* (7 Apr) noted that Exxon wanted to protect its large dividend to shareholders, \$14.7 billion in 2019, so decided to make huge cuts in cash operating expenses and investment.



## Brazilian cocaine baron caught in Maputo

"Fuminho", who controls the cocaine trade in Mozambique, was arrested in Maputo Monday. The arrest of Gilberto Aparicio dos Santos at the Montebello Indy Village hotel was first revealed by *Carta de Mocambique* (13, 14 Apr). *Carta* reports that he has been travelling between Mozambique and South Africa for a decade, and is also a major supplier of cocaine to South Africa and, via Mozambique, to Europe.

Fuminho is apparently responsible for the increasing number of cocaine "mules", mainly women, caught coming in at the airport. Most get through but some get caught (perhaps by agreement, to show there is some enforcement), and, *Carta* says, "in jail enjoy privileges that can only be obtained with bribes. Fuminho is believed to have a set of prison staff on his payroll."

To have been active in Mozambique for this long means he must have a high level patron, who will want him extradited to Brazil quickly so that he is not interrogated in Mozambique and does not reveal his local network. But to detain and charge him in Maputo "would be a great coup against local impunity," writes *Carta* editor Marcelo Mosse.

Fuminho has been wanted by the Brazilian police and by Interpol since 1999 after his escape from a Sao Paulo prison. When the heat became too intense, he moved to southern Africa and Mozambique, where he felt safer. Police sources told *Carta* that Fuminho arrived in Maputo in March from Bolivia. He was then apparently caught in Maputo by the sudden lockdown in South Africa, and was staying temporarily in an Indy Village hotel room with two colleagues.

**Comment:** Drugs are just another commodity traded by international networks, but in Mozambique they have two kinds of value chains. Some industries, like clothing, are highly decentralised and based on a network of local companies. Heroin is traded in that way. Heroin comes by dhow from Pakistan, passes through Mozambique to South Africa, and on to Europe. The heroin barons in Mozambique are Mozambican, often Asian origin business people also engaged in normal trade and import-export; for three decades they have operated with informal agreements with senior Frelimo party figures. One part of the agreement is that no heroin remains in Mozambique; much less heroin is consumed locally than cocaine, and that heroin mostly comes from different networks based in Tanzania.

By contrast, cocaine follows a different capitalist model, used for example by the big mining and gas companies, in which the entire value chain is controlled centrally, by head office. The establishment of Fuminho in Mozambique fits that model - local control by a cartel employee for cocaine, rather than a local subcontractor, as with heroin.

But in the era of Nhinyane Chissano there was a struggle, with well placed Frelimo people demanding to be subcontractors, and the cocaine cartels refusing. Since then, a deal must have been reached with allowed Fuminho free movement and control of the trade. The people who made the deal would rather he was sent home and did not reveal his local patrons. *jh*

## No cash for government for Covid-19

Not one penny in cash, health donors told the government. Donors will provide \$48 mn for the Ministry of Health for Covid-19, and donors will do all the procurement. This is far less than the \$700 mn Finance Minister Adriano Maleiane wanted, but close to what the Ministry of Health said it really needed. (*Carta de Mocambique* 13 Apr) Government is no longer trusted even to buy basic medical equipment. Purchases under way include 140 ventilators, 100 cardiac monitors, 1000 body bags, and other items.

The IMF on Tuesday (14 Apr) announced \$15 mn debt cancellation for Mozambique to address the impact of Covid-19. The Jubilee Debt Campaign in London said "The IMF is sitting on \$27 bn of reserves and over \$135 bn of gold. It can afford to cancel more debt, and now is the time to do it." On 15 April the G20 finance ministers announced a suspension of debt repayments from 1 May until the end of this year. But the debt will not be cancelled and must be repaid, with interest, in 2022-4.

## Cabo Delgado

**Yussuf Adam: 'The fight against terror cannot be based on terror '**

"The insurgents were created by an internal political and administrative process that gave them no voice, that discriminated against them, that marginalized them, and made their socio-economic characteristics, poverty, etc. extreme," warns Yussuf Adam, a Universidade Eduardo Mondlane professor and one of the most respected long-term researchers of Cabo Delgado. "They were marginalized by the State. Factors such as corruption, nepotism, the lack of democracy, freedom of expression, and a lack of rigorous justice further marginalized these groups. Instead, they found armed violence and support from throughout the world for that form of struggle."

"We need to develop a response strategy that is not only based on the use of force, torture, fictitious judgments, and repression of journalists and freedom of expression," he argues. "The fight against terror cannot be based on terror. There is a need for a military response but also for mobilization systems that remove their ability to become fish in water," he explains in an article written on the Facebook page Lutar por Cabo Delgado on 14 April. The article in English and Portuguese is on:

<https://bit.ly/Adam-Lutar1>

**"Religious and ethnic explanations are a smoke screen"**, Adam says in an interview in *Canal De Mocambique* (1 Apr) "There are Mwanis, Macondes, Angonos, etc involved in the insurgency. There are Christians. Catholics, Muslims, Protestants and even animists."

The insurgents "want part of the benefits of the investments in Cabo Delgado. They want fair payment for land that is expropriated. They want jobs." In Mocimboa da Praia and Palma, people don't like the "Maputecos" - the pejorative term for people from the south. "The targets of attacks in Mocimboa were symbols of the institutions that the local people do not like or have given them trouble: police, army, finance, etc. Curiously, they also destroyed businesses and investments of the rich of Mocimboa, but not of ordinary traders and business people." Younger civil servants and business employees stayed in Mocimboa during the attack, frequently moving houses and apparently protected by local people, Adam added.

Many soldiers fled, leaving behind their uniforms and weapons. "And when the soldiers fled in Mocimboa da Praia and Quissanga, the people applauded." But some fought, and between 60 and 120 soldiers were killed [in Mocimboa] and were buried in mass graves, without their identify "dog tags" which were sent to their families. The entire interview, in Portuguese only, is on: <https://bit.ly/Adam-Canal>

## **Bishop Luiz Fernando Lisboa: without jobs, resources are a curse**

"It is very sad that this is happening in a province so rich in resources such as natural gas, precious stones and rubies. ... These resources should not continue to be a curse for the people, as they have been until now," said the Pemba Catholic Bishop Luiz Fernando Lisboa, in an interview with CDD (Centre for Democracy and Development, 12 Apr) on <https://bit.ly/CDD-Bispo-1> in Portuguese only.

"The population must be consulted and heard. The population needs to be part of the processes and not a group of five or six people who are often co-opted, bought - they speak on behalf of the population, but have no power or legitimacy to speak on behalf of the people. Often the population is left out. If they don't involve the population, if they don't bring jobs to the youth, the resources end up becoming a curse."

"It is necessary to invest massively in youth, because if we do not give opportunities to our young people, they will follow the path they are following now."

"Cabo Delgado today lives in a situation of isolation; it does not seem that we are part of Mozambique. We feel isolated, abandoned," the Bishop continued. "The climate of fear is widespread. And fear is not unfair. We all follow that some journalists who tried to cover the attacks were arrested."

And the war is getting worse. "It was unthinkable to attack Mocimboa da Praia, which is a town with a large contingent of military personnel, but they attacked and occupied it. They attacked the places where the police and the military were camped, took weapons, took cars, took food. The entire northern area of Cabo Delgado is a powder keg. The population is agitated and in almost all districts people are fleeing to safe places. For those who cannot afford to leave, the solution is to sleep in the bush."

## **Sergo Chichava: Who is the enemy?**

"Evidence on the ground shows clearly that the country faces the presences of a radical Islam group that want to impose Sharia", and this is reinforced by the attacks of 23 and 24 March in Mocimboa da Praia and Quissanga, writes Sergio Chichava, scientific director of IESE (Institute of Economic and Social Studies) in Maputo, in Ideas Bulletin 127 published 13 April, in Portuguese only on <http://www.iese.ac.mz/ideias-127/>

But the roots of that enemy and its history are less clear, and in the paper he looks at four different explanations that have been given by the government: 1. Individuals who want to install an Islamic state, 2. artisanal ruby miners displaced by Gemfields (some of whom, Chichava confirms, have joined the insurgency), 3. business people based in Beira (which seems not to have been backed up), and 4. vaguely defined external forces.

## Palma journalist still missing

Palma community radio journalist Ibraimo Mbaruco is still missing after he was kidnapped, apparently by military, on 7 April. The last anyone heard from him was a short text message to colleagues saying he was "surrounded by soldiers". On 14 April, Cabo Delgado police spokesperson Augusto Guta said the police, secret services SISE, and "all the security and defence forces" had been unable to locate Mbaruco.

Also on 14 April, police in Pemba detained Hizidine Acha, a reporter for O Pais newspaper and the STV television station, forcing him to delete images of police beating and whipping people in the Paquetiquete neighbourhood of the city. Spokesperson Guta told Zitamar that the situation had been a misunderstanding and that the police were not beating or whipping people. (Zitamar 15 Apr)

## Other Cabo Delgado news

**"Jobs don't exist"**, explained the General Commander of the Mozambican police force, Bernadino Rafael, on STV (14 Apr). Young people being offered jobs "are being tricked so that they enter the labyrinth of crime" by joining the insurgents. He said that most of the insurgents are Tanzanians, but some Mozambicans had joined because of offers of jobs. "There are no zones that can be said to be in the hands of the insurgents", he insisted. "What does exist are areas that are prone to incursions by the criminals" - where there is an "alteration of public order". (AIM 14 Apr)

**The Pope in his Easter message** said: "The crisis we are facing should not make us forget the many other crises that bring suffering to so many people. May the Lord of life be close to all those in Asia and Africa who are experiencing grave humanitarian crises, as in the Province of Cabo Delgado in the north of Mozambique."

**Is working day and night enough?** "I want to assure all Mozambicans that the government will continue to work, night and day, using all that is in its power to defend the population of the Cabo Delgado districts plagued by these violent attacks," said President Filipe Nyusi on 13 April. "We call on the populations not to accept information intended to divide Mozambicans and to create hatred between the people and their Defence and Security Forces."

**Map of incidents** this year to 12 April, from Jasmine Opperman, shows clearly three concentrations - Mocimboa da Praia, Muidumbe, and Macomia-Bilibiza-Quissanga. <https://twitter.com/Jasminechic00/status/1250026656724631553/photo/1>

**Five people died in the Quirimba attack** on 10 April; three drowned as they tried to escape. One of the victims was burnt alive, while the fifth was shot dead. About 60 people were taken hostage, perhaps as a shield against the helicopter attack, but released later. (*Carta de Mocimboa* 13 Apr).

**There was no massacre in Xitaxi** we now believe. In the series of raids on Muidumbe on 5-7 April (this newsletters 479, 480) *Savana* (10 Apr) reported a massacre with 50-70 dead. We now believe this was hugely exaggerated in reports by local people. It appears to be correct that liberation war veterans attacked a band of insurgents and killed up to 30, and that the insurgents retaliated with a renewed attack on Xitaxi, which was done with some violence and anger and significant destruction. But we believe the deaths were closer to the 14 reported by Zitamar, and not the very large number reported by *Savana*.

**The historic Nangololo mission was attacked** and vandalised and partly burned as part of the 5-7 April raids in



Muidumbe. The mission is in Muambula, the former district headquarters before it was moved to Namacande, and insurgents were still occupying the mission on 11 April. All the foreign missionaries there fled to Mueda, then Montepuez, and then Pemba. Southeastern parts of Muidumbe district are low and occupied by a mix of Mwani and Maconde speakers. The attacks started there but then moved up the road onto the Mueda plateau and thus were a direct attack on a Frelimo stronghold. Nangololo produced many Frelimo leaders and thus its occupation for several days was a strong statement by the insurgents.

**Creating fear and paranoia** is a goal of any insurgent group, and as insurgents move through Bilibiza and Quissanga the wave of fear goes ahead of them.

**On Ibo island** on the night of 11-12 April rumours spread that insurgents were approaching the island for an attack, causing panic among local residents. Security forces then reportedly stopped a boat believed to be carrying insurgents, but which in reality was carrying local fishermen. Security forces reportedly fired shots during the incident though no injuries were reported. (Intelyse 13 Apr)

**In Nacuta, Metuge** District, just across the bay from Pemba, two 2 suspected insurgents were attacked by civilians on 5 April; one man was killed, while the other was badly injured. This links to rumours and fears in Pemba of an attack. (Intelyse 13 Apr)

**Eric Prince never goes away**, but never does anything. Prince has tried to sell military and mercenary capabilities around the world. After the Russian government linked Wagner group failed in Cabo Delgado, "Prince sent a proposal to the Russian firm offering to supply a ground force as well as aviation-based surveillance", according to The Intercept, the investigative journalism group founded by Glenn Greenwald.

<https://theintercept.com/2020/04/13/erik-prince-russia-mercenary-wagner-libya-mozambique/>

It is part of Prince's continuing efforts to get a foothold in Mozambique, which included bringing helicopters to Nacala last year in the unsuccessful expectation of being given a big role. We reported on 19 December (this newsletter 465) that his Frontier Services Group (FSG) had withdraw from the joint venture with Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos (ENH), intended to supply logistics and security for Cabo Delgado gas projects. Two years ago Prince signed a joint venture agreement with Ematum, the tuna fishing company set up as part of the \$2 bn secret debt, but which has never caught any fish. Prince said he would have the company fishing last year, but instead quietly withdrew. Prince established FSG Mozambique, which in turn owns 49% of FSG Mozambique Seguranca; the other 51% owned is owned by Lucilio (Tchenguela) Matsinha, son of the revolutionary war veteran and former security minister Marianao Matsinha. Prince set up the private security company Blackwater which sent contract security workers to Iraq and Afghanistan, and claims Russian, Chinese, and US high level links. Prince was an adviser to the de facto ruler of the United Arab Emirates, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed, known as MBZ, for more than a decade, when the close ally of the US intervened militarily in several regional wars in the Middle East and Africa. He also had a contract worth hundreds of millions of dollars to create and train a presidential guard for the royal family, but was later removed for mismanagement, reports the Intercept.

=====

**ELECTION OVERLOAD?** - You are subscribed to two newsletters, the *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin election newsletters* (published by CIP), and *Mozambique News Reports and Clippings* (published by Joseph Hanlon and not linked to CIP). If you want to receive this newsletter but not the election newsletters, just reply to this e-mail with "no election" in the subject line.

=====

The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) strengthens data protection and requires that consent to receive communication must be 'freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous'. Importantly, there must be a positive opt-in as opposed to an opt-out. As you have voluntarily subscribed to our newsletters, you do not need to take any action and will continue to receive them as usual. We hold only your e-mail address and no other information about you, and we never share our subscription list with anyone.

To **unsubscribe**: [tinyurl.com/unsunsub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/unsunsub-moz)

=====

ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED but please cite the source: "Mozambique News Reports and Clippings". Previous newsletters are posted on [bit.ly/mozamb](http://bit.ly/mozamb)

=====

## Background reading

### Special reports

#### Mozambique heroin transit trade

English - L SE - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin>

Portuguese - Pt - CIP - <http://bit.ly/HeroinaPT>

#### Gas for development?

1203152

00089



Gas\_for\_development\_or\_just\_for\_money?\_2015 [bit.ly/MozGasEng](http://bit.ly/MozGasEng)  
Gás\_para\_desenvolvimento\_ou\_apenas\_dinheiro?\_2015 [bit.ly/MozGasPt](http://bit.ly/MozGasPt)  
Social protection report - 2017 Mozambique - <http://bit.ly/MozSocPro>  
Special report on four poverty surveys: [bit.ly/MozPoverty](http://bit.ly/MozPoverty)  
2018 Constitution - <http://bit.ly/2KF588T>  
Minimum wage and exchange rates 1996-2018 -- <http://bit.ly/MinWage18>

**\$2bn secret debt - in English**

Kroll - Full report on \$2bn debt - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-Moz-full>  
Kroll report summary - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-sum>  
Key points of Mozambique parliament report - Nov 2016 - <http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt-En>  
Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique's \$2.2 bn debt - <http://bit.ly/3WQ-hanlon>

**In Portuguese:**

Parliamentary Report on the Secret Debt (complete) [bit.ly/MozAR-debt](http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt)

**Election study collaboration:** We have detailed election data from 1999 through 2014 and are inviting scholars to use this data collaboratively.  
<http://bit.ly/MozElData>

Election newsletters are on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

**Eight books by Joseph Hanlon can be downloaded, free: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books>**

Bangladesh confronts climate change (2016)  
Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique (2014)  
Há Mais Bicicletas – mas há desenvolvimento? (2008)  
Moçambique e as grandes cheias de 2000 (2001)  
Paz Sem Benefício: Como o FMI Bloqueia a Reconstrução (1997)  
Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding (1996)  
Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots (1991)  
Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (1984)

**Two more will be available shortly to download:**

Apartheid's 2nd Front (1986)  
Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000

**These are still available for sale:**

Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento (2014) (free in English)  
Zimbabwe takes back its land (2013)  
Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South (2010)  
Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique? (2008) (free in Portuguese)  
Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (1986)

=====  
This mailing is the personal responsibility of Joseph Hanlon, and does not necessarily represent the views of the Open University.  
=====□

-- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority in relation to its secondary activity of credit broking.

To: 5.1.2.e @open.ac.uk]  
From: 5.1.2.e  
Sent: Mon 4/27/2020 12:46:02 PM  
Importance: Normal  
Subject: Mozambique 483 - Cabo Delgado massacres by both sides; is army infiltrated? - Covid-19  
MAIL\_RECEIVED: Mon 4/27/2020 12:50:21 PM  
[Mozambique 483-27Aor2020 Xitaxi-Ibo-massacres CEEI-military-strategy Covid-19-peak-year-end.pdf](#)

# MOZAMBIQUE 483

## News reports & clippings

### 27 April 2020

=====

Editor: Joseph Hanlon ( [j.hanlon@open.ac.uk](mailto:j.hanlon@open.ac.uk) )

To subscribe: [tinyurl.com/sub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/sub-moz)

To unsubscribe: [tinyurl.com/unsub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/unsub-moz)

**Articles may be freely reprinted but please cite the source.**

Previous newsletters and other Mozambique material are posted on [bit.ly/mozamb](http://bit.ly/mozamb)

Downloadable books: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books> Election data: <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>

=====

**Attached: this newsletter in pdf**

=====

*Also in this issue:*

**Ibo 'police state'**

**Report says army incompetent or infiltrated**

**Minister: Covid-19 cases will increase until December**

=====

*Cabo Delgado fog of war:*

## Massacres by both sides & press restrictions

Information has only come out in the past week about the massacres two weeks ago by the insurgents in Xitaxi, which killed 50-70, mostly young men, and in a series of attacks on civilian boats by the military on Ibo island which have killed 18-48, including a local Renamo leader.

Reports are confused and sometimes conflicting, which is exacerbated by the increasingly severe limitations on the press. Palma community radio journalist Ibraimo Mbaruco has been missing since he was taken, apparently by the military, on 7 April; there are growing fears that he has been "disappeared" by the military. And for its regular Wednesday Maputo press briefings, the General Command of the Mozambican Police on 15 and 22 April only invited state media, Radio Mocambique (RM) and Mozambique Television (TVM), and excluded all private and independent media. MISA (Media Institute of Southern Africa) in a critical 24 April statement suggested this was a response to private media criticism of police behaviour.

**Comment:** We have no independent sources and as the newsletter title "News Reports & Clippings" makes clear, we report what is in the media. The media crackdown has, we think intentionally, made people in Cabo Delgado afraid to report. This leaves the field open to rumour, error and exaggeration. The best we can do is apply a plausibility filter and cite the sources. (See also the background note in the attached pdf version of this newsletter.) *jh*

## Xitaxi massacre confirmed

The Mozambican police have confirmed the story first published in Pinnacle News (8 April) and Savana (10 April) that insurgents killed at least 52 people on 8 April in Xitaxi. Muidumbe district, on the N380 road where it divides with the N380

1203151

going north to Palma and a branch going up the hill to Mueda.

Cited by Radio Mozambique (21 Apr), the spokesperson for the General Command of the Mozambican police, Orlando Mudumane, said insurgents "cruelly and indiscriminately shot dead 52 youths in the village of Xitaxi." He said that in their attempt to recruit young people to their ranks, they encountered resistance, and reacted by murdering those who refused to join.

Investigative journalist Armando Nhantumbo who wrote the *Savana* article disagrees with the police interpretation and the numbers. (*Savana* 24 April) He says that local people were called to a meeting at 13h00 and people of all ages were there, from children to the elderly. The insurgents began to behead people and when people tried to flee, they were machine-gunned. The 52 dead were the bodies found by the police on the site. But Nhantumbo says others, although seriously injured, fled to the bush, where they died. He estimates the total dead at more than 70.

Nhantumbo also disputes the cause. The dead were not all young men. Instead the massacre was in retaliation for an attack on the insurgents the day before, when veterans of the liberation war killed more than 30 insurgents in a battle.

*Savana* says that Muslim coastal villages are now largely controlled by the insurgents. It appears the attacks on Muidumbe district were an attempt to push inland and up onto the Mueda plateau. Xataxi at the foot of the plateau is largely Christian in a zone with an historic catholic mission. The Makonde from the plateau formed the core of the initial independence guerrilla force and still form a key part of the army, faced with such a weak response from the military, it was left to independence war veterans and the families to stop the insurgents climbing up the hill.

## Ibo 'police state'

"Security forces turning Ibo Island into murderous police state, locals say," was the Zitamar (23 Apr) headline. Arriving boats were attacked on 12, 16 and 21 April, with estimates of civilians killed ranging from 18 to 48.

In an unusually detailed statement on 23 April, Renamo national spokesperson Jose Manteigas accused the armed forces (FADM) of murdering defenceless civilians on Ibo. He said that on 12 April, a boat carrying people and goods from Pemba was intercepted as it arrived at the Ibo jetty. FADM members allegedly dragged the boat under the pier, and opened fire against the occupants. Manteigas gave the names of eight people who had been killed, including the Renamo head of mobilisation in Ibo district, Momade Chabane, and his son, Samuel Momade, who was also a member of Renamo. The killers threw the bodies into the sea. The Renamo statement is on <https://bit.ly/Renamo-Ibo>

Other reports said 12 people were killed, but *Carta de Mocambique* (24 April) said 40 people were killed and that the attack was by members of the riot police (UIR, Unidade de Intervencao Rapido). Most people on the boat were traders carrying merchandise, and the riot police took all the goods they had been transporting, says *Carta*.

Ibo has a large military presence and many refugees from the mainland, notably from Macomia and Quissanga, which have been repeatedly attacked. But many residents fled Ibo after insurgents attacked neighbouring Quirimba island on 10 April. On 22 April the Ibo administrator ordered the reopening of district offices of health, education and others which had been closed after the attack on Quirimba, and gave civil servants who had fled six days to return to work.

## Controlling a key corridor

Insurgents have been moving over the past two months to control a key 100 km east-west corridor south of Macomia and the Quirimbas national park. See map on <https://bit.ly/BilibizaMap>. This is an area of only 3 main roads.

+ The N380 is the only paved road from Pemba to the gas fields. Going north it crosses the washed out bridge over the Montepuez river and runs north through Nangololo to Macomia and then further north to Muidumbe where there were further attacks, including the massacre at Xitaxi.

+ Just north of the Montepuez river there is a dirt road going east from Montepuez through Meluco, which then crosses the N380 south of Nangololo and goes to Bilibiza and then ends at Mahate at the coast, where it joins

+ a dirt road runs from Quisanga, an important coastal port, south to Pemba; 10 km south of Pemba is Mahate, with the road west to Bilibiza, and the road continues south over the Montepuez river (over a bridge which is also washed out).

Control of this zone south of the Quirimbas park and north of the Montepuez river gives the insurgents the ability to tax and

attack all west-east and south-north traffic. The move from Quissanga to Quirimba island was straightforward. Ibo is the obvious next target, because control of Ibo and Quirimba would give the insurgents control of coastal shipping as well.

These are recent incidents reported in this corridor:

**Qurimba.** After the Qurimba island attack on 10 April, a large group was taken both to carry goods taken from the market to Quissanga, and to serve as shields against the Dyke helicopter gunship. Some were quickly released, but 26 young women and 15 young men are still being held - the men apparently to be guerrillas, which is a further indication that the insurgents are following the 1980s Renamo model of kidnapping school-age young men as fighters. There are rumours of similar kidnappings from other villages,

**Quissanga.** Insurgents have been living alongside locals since Quissanga was occupied on 25 March. Officials and many residents fled to Pemba, and the insurgents exert some control over daily life for those who remain, reports Zitamar (24 Apr). They encourage those in the town to pray every morning, and encourage fishers to continue, but demand a portion of the catch for themselves. On Sunday 19 April insurgents played - and won - a football match against the local youth, according to a source employed by the district administration, who has sought refuge in Pemba. The insurgents are staying in the unfinished new building of the Quissanga secondary school, the source said. Zitamar says that the insurgents are trying to win hearts and minds in coastal areas, but are being much harsher inland.

**Mahate,** the village 10 km south Quissanga at the junction of the roads going west to Bilibiza and south to Pemba. Local people have been encouraged to take food from a warehouse with aid for the victims of cyclone Kenneth that hit the area just over a year ago. (Zitamar 24 Apr)

**Bilibiza,** 30km southwest and inland from Quissanga. Insurgents have banned the sale of alcohol and tobacco. In one incident, locals helped insurgents collect firewood for cooking; on their return to the town, insurgents fired into the air, causing local traders to flee - allowing the insurgents to distribute food to the local people, in particular the elderly. (Zitamar 24 Apr)

**Cagembe,** 20 km north of Bilibiza. Insurgents are issuing travel passes to peasants to allow them to tend their fields without fear of assault. (Zitamar 24 Apr)

**Nangololo,** on the N380 between Macomia and the junction of the east-west road, has had three attacks and decapitations in the past week. Four people were decapitated during the 18-19 April weekend. Four men in Imbada village were surprised by attackers while participating in a funeral ceremony on 22 April, and were beheaded. Three more people were beheaded in the nearby village of Unguia on 25 April. (Zitamar 24 Apr; @jasminechic00)

## Foreign support arrives in Pemba

Two pictures of foreign military support at Pemba airport have been posted on 25 and 24 April by Portuguese journalist Nuno Rogerio on his Facebook. Both are confirmed to be Pemba airport, but without a date. The first shows the arrival of unidentified African troops.





The second photo shows a drone which he identifies as a Viper 1000/Helix ISR UAS, alongside a Cessna Caravan, both from Ultimate Aviation of South Africa. The Viper is a South African design. The Viper 1000 has night vision capability and comes with command and control centre on a double axle trailer. It has an 18 m wingspan. <http://ultimate-aviation.net/viper-1000c/>



*Africa Intelligence* (22 April) says that President Filipe Nyusi has turned to mercenaries because South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola and SADC refused requests for help. But apparently no one told the South Africa government and an embarrassed State Security Agency first learned about the Dyck Advisory Group helicopters from video footage on social media.

## Foreign aggression?

"The authorship of the attacks has been claimed by the Islamic State, a terrorist organisation, which shows that we are facing foreign aggression perpetrated by terrorists," declared the National Defence and Security Council (CNDS), a body that advises President Filipe Nyusi, at its 23 April meeting in Maputo. (AIM 24 Apr)

In the attack on Mocimboa da Praia on 23 March, TVM said that the insurgents included two men "of Asian origin", one of whom was killed by the military. "The presence of Asians contributes definitive proof that the terrorist group acting in Cabo Delgado has strong links with Islamic State," writes the Centro de Estudos Estrategicos e Internacionais (CEEI, Strategic Studies Centre) of Universidade Joaquim Chissano (formerly ISRI, Instituto Superior de Relacoes Internacionais, and with close government links as the diplomatic training institution). CEEI's Security Brief 2 is on <https://bit.ly/CEEI-2> (Portuguese only).

## CEEI: Strategy only military but army unable to confront insurgents

"Dozens" of government soldiers were killed in the Mocimboa attack, says the CEEI report, in what is perhaps the most candid analysis of government failures to be made by a public institution. It argues that the insurgent "group proved that it is evolving and that it has a great capacity to quickly adapt its tactics, operating modes and military targets," yet the government is failing to win over the population and the military has neither the equipment nor the leadership to defeat the insurgents.

In its analysis of insurgent strategy, CEEI says: "In the beginning, terrorists primarily targeted unguarded villages, considered easy. However, its modus operandi evolved, starting to attack road traffic. In the attack on Mocimboa da Praia, unlike the attacks in the villages, there was no beheading of people as had become usual. In addition, there was a use of heavy artillery. Considering this, we can affirm that the objectives of these attacks were quite clear: 'to show real military strength to the political leadership of the country.' This time the terrorists aimed only at military and economic targets, mainly state institutions. As proof of this, when they arrived, they sent local people away, saying that they only wanted to attack and confront the FDS." FDS (Forças de Defesa e Segurança) is the defence and security forces, the army as well as the riot police (UIR) who are doing much of the fighting.

Criticising the government response, CEEI says: "The Mozambican government is conducting a strategy to neutralize terrorist groups that does not match the needs on the ground to isolate groups from their main source of survival: the people. The strategy employed until today only contemplates military actions that involve attacks against terrorist camps and the constant pursuit of terrorists in the bush. Members of the armed group began to circulate in larger groups, with more than 30 men approaching villages without being identified or even being harassed by the armed forces. This reveals an authentic inability of the FDS or, even more serious, a high level of infiltration of the terrorists in the FDS, a high level of complicity of some members of the FDS with the group, or even a sign of incompetence of the commanders seconded to direct the operations in that region. What is most frightening is not simply the government's inability to suppress this genocidal insurgency, but the reports that indicate that the military equipment used is inadequate and outdated. The Mozambican military are inadequately equipped to confront terrorists and there are no signs that the situation will change rapidly."

"It should be noted that the terrorist group intensified the attacks after the FDS started an offensive in the last quarter of 2019, aimed at exterminating the terrorist group and destroying its bases, with the help and support of Russian mercenaries. But the operation failed to kill or capture the insurgents. At the time, the FDS claimed to have caused huge casualties in the group and boasted of the number enemy casualties. There was an excess of optimism on the government side as they believed that the situation was under control and there was a relaxation of surveillance that proved fatal. In response, the terrorist group, which previously only attacked villages, started a terror campaign targeting the FDS with ambushes on military patrols and attacks on garrisons, camps and military bases. The attack on FDS positions has become normal and shows that the terrorist group has improved its capabilities. According to sources, the terrorists who attacked the towns of Mocimboa da Praia and Quissanga were heavily armed and briefly took control of the villages in a clear display of strength. According to some military and eyewitnesses who watched the assault in Mocimboa da Praia and Quissanga, terrorists are, in general, better trained and better equipped than government officials and the Army. The return of the FDS to the villages was not result from the deployment of new reinforcements or a counter-offensive, but from the "will" of the terrorists." In other words, the FDS was allowed to return. The report is on <https://bit.ly/CEEI-2>



The CEEI report ends by pointedly citing a 2014 US Institute of Peace report "Why do youth join Boko Haram?", which says "Addressing the conditions that make it possible for insurgents to recruit young men in Nigeria can significantly diminish the strength of the insurgency, if not eliminate it altogether." <https://www.usip.org/publications/2014/06/why-do-youth-join-boko-haram>

## Elsewhere

**Pemba.** The people of Paquitequete, a dense older neighbourhood on the shore of Pemba, evicted the police in a demonstration on 21 April, which included blocking local streets with burning tyres. Many displaced people fleeing insurgent attacks in Quissanga and Mocimboa da Praia have recently arrived in Paquitequete, and police clearly fear that insurgents could have arrived with the displaced people. On 14 April police illegally detained journalist Izidine Acha, a journalist who photographed them beating a local people - police forced him to delete his pictures, but the beating was filmed: <https://bit.ly/Paquitequete> Police have imposed at 19h00 curfew on Pemba (although they have no right to do so) and were trying to enforce it on 21 April when local people resisted. Police fired shots into the air and used tear gas against the crowd, but they proved unable to disperse the protesters, who remained on the road linking Paquitequete to the centre of Pemba. Finally, the police withdrew. (*Carta de Mocambique* 23 Apr, Moz24h 22 Apr)

**Palma.** Soldiers shot and killed four named civilians, according to Renamo in its 23 April statement. No date was given. *Carta de Mocambique* (27 Apr) reports that an important Islamic leader, Sheik Kidume, has been kidnapped. Journalist Ibraimo Mbaruco, apparently kidnapped by the military on 7 April, remains missing.

**Beira.** Two police have been arrested for beating to death a 44-year old man, Abdul Razak, in Beira on 19 April. Police had dispersed a group of adolescents playing football, in defiance of the rules of the Covid-19 state of emergency. Police picked up their ball, and began to play football themselves. Razak criticised the attitude of the policemen and said he would film them. Two policemen turned on Razak and began beating him with their guns. Passers-by urged the policemen to stop the violence, but they ignored all such appeals. The badly battered Razak was thrown into a cell in the Beira fourth precinct. Three hours later, his relatives found him there and demanded his release. "They demanded beer from us and 300 meticaïs" (\$4.50), said Razak's sister. "Since we wanted our relative, we paid the money and he was released. But he was very weak and on the way to the hospital he died". The autopsy says that Razak died of trauma caused by being struck with heavy objects. (AIM 21, 22 Apr; STV 21 Apr)

## Covid-19 cases will continue to increase until end of year, says minister

The government is hoping to delay the peak of Covid-19 infections as a means of protecting the Mozambican health system from being overwhelmed, according to Health Minister Armindo Tiago. "Right now, what we are trying to do is push the peak to between December 2020 and February next year", he said Tuesday 21 Apr. (AIM 22 Apr)

The number of people in Mozambique known to have been infected with the coronavirus that causes the respiratory disease Covid-19 has jumped by 30 Friday to Sunday (24-26 Apr), to a total of 76. All of the new cases are at the Total gas construction camp on Afungi, Cabo Delgado, which has two-thirds of all detected cases. The other 20 are in Maputo and Matola. Of the 76 cases, 8 are imported and the rest are local transmission. There have been no deaths. The Ministry of Health publishes a daily bulletin on <http://www.misau.gov.mz/index.php/covid-19-boletins-diarios> A good up-to-date summary is on <http://www.misau.gov.mz/index.php/covid-19-boletins-diarios?download=288:suma-rio-epidemiologico>

The Ministry is stressing testing, contact tracing, and enforced isolation of contacts, which has led to the identification of a large group at the Total camp. The worry is that the disease is spreading in other places and has not been reported. One case reported Thursday is of a Mozambican man, resident in Matola and aged over 30, not known to have had any contact with the Afungi camp and not having been outside of Mozambique recently. Many of the cases detected in Afungi are asymptomatic but still contagious - meaning people did not know they were infecting others.

STV reported a suspected Covid-19 case who was not home when health officials arrived to check on him, and who had broken quarantine to attend his mother's funeral in Magude, Maputo province.

More than 1000 cultural and tourism establishments have closed and at least 5000 people have lost their jobs, according to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. Museums, libraries, schools, beaches, bars and casinos are closed; groups over 10 people are banned; these are some restrictions on public transport. Restaurants and bottle stores are allowed to remain open, but many restaurants and tourist resorts have closed. The largest poultry producer in northern Mozambique, Novos Horizontes, says it has huge quantities of unsold chickens on its hands because most of the clients had been hotels, restaurants, and take-aways, which have closed. It says it has 380 tonnes of frozen chickens in its freezers and 170,000 live chickens ready to be slaughtered.

There is growing evidence that the state of emergency and restrictions are being ignored in many parts of the country. Police arrested a protestant pastor and his assistant in Zavala, Inhambane, who violated the state of emergency regulations by holding a religious ceremony attended by over 300 people. In Nampula city and Nacala, there is no attempt to ensure social distancing. Crowds of people continue to gather in formal and informal markets, at shops and banks, and in buses and minibuses. Drivers and passengers in minibuses are supposed to wear masks and the loading is restricted, but this is ignored. (AIM 22, 23, 24, 25 Apr; O Pais 27 Apr))

Security Brief 2 by the Centro de Estudos Estrategicos e Internacionais (CEEI) of Universidade Joaquim Chissano has a detailed analysis of the economic and social impacts of Covid-19 on Mozambique, noting in particular that it will increase poverty and inequality. It also warns that "The possibility of total confinement of a population that survives from daily work on a self-employed basis is a challenge for countries such as Mozambique. The possibilities for greater resistance, demonstrations or the occurrence of acts of violence and vandalism cannot be ruled out. ... If the government fails to approve a package of assistance for the people who will suffer most from the economic crisis resulting from the closure of economic activities, there will be an upheaval. ... If the state does not inject huge sums of money into the economy to rescue companies and sectors at risk that are considered essential, the popularity and legitimacy of the government will be questioned." CEEI's Security Brief 2 is on <https://bit.ly/CEEI-2> (Portuguese only).

## Is lockdown feasible?

South Africa has the most cases and deaths in Africa south of the Sahara, with 4,546 cases and 87 deaths. Because of different country sizes, it is easier to compare the rate per million population - South Africa has 77 cases per million and 1 death per million, compared to Mozambique with just 2 cases per million and no deaths. Zimbabwe and Malawi have 2 deaths each and 2 cases per million population; Tanzania has 10 deaths and 5 cases per million. (These are low compared to Europe and the US, which have 2000 to 5000 cases per million population and 200 to 500 deaths per million population. Portugal is seen as a success in curbing the disease, but still had 2,300 cases per million and 186 deaths per million.)

With relatively high numbers, South Africa imposed a complete lockdown to try to stop the spread of Covid-19. The choice as presented is cruel and stark for individual families - to suffer real and serious disruption and even possible hunger by maintaining social distancing (to stop the spread of the disease), or to continue approximately normal life only to have a significant chance of major disruption due to family members seriously ill with Covid-19 and some perhaps dying.

A new study headed by Sam Jones at the World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University (UNU-WIDER) argues that most people in Mozambique, even in urban areas, do not meet the most basic conditions for lockdown or isolation, namely safe drinking water, adequate sanitation at home, and a source of reliable energy. Many more depend on a daily income to survive. They say: "Rather than blindly replicating policies from higher income contexts, we recommend practical alternatives to a complete or general household lockdown. While this must be designed locally, ideally with community engagement, part of such a package must involve extensive testing and tracking to identify virus hotspots, as in Vietnam, as well as extensive prevention measures. And even if a lighter form of lockdown must be enforced, large-scale social protection programmes (such as cash transfers) and basic service expansion (such as mobile drinking water stations) would be required to avoid an even greater catastrophe." <https://theconversation.com/the-five-criteria-low-income-countries-must-have-in-place-for-lockdowns-to-work-136263>

=====

## Hidden debt and keeping \$ away from government

As part of the donor attempts to not give cash to government, the European Union signed an agreement with the United



Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on 22 April for the UNDP to manage a Mozambique post-cyclone recovery fund with \$37 mn from the EU. (AIM 22 Apr)

The IMF announced Friday 24 April that it would disperse \$309 mn under the IMF's Rapid Credit Facility to allow the country to meet health and other costs of Covid-19. But IMF Deputy Managing Director Tao Zhang made clear this emergency funding does not mean a new IMF programme for Mozambique. That is still to be negotiated and will require "strengthened debt management and transparency" and "structural reforms". The Public Integrity Centre (CIP) in a statement the next day called for civil society to monitor the use of this money and for the government to create a formal mechanism to do this.  
<https://cipmoz.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/ORCAMENTO-PARA-COMBATER-O-COVID-19-1.pdf>

Donors no longer trust government to manage aid after the \$2 bn secret debt scandal. Thus it was seen as government thumbing its nose to the donors when Maria Isaltina Lucas, the finance ministry national budget director who signed the illegal government guarantees on some of the \$2bn secret loans in 2013-4, was recently appointed as an adviser to Prime Minister Carlos Agostinho do Rosário. Under pressure from people within Rosario's office, she has now resigned rather than further embarrass the Prime Minister. (Mediafax 21 Apr)

## Police sold 100kg of seized drugs on black market

Over 100kg of the 430kg of heroin and methamphetamine seized last year in Cabo Delgado was stolen by police officers in Pemba, which continued until the remaining drugs were taken to a secret warehouse. The drugs in question were intended to serve as evidence during the trial of the traffickers, who are being held in the local maximum security prison in Mize. A spokesman for criminal investigation service Sernic recently denied that Mozambique was a drug-trafficking corridor on the grounds that no drug seizures had been verified since 2018. (*Carta de Mocambique* 21 Apr)

=====

**ELECTION OVERLOAD?** - You are subscribed to two newsletters, the *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin election newsletters* (published by CIP), and *Mozambique News Reports and Clippings* (published by Joseph Hanlon and not linked to CIP). If you want to receive this newsletter but not the election newsletters, just reply to this e-mail with "no election" in the subject line.

=====

The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) strengthens data protection and requires that consent to receive communication must be 'freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous'. Importantly, there must be a positive opt-in as opposed to an opt-out. As you have voluntarily subscribed to our newsletters, you do not need to take any action and will continue to receive them as usual. We hold only your e-mail address and no other information about you, and we never share our subscription list with anyone.

To **unsubscribe**: [tinyurl.com/unsub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/unsub-moz)

=====

ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED but please cite the source: "Mozambique News Reports and Clippings". Previous newsletters are posted on [bit.ly/mozamb](http://bit.ly/mozamb)

=====

## Background reading

### Special reports

#### Mozambique heroin transit trade

English - LSE - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin>

Portuguese - Pt - CIP - <http://bit.ly/HeroínaPT>

#### Gas for development?

Gas\_for\_development\_or\_just\_for\_money?\_2015 [bit.ly/MozGasEng](http://bit.ly/MozGasEng)

Gás\_para\_desenvolvimento\_ou\_apenas\_dinheiro?\_2015 [bit.ly/MozGasPt](http://bit.ly/MozGasPt)

Social protection report - 2017 Mozambique - <http://bit.ly/MozSocPro>

Special report on four poverty surveys: [bit.ly/MozPoverty](http://bit.ly/MozPoverty)

2018 Constitution - <http://bit.ly/2KF588T>

Minimum wage and exchange rates 1996-2018 -- <http://bit.ly/MinWage18>

#### \$2bn secret debt - in English

Kroll - Full report on \$2bn debt - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-Moz-full>

Kroll report summary - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-sum>

Key points of Mozambique parliament report - Nov 2016 - <http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt-En>

Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique's \$2.2 bn debt - <http://bit.ly/3WQ-hanlon>

#### In Portuguese:

Parliamentary Report on the Secret Debt (complete) [bit.ly/MozAR-debt](http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt)

**Election study collaboration:** We have detailed election data from 1999 through 2014 and are inviting scholars to use this data collaboratively.  
<http://bit.ly/MozEIData>

Election newsletters are on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

1203151

00092

**Eight books by Joseph Hanlon can be downloaded, free:** <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books>

Bangladesh confronts climate change (2016)

Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique (2014)

Há Mais Bicicletas – mas há desenvolvimento? (2008)

Moçambique e as grandes cheias de 2000 (2001)

Paz Sem Benefício: Como o FMI Bloqueia a Reconstrução (1997)

Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding (1996)

Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots (1991)

Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (1984)

**Two more will be available shortly to download:**

Apartheid's 2nd Front (1986)

Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000

**These are still available for sale:**

Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento (2014) (free in English)

Zimbabwe takes back its land (2013)

Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South (2010)

Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique? (2008) (free in Portuguese)

Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (1986)

=====  
This mailing is the personal responsibility of Joseph Hanlon, and does not necessarily represent the views of the Open University.

=====□

-- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority in relation to its secondary activity of credit broking.

To: [redacted] 5.1.2.e @open.ac.uk]  
From: [redacted]  
Sent: Thur 5/1/2020 12:31:44 AM  
Importance: Normal  
Subject: Mozambique 484 - Govt. says debt 'criminal'; Insurgents move toward Pemba; Religion in Cabo Delgado - 30 Apr 2020  
MAIL\_RECEIVED: Thur 5/1/2020 12:32:10 AM  
[Mozambique 484-30April2020 Gov-says-debt-criminal Insurgents-toward-Pemba.pdf](#)  
[Mozambique 484-30Apr2020 Supplement-religion-vote.pdf](#)

# MOZAMBIQUE 484

## News reports & clippings

### 30 April 2020

=====

Editor: Joseph Hanlon ( [j.hanlon@open.ac.uk](mailto:j.hanlon@open.ac.uk) )

To subscribe: [tinyurl.com/sub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/sub-moz)

To unsubscribe: [tinyurl.com/unsub-moz](http://tinyurl.com/unsub-moz)

**Articles may be freely reprinted but please cite the source.**

Previous newsletters and other Mozambique material are posted on [bit.ly/mozamb](http://bit.ly/mozamb)

Downloadable books: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books> Election data: <http://bit.ly/MozElData>

=====

Attached: this newsletter in pdf and Special Report: "Religion is shaping Cabo Delgado civil war" (also on <https://bit.ly/CDelgadoReligion>)

=====

*Also in this issue:*

**Insurgents move toward Pemba**

=====

## Secret debt guarantee 'criminal', 'illegal' says government

In its strongest public statement so far, government has called the guarantees on the MAM and Proindicus secret debt to be "illegally obtained" and "criminally obtained". But it confirms the acceptance of the Ematum bonds and that they will be paid

The \$2 bn secret debt taken in 2013-4 was in three parts as loans to three companies largely owned by the security services. Proindicus borrowed \$622 mn, \$504 mn from Credit Suisse and \$118 from VTB. MAM borrowed \$535 from VTB. These loans are now challenged.

Ematum borrowed \$850 mn in the form of bonds, which have been rescheduled twice and are accepted as payable.

In the government's request to the IMF for a Covid-19 rapid credit, its Letter of Intent from Minister of Economy and Finance Adriano Afonso Maleiane Bank of Mozambique Governor Rogério Zandamela says: (emphasis added)

"Last year, a restructuring agreement was reached with Eurobond holders providing substantial debt service relief.

Mozambique's Attorney-General has filed a lawsuit in the U.K. to nullify the **criminally obtained government guarantee** on the loan contracted by Proindicus SA, a state-owned enterprise, with Credit Suisse. Similarly, in its defense against a lawsuit brought by VTB in the U.K., the Government will seek to nullify the **illegally obtained government guarantee** on the loan contracted by MAM SA, another state-owned enterprise."

The IMF adds that "the government does not intend to support MAM, which will follow the normal course of commercial bankruptcy without backing, and the validity of the government guarantee on VTB's loan to MAM is in dispute."

The full IMF document is on: <https://www.imf.org/~media/Files/Publications/CR/2020/English/1MOZEA2020001.ashx>  
1203149

00094

The Letter of Intent is on page 21 as Annex 1 of the main report.

## Transparency promises to gain \$309 mn

To get its \$309 mn in Covid-19 money from the IMF, the government has been forced to make unprecedented concessions to transparency of the use of the money. In the Letter of Intent, the ministers say: "We will undertake an independent audit of crisis-mitigation spending and related procurement processes once the crisis abates and will publish its results. We will also publish on the government's website large public procurement contracts related to crisis mitigation, the names of the awarded companies, their beneficial owners, and ex-post validation of delivery."

Tao Zhang, IMF Deputy Managing Director and Chair, made clear this is linked to the need to "prevent corruption and misuse of emergency financing, by strengthening transparency and accountability." And the IMF's report stresses that legislative and institutional reforms were adopted a few years ago, but there is "a lack of effective implementation."

The requirement for audits and validation of delivery are important. But the strongest is revealing the "beneficial owners" of companies that win tenders. The escape clause is that it only applies to " **large** public procurement contracts," making is easy to split larger contracts in to many smaller pieces.

There will be a 2020 wage freeze.

**The Covid-19 State of Emergency** was extended for 30 days by President Nyusi.

---

### Special report: Religion is shaping Cabo Delgado civil war

Supplement on religion and voting in Cabo Delgado districts and administrative posts. Attached to this newsletter, and on <https://bit.ly/CDelgadoReligion>

---

## Insurgents move toward Pemba

Insurgent groups moved south toward Pemba Monday-Wednesday (27-29 April), but were stopped by the army and mercenaries. They did, however attack and burn villages.

The target appears to have been Metuge, across the bay to the west of Pemba. On Monday and Tuesday (27-28 Apr) there were reports of large military movements by road into Metuge district and deployment of South Africa Dyke Advisory Group helicopters. It appears that the military took control of Metuge; shops and offices are closed. Details are scarce, but it appears there was a confrontation at Nacoba, Quissanga district, about 20 km south of Quissanga town and 40 km from Pemba (by air, 85 km by road around the bay). T

he Mozambican military moving north and a large group of insurgents moving south met a Nacoba. It is unclear if there was actually any fighting but it was one of the largest government military movements of the war. Intelyse (30 April) says that insurgents on 28 April burned at least 20 houses in Nacoba and killed 15 head of livestock, but that "security forces supported by South African private military contractors (PMCs) arrived at the scene" and that insurgents fled the area "after brief clashes. Multiple military vehicles and helicopters were reported to be present in the area."

The government military action was a response to a move south by the insurgents, who established themselves near Napuda (Quissanga) and Namiteue (Metuge) 10 km south of Nacoba on the Quissanga-Nacoba-Metuge road. On 27 April there was a report that they had burned the nearby village of Muaja. *Pinnacle News* (29 Apr) reported that on Tuesday (28 April) insurgents burned Nacoba, Napuda, and a series of villages nearby along the north-south road: 1 de Maio, Natugo, Girumba, and Tacuanama. *Carta De Mocambique* (30 Apr) says insurgents on Tuesday reached another 5 km south to Messanja and Ntessa in Metuge.

At Nacoba the road is about 15 km inland from the coast and there are confirmed reports of attacks by insurgents on coastal villages. It is unclear if this was a separate group also moving south, or part of the main group leaving the main road and breaking up into smaller groups when confronted by government soldiers.



The village of Arimba was burned on Wednesday (29 Apr), and insurgents stole food and livestock and had a feast. The burning of Arimba is confirmed. One report said the attack was done by 16-20 men on 6-7 motorcycles. Arimba is an old and large coastal village and grew up around a coconut plantation abandoned in the colonial era.

Insurgents were said Thursday morning (30 April) to have raided two other coastal villages. A group was said to be moving south on an old dirt road toward Namau, Namavi and Sessoane villages, 10 km south of Arimba and in Metuge district, and were said to have arrived at mid-day. {unconfirmed}

## Government says 129 insurgents killed this month

Government forces killed 129 insurgents in four operations in April, Interior Minister Amad Miquidade reported, in a joint press conference with Defence Minister Jaime Neto.

- + 39 killed in Muidumbe on 7 April.
  - + 59 killed on Quirimba island on 10 April.
  - + 30 killed on Ibo Island on 11-12 April.
  - + 1 Killed on Ibo with the capture of a boat on 13 April.
- Nothing was said about government casualties.

Miquidade also attacked the press and Renamo for "acts of disinformation [of] some news organizations [and] spokesmen." Miquidade declared that "the Defence and Security Forces strongly condemn the statements by the spokesman of the Renamo party, which accuses the Mozambican state of murdering civilians." This was a reference to a 23 April statement by Renamo spokesman Jose Manteigas saying the security forces on 12 April had murdered defenceless civilians arriving on a boat; he gave 8 names of people killed, including a local Renamo leader.

*Zitamar* (29 Apr) writes "In a press conference yesterday, the ministers of defence and the interior said they wouldn't 'tolerate' those who accuse the state of killing civilians during counter-terrorism operations. The comment was aimed at opposition party Renamo, but it has also been interpreted as a veiled threat to the media."

Seventeen national and international civil society organizations have submitted a letter to President Filipe Nyusi expressing their concern about the increase in police violence against defenceless civilians in Cabo Delgado by the police Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR) and the Special Operations Group (GOE). The organizations also denounce the "harassment and intimidation" of civil society groups and journalists. They note in particular the disappearance on 7 April of Ibraimo Abu Mbaruco, a journalist at Palma Community Radio. *Zitamar* (29 Apr) reports that "Mbaruco continues to be held by the military", and that he was held first in the military quarters in Muidumbe, and is now being held in Mueda.

**Insurgent control of N380.** Insurgents now operate regularly along this route, exercising a form of semi-control over the Unguia - Macomia stretch of the road, according to Intelyse (30 April) Unguia is the junction with the road from Montepuez to the west and Bilibiza and Quisanga to the east. The N380 is the only paved road north from Pemba to the gas fields in Palma. There have been multiple insurgent attacks in March and April 2020 on the N380 between Unguia and Machova Koko 10 km further north. Insurgents control this stretch of road and can erect checkpoints in the area and potentially tax traffic travelling along the road, and are able to attack at will along this route, Intelyse says. This allows the militants to strain government and military supply lines to Cabo Delgado's Northern Districts.

**Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa** met with President Filipe Nyusi and Defence Minister Jaime Neto this afternoon in Chimoio.

=====

**ELECTION OVERLOAD?** - You are subscribed to two newsletters, the *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin election newsletters* (published by CIP), and *Mozambique News Reports and Clippings* (published by Joseph Hanlon and not linked to CIP). If you want to receive this newsletter but not the election newsletters, just reply to this e-mail with "no election" in the subject line.

=====

The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) strengthens data protection and requires that consent to receive communication must be 'freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous'. Importantly, there must be a positive opt-in as opposed to an opt-out. As you have voluntarily subscribed to our newsletters, you do not need to take any action and will continue to receive them as usual. We hold only your e-mail address and no other information about you, and we never share our subscription list with anyone.

To **unsubscribe**: [tinyurl.com/unsub-moz](https://tinyurl.com/unsub-moz)

=====□

ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED but please cite the source: "Mozambique News Reports and Clippings". Previous newsletters are posted on [bit.ly/mozamb](http://bit.ly/mozamb)

=====

## Background reading

### Special reports

#### Mozambique heroin transit trade

English - LSE - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin>

Portuguese - Pt - CIP - <http://bit.ly/HeroínaPT>

#### Gas for development?

Gas for development or just for money? 2015 [bit.ly/MozGasEng](http://bit.ly/MozGasEng)

Gas para desenvolvimento ou apenas dinheiro? 2015 [bit.ly/MozGasPt](http://bit.ly/MozGasPt)

Social protection report - 2017 Mozambique - <http://bit.ly/MozSocPro>

Special report on four poverty surveys: [bit.ly/MozPoverty](http://bit.ly/MozPoverty)

2018 Constitution - <http://bit.ly/2KF588T>

Minimum wage and exchange rates 1996-2018 -- <http://bit.ly/MinWage18>

#### \$2bn secret debt - in English

Kroll - Full report on \$2bn debt - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-Moz-full>

Kroll report summary - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-sum>

Key points of Mozambique parliament report - Nov 2016 - <http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt-En>

Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique's \$2.2 bn debt - <http://bit.ly/3WQ-hanlon>

#### In Portuguese:

Parliamentary Report on the Secret Debt (complete) [bit.ly/MozAR-debt](http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt)

**Election study collaboration:** We have detailed election data from 1999 through 2014 and are inviting scholars to use this data collaboratively. <http://bit.ly/MozElData>

Election newsletters are on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

**Eight books by Joseph Hanlon can be downloaded, free:** <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books>

Bangladesh confronts climate change (2016)

Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique (2014)

Há Mais Bicicletas – mas há desenvolvimento? (2008)

Moçambique e as grandes cheias de 2000 (2001)

Paz Sem Benefício: Como o FMI Bloqueia a Reconstrução (1997)

Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding (1996)

Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots (1991)

Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (1984)

#### Two more will be available shortly to download:

Apartheid's 2nd Front (1986)

Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000

#### These are still available for sale:

Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento (2014) (free in English)

Zimbabwe takes back its land (2013)

Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South (2010)

Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique? (2008) (free in Portuguese)

Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (1986)

=====

This mailing is the personal responsibility of Joseph Hanlon, and does not necessarily represent the views of the Open University.

=====□

-- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority in relation to its secondary activity of credit broking.